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Abstract 
 The effects of board size and board composition on various measures of firm perfor-
mance is a well researched topic in the area of corporate governance research; the main focus 
of this research has been on the US market but in the last years more research in other devel-
oped and developing economies has emerged as well. Research on board size does currently 
not exist for the German market, but board composition has been examined mainly regarding 
two unique characteristics of German supervisory boards: first, codetermination, i.e., the 
mandated employee representation, and second, the representation of bank employees on the 
board.  
 Based on the most comprehensive data set in German corporate governance research 
thus far, I consider the effects of board size and board composition on 1) market valuation and 
performance, 2) earnings management, and 3) cash holdings. The unique data set includes all 
major German listed companies from a ten year period (1998-2007, n=294, with some 2,400 
observations).  
 The results of my analyses vary: while no consistent effect of either board size or board 
composition on firm valuation and performance can be found, the latter does have a signifi-
cant impact on earnings management: female directors are associated with less earnings man-
agement. Eventually, I find lower levels of cash holdings for firms with smaller boards and 
with employee representatives on their boards.  
 The mixed results clearly show the limitations of empirical research in this area: these 
three outcomes suggest that board size and board composition should be considered carefully 
when structuring a company as well as when investing in certain firms. In contrast, the crea-
tion of a "general strategy" with regards to board size and composition is not advisable. These 
two conclusions of my research should be particularly considered when performing further 
research on this topic.   
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Zusammenfassung 
 Der Einfluss von Aufsichtsratsgröße und –zusammensetzung auf verschiedenste Größen 
der Unternehmensperformance ist vielfältig in der Forschung untersucht worden. Der Großteil 
dieser Forschung war bislang hauptsächlich auf dem amerikanischen Markt ausgerichtet. Erst 
in den letzten Jahren haben auch vermehrt Untersuchungen in weiteren Ländern stattgefun-
den. Während es keine Untersuchungen zur Auswirkung der Aufsichtsratsgröße für den deut-
schen Markt gibt, werden bezüglich der Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats in deutschen 
Unternehmen hauptsächlich zwei Charakteristika betrachtet: Zum einen die Einflüsse von 
Mitbestimmung und zum anderen die Auswirkungen von Bankenvertretern. 
 Auf Basis des bislang umfangreichsten Datensatzes, der in der deutschen Corporate 
Governance Forschung verwendet wurde, untersuche ich die Auswirkungen von Aufsichts-
ratsgröße und –zusammensetzung auf 1) Marktbewertung und Unternehmensperformance, 2) 
Manipulation von Bilanzdaten und 3) Liquiditätslevel. Dieser einzigartige Datensatz enthält 
alle großen deutschen börsennotierten Unternehmen von 1998 bis 2007 (n=294 mit etwa 
2.400 Beobachtungen).  
 Die Ergebnisse meiner Analysen sind sehr unterschiedlich: Während ich keine konsis-
tenten Auswirkungen von weder Aufsichtsratsgröße noch Aufsichtsratszusammensetzung auf 
Marktbewertung und Unternehmensperformance finden kann, hat erstere erheblichen Einfluss 
auf das Management von Bilanzdaten: Weibliche Aufsichtsratsmitglieder werden mit geringe-
rem Management von Bilanzdaten assoziiert. Weiterhin haben Firmen mit kleineren Auf-
sichtsräten und mehr Mitarbeitervertretern geringe Liquiditätsreserven.  
 Diese unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse meiner Analysen zeigen sehr deutlich die Grenzen 
von empirischen Untersuchungen in diesem Bereich der Corporate Governance Forschung 
auf: Sämtliche Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass sowohl Aufsichtsratsgröße wie auch  
-zusammensetzung genau betrachtet werden sollten, wenn man Entscheidungen diesbezüglich 
im Unternehmen zu treffen hat oder in diese investiert. Eine generelle Strategie an sich sollte 
jedoch nicht verfolgt werden. Beides sollte bei weiterer Forschung zu diesem Corporate 
Governance Thema beachtet werden. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Current newspaper headlines1 in German newspapers indicate the importance and 
prevalence of corporate governance in public policy discussion: 
"Supervisory boards are clueless" (Handelsblatt, July 10th 2009) 
 "Corporate governance commission under pressure" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
June 20th 2009) 
 "Supervisory boards caught in thicket of regulation" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
June 18th 2009) 
 "The metamorphosis of supervisory boards" (Handelsblatt, March 27th 2009) 
 "Supervisory boards comply too fast to peer pressure" (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, June 6th 2009)  
 "Employee representation makes firms profitable" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
November 1st 2009) 
 "More women and foreigners have to join supervisory boards" (Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, Mai 27th 2009) 
Major German newspapers publish numerous articles per week on corporate govern-
ance. With regards to the supervisory board, topics of discussion mainly consider transition of 
supervisory boards to a more professional body that is better capable to diligently cater super-
visory and consulting needs, especially in the wake of the current economic crisis. Thus, top-
ics as the size of the board and its composition take a prominent role in the public policy de-
bate.  
 Given this high attention of corporate governance regarding to supervisory boards in the 
public policy discussion for the past couple of years, it is surprising that academic research 
concentrating on board size and board composition has just recently picked up in the German 
                                                           
1 These headlines are translated from German language and adjusted in wording to best represent the meaning of   
the original statement 
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market. Based on the shortcomings as well as the gaps of prior research, I address the effect of 
board size and board composition in three areas in this thesis: firm valuation and firm perfor-
mance, earnings management, and cash holdings.  
 The first topic – the effect of board size and board composition on firm performance – is 
the most thorough researched area both internationally and in the German market. While prior 
research on the US market mainly finds a negative relation between board size and firm per-
formance, i.e., smaller boards are considered to be more effective in reaching decisions and 
monitoring (e.g., Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, et al. (1998)), no research of board size and 
firm performance has been available for the German market. The lack of research is mainly 
due to the fact that board size for German corporations is largely set by law, according to the 
firm's statuary capital and number of domestic employees. As the law only requires a mini-
mum number of board members firms indeed have flexibility with regards to their board size, 
which is also apparent in my extensive data set – at least 24-28% of all firms have a larger 
board than required by law2 (this is also confirmed by Gerum and Debus (2006)). Considering 
board composition, research on German boards is more elaborate than research on US boards; 
this is due to the fact of mandated employee representation (codetermination) in German su-
pervisory boards. Therefore, the role of employee representatives in boards has been re-
searched numerous times for the German market while research on the US market mainly 
considers the independence of directors (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Adams and 
Ferreira (2007), Bange and Mazzeo (2004)). While research on codetermination in Germany 
has been performed for a long time (e.g., Baums and Frick (1998), Gorton and Schmid 
(2000)) many authors (e.g., FitzRoy and Kraft (2005)) criticize that only few empirical studies 
on codetermination exist and that many of these studies have shortcomings based on the data 
or methodology used (e.g., by using cross-sectional data which does not allow to control for 
firm-specific effects). Thus, I aim to fill this gap by using the most comprehensive data set 
used in German corporate governance research to date (see description in section 4). Aside 
from firm performance the effect of board size and composition on other measures has not 
been considered thus far for the German economy.  
                                                           
2 Due to the fact that we only have the total number of employees (including international employees) as a basis 
 for calculations of the required board size and the law bases the board size on domestic employees, this per
 centage is likely to be higher.  
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 The second topic concerns the effect of board size and board composition on earnings 
management. It is quite surprising that there is little research for the German market as earn-
ings management itself is a highly discussed topic in the public debate. Aside from board 
composition in general, I research one aspect of board composition in more detail: the effect 
of female directors on earnings management. The first research in the area of corporate gov-
ernance and earnings management dates back to 1996 (Beasley (1996)), when Beasly showed 
that firms with no fraudulent accountings have a higher share of outside directors. Further 
research in this area suggests that also smaller boards and boards with members with corpo-
rate and finance backgrounds are associated with less earnings management (e.g., Klein 
(2002), Xie, et al. (2003), Cornett, et al. (2008)). Regarding literature on gender diversity re-
ferring to earnings management and corporate governance only few studies are available: 
While one article is available on gender diversity and earnings management for the US 
(Parsons and Krishnan (2006)) find that gender diversity is positively related to earnings qual-
ity), slightly more work is available on corporate governance and gender diversity in general; 
once again the focus of this work has been the US market: Carter, et al. (2003) find a positive 
relation between percentage of women and ethnic minorities and firm value. Furthermore, 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) research the probability of the addition of a female director and 
most recent Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female board members have a positive effect 
on board inputs, e.g., attendance, and firm outcomes. I aim to fill the gap of research on the 
German market with my second topic, again using the same comprehensive data set that is 
mentioned in section 4.  
 Eventually, I consider the third topic – cash holdings –, which is highly relevant in the 
context of corporate governance but has thus far not received much attention concerning the 
German market. Cash holdings have been of interest in academia for a very long time; Keynes 
already described in 1936 possible motives for holding cash (Keynes (1936)). Motives de-
scribed by Keynes are nowadays considered a central part in the principal-agent conflict be-
tween shareholders and managers:  
 " The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it 
at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies" (Jensen (1986), p. 
323).  
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 Further research on the US market mentions numerous ways to mitigate this conflict, 
e.g., by taking on debt (Jensen (1986)) or changing financial policy in general (Stulz (1990)). 
More recent research also considers stronger corporate governance as a way to reduce the cost 
of this conflict. Multinational studies argue that this conflict is less in countries with higher 
levels of investor protection (e.g., Dittmar, et al. (2003), Pinkowitz, et al. (2006)). Further 
research on the US market confirms that stronger firm-level corporate governance leads to 
lower cash holdings and higher valuations of excess cash (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007), Harford, et al. (2008)). Most studies on the European market focus on ownership con-
centration (e.g., Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)), but no research regard-
ing to board size and board composition is available. In this case as well I aim to fill the gap 
in research and provide further insights.  
 Given the public debate and prior research on the above discussed topics, this thesis 
provides significant additions to the corporate governance research in general, and especially 
to the research on the German market leading to important implications for policy makers and 
further research. 
  
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   
 
Page 15
2. Structure of the Thesis 
 This thesis consists of four self-contained articles covering the three above mentioned 
topics – researching the effect of board size and board composition on various dependent var-
iables. While all papers have their own focus, they are based on the same comprehensive data 
set, which is described in the first of the four articles. This approach enables me to separately 
publish all of the articles in academic journals as well as the presentation of these articles at 
academic conferences3. One drawback of this approach is that some of the content with re-
gards to the data set used and the institutional background are somewhat redundant or overlap 
in the four articles presented below. Furthermore, the second and third article (sections 5 and 
6) are written in collaboration with Professor Bernd Frick and thus are written in plural voice. 
 The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Section 3 gives a brief overview 
over the unique institutional setting for German supervisory boards; the articles themselves 
are presented in section 4, 5, 6 and 74. Finally, section 8 concludes with a summary and dis-
cussion of the results, managerial implications and directions for future research.  
  
                                                           
3 Thus far, the second paper has been presented by me at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Economics and 
 Finance 2010, Houston, USA, and at the 49th annual meeting of the Southwestern Finance Association 2010, 
 Dallas, USA, a modified German version of it "Mitbestimmung und Unternehmensperformance: Der Einfluss 
 von Arbeitnehmervertretern im Aufsichtsrat auf den Unternehmenswert" has been presented by Prof. Dr. Bernd 
 Frick at the 13. Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie, Trier 2010 and at the Workshop der Kommission Organi
 sation 2010 of the Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft (VHB) Berlin. This German version is 
 accepted for publication in "Die Betriebswirtschaft". The second paper has been under review of the Academy 
 of Management Journal and has unfortunately been rejected after the first round due to the fact that it was  
 considered to be too empirical for the journal. 
4 All articles are presented as submitted to the respective journals with the exception of the abstract, which has 
 been omitted in this thesis, and the references, which are presented consolidated at the end of this dissertation.  
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3. Institutional Background 
 The German system of corporate governance differs fundamentally from the Anglo-
American one: while the latter has a one-tier board structure, a publicly held German compa-
ny (Aktiengesellschaft) has two boards: a management board (Vorstand), which is responsible 
for running the firms operations and setting its strategy, and a supervisory board (Aufsichts-
rat), which has supervisory and consulting duties and sets the remuneration of the manage-
ment board and appoints its members. In addition, the management board reports to the su-
pervisory board and no member of each board can be a member of the other board at the same 
time. Eventually, an array of laws sets the minimum and maximum sizes of the German su-
pervisory board as well as the composition requiring employee representation for certain 
firms5. 
 Besides the differences in the setup, the German corporate governance system also dif-
fers significantly from the Anglo-American counterpart regarding its goal: the German system 
tries to take the views of all stakeholders into consideration when making corporate decisions 
(see Fauver and Fuerst (2006)) whereas the Anglo-American system mainly tries to mitigate 
agency problems and thus to maximize shareholders' wealth (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  
  
                                                           
5 More detailed information is set forth in the respective sections of the articles in section 5,6, and 7 of this the
 sis. 
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   
 
Page 17
4. A Comprehensive Data Set on German Supervisory Boards 
4.1. Introduction 
 Corporate governance is prevalent in public policy discussion in Germany. Major Ger-
man newspapers currently publish numerous articles per week on corporate governance. With 
regards to the supervisory board, topics of discussion mainly consider transition of superviso-
ry boards to a more professional body that is more capable to diligently cater supervisory and 
consulting needs, especially in the wake of the current economic crisis. Thus, topics as the 
size of the board and its composition are a focus of the public policy debate.  
 Board composition is one of the major concerns of the German corporate governance 
code commission; the most recent version of the German corporate governance code (Regier-
ungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (2009)) has several additions that 
demand diversity, sufficient knowledge and an age cap, which is to be set by the respective 
firm. Furthermore, it limits the number of additional outside board memberships to three and 
sets limitations to impede the change of managing board members to the supervisory board.  
 The discussion of board size has been a heated one in the political arena: since the in-
troduction of the European stock corporation (Gesetz zur Einführung Gesellschaft (SEEG), 
Bundesministerium für Justiz (2004)) in Germany in 2004, which allows companies to adopt 
the above mentioned legal form and set the size of their board according to their statutes. This 
enabled, for example, the largest German insurer Allianz to reduce their board from 20 to 10 
members. During the election campaign for the German parliament in 2009 the German Lib-
eral Party (FPD) even postulated a reduced board size for all corporations to 12 members 
(Freie demokratische Partei (2009)) along with the Federation of German Industries (as the 
BDI president Michael Rogowski expressed6: "Supervisory boards, which are equally com-
posed of employee and shareholder representatives, with up to 20 members are fairly ineffec-
tive", Stern, December 21st 2004).  
 Given the high attention of corporate governance regarding to supervisory boards in the 
public policy discussion for the past couple of years, it is surprising that the academic re-
search concentrating on board size and board composition has just recently picked up in the 
                                                           
6 Quote translated from German language 
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German market. To enhance current research in this area I compiled a comprehensive dataset, 
which provides detailed information on supervisory boards of the largest German listed com-
panies.  
4.2. Dataset 
 
4.2.1. Description 
Datasets used in previous research on German supervisory boards are mainly cross-
sectional, i.e.,  not allowing to control for any changes over time (e.g., Fauver and Fuerst 
(2006), Gorton and Schmid (2004)). To enhance this shortcoming, the data set I collected is a 
time series and includes all publicly listed German companies that were listed for at least one 
year in one of the three main German stock market indices - DAX, MDAX, or SDAX;  these 
are constituted of the German public companies with the largest market capitalization – dur-
ing the period 1998-2007. Only those companies with at least two years of available data were 
included in the database. As I was not able to obtain annual reports for one or more years for 
seven companies, the initial sample consists of 2,476 observations from 306 companies.  
The data set consists of all names, job titles, PhD titles, an indication if the member is 
chairman, vice chairman, employee representative, union representative, works council repre-
sentative, bank representative, former managing board member, female, auditor or a lawyer. 
Furthermore, I collected information on the number of outside board memberships in the re-
spective year7 for each member and noted which union type and organization a union repre-
sentative belonged to. All this data was consolidated on a firm and year level and then used as 
the basis for my research. In my various research efforts based on this data set I enhanced it 
by variables used as dependent and further explanatory variables such as firm performance 
(based on both stock market and accounting measures) and numerous accounting measures 
and further firm characteristics. Table 1 provides an overview and a description of the main 
variables used.  
 
 
Table 1:  Description of main variables 
                                                           
7 Both measured within the database, i.e., for all DAX, MDAX, SDAX companies, as well as provided in the 
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4.2.2. Sources 
All data on supervisory board composition was hand-collected from annual reports of 
the respective firms. Reports not available from the company's website were obtained from 
the investor relations department, the annual report database of the Schutzgemeinschaft der 
Kapitalanleger e.V. as well as various archives in Germany (Archive of the Bavarian Cham-
bers of Commerce, Archive of the University of Bremen, Archive of the University of Co-
logne). Finally, if no reports were available, data for supervisory board composition was as-
sembled using the Hoppenstedt Jahrbuch der Großunternehmen. Measures of accounting per-
formance as well as business and geographic segment data were obtained from Thomson Reu-
ters Worldscope. Accounting data that was missing in Worldscope was taken from the com-
panies’ annual reports. The data on market capitalization comes from Datastream. Finally, I 
added information on specific company events (restructurings, mergers & acquisitions) fol-
lowing an extensive press search.  
4.2.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 The supervisory boards of the largest German listed companies are subject to quite sig-
nificant changes during the time period of my observation from 1998 to 2007. Especially with 
the introduction of the German corporate governance code and with changes in taxation (both 
in 2002), which allowed banks to divest their equity holdings without paying taxes on capital 
gains, the structure and composition of German supervisory boards changed. Another big 
change was the introduction of the European stock corporation (Societas Europaea) in 2004. 
These changes in the institutional landscape also had an effect on the size and composition of 
the supervisory boards: as Figure 1 shows, the average board size has declined from 10.7 
members in 1998 to 9.5 members in 2007. This does not hold for the 156 firms, which are 
represented for ten years in my data set; the average board size first increases from 10.5 in 
1998 to 11.0 in 2002 and then decreases again to 10.6 in 2007 – much likely due to the above 
described institutional changes in Germany.  
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Figure 1: Development of average board members 
 
Source: Annual reports 
 The same effect is visible when considering the share of employee representatives (see 
Figure 2): as the average share of total board members declines from 34% in 1998 to 28% in 
2007. Once again, the same does not hold for the 10-year firms as the share of employee rep-
resentatives is about stable at 34% (with a peak of 36% in 2002).  
Figure 2: Development of employee representatives  
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 The development of increasingly smaller boards with less employee representatives is 
also apparent, when considering the share of union representatives, which is also declining (as 
shown in Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Development of union representatives 
 
Source: Annual reports 
 One central postulation of the German corporate governance code (Regierungskommis-
sion Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (2009)) was to limit the influence of former 
managing board members which usually “moved” up to the supervisory board after their term 
in the management board had ended. To provide a more independent view and to weaken "old 
boys" networks, the code suggests that "Management Board members may not become mem-
bers of the supervisory board of the company within two years after the end of their appoint-
ment unless they are appointed upon a motion presented by shareholders holding more than 
25% of the voting rights in the company" (German Corporate Governance (2009): 10). The 
reality shows a different picture though: as Figure 4 shows the share of former managing 
board members has risen for both all firms as well as the 10-year firms. While it increased 
from 3.5% to 3.9% for all firms, it rose even more for the 10-year firms from 3.6% to 4.6%.  
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Figure 4: Share of former managing board members 
 
Source: Annual reports 
 One area where the institutional changes are very obvious, is the share of bank repre-
sentatives; as Figure 5 shows the share declined for both the entire sample as well as for all 
10-year firms; the share for all firms decreased from 7.8% in 1998 to 5.6% in 2007.  
Figure 5: Share of bank representatives 
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 While share of female board members in German supervisory boards has increased as 
well (from 7.2% to 8.0% for all firms), it still lags behind the international average, and is at 
about average in Europe (see section 6.2. for more detail). It remains to be seen if the recent 
change to the German corporate governance code (in the latest version of June 2009 the code 
now includes that "attention shall also be paid to […] diversity") will cause more significant 
changes to the share of female directors.  
Figure 6: Share of female board directors  
 
Source: Annual reports 
 Another area where the German corporate governance code has been effective is the 
number of outside supervisory board mandates. The code suggests that "Members of the Man-
agement Board of a listed company shall not accept more than a total of three Supervisory 
Board mandates in non-group listed companies" (Regierungskommission Deutscher Corpo-
rate Governance Kodex (2009), p. 10). As Figure 7 shows the number of outside supervisory 
board memberships has decreased from 5.6 to 3.0 for all firms in the dataset (the average has 
decreased from 5.5 to 3.6 for all 10-year firms).  
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Figure 7: Number of outside board memberships  
  
Source: Annual reports 
 Finally, the share of board members with PhDs (which includes honorary PhDs) has 
also decreased in recent years (from 34% to 32% for all firms – see Figure 8) but remains 
relatively high with 32%.  
Figure 8: Share of board members with PhDs 
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 All of the above mentioned characteristics of German supervisory boards are again 
summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Composition of German supervisory boards 
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 One further advantage of this dataset is that I observe firms over an extended period of 
time (up to ten years). During this time period many of the firms have experienced changes in 
the characteristics relevant to employee representation and board size, i.e., either increased or 
decreased the number of employees around the different legal threshold levels (see Table 3 
and Table 4). This considerable number of companies changing their “codetermination status” 
allows using fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved heterogeneity when analyzing 
this data set. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on changes in the number of employees, size of superviso-
ry board, and employee representation 
  
 Note: Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on changes in the number of employees, size of supervisory 
board, and employee representation for a sample consisting of all German firms listed in the DAX, MDAX, or 
SDAX for the years 1998 to 2007.  Foreign companies, financial companies and KGaAs were excluded from this 
analysis. The board size and composition data is obtained from annual reports, data on the number of employees 
is obtained from Datastream. Number of employees is total number of employees, thus including both domestic 
and international employees. The number of domestic employees though is the only relevant number for laws 
requiring a certain size and composition of the board; therefore, I expect more companies with changes to em-
ployee representation. Thresholds for size and employee representation are below 500, between 500 and 2,000, 
and above 2,000 employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of change 
# 
companies     
      
Change in number of employees from …       
less than 500 to more than 500 24     
less than 500 to more than 2,000 1     
less than  2,000 to more than 2,000 34     
more than 2,000 to less than 2,000 23     
more than 2,000 to less than 500 2     
more than 500 to less than 500 11     
Total 95     
      
Change in size of supervisory board       
Increase in size 56     
Decrease in size 47     
Total 103     
      
Change in employee representation from …       
no representation to one-third representation 3     
one-third representation to no representation 3     
no representation to one-half representation 7     
one-half representation to no representation 3     
one-third representation to one-half representation 9     
one-half representation to one-third representation 12     
Total 37     
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Table 4: Companies with changes in the form of codetermination during the years  
1998-2007 
  Number of years (duration of cluster affiliation) 
Type of change / company Total 
No code-
termina-
tion 
1/3 code-
termina-
tion 
1/2 code-
termina-
tion 
Other form of 
codetermina-
tion 
No codetermination to 1/3 codetermination 3     
DAB BANK AG  1 3  5 
GERRY WEBER AG  1 9   
HACH AG  1 2   
1/3 codetermination to no codetermination 3     
ADCAPITAL AG  5 5   
AGIV REAL ESTATE AG  2 1 3  
LOEWE AG  7 2   
No codetermination to 1/2 codetermination 7     
CINEMAXX AG  1  9  
DÜRR AG  3  7  
KAMPS AG  1  4  
MATERNUS KLINIKEN AG  4  6  
MEDICLEAN AG  2  6  
SCHLOTT AG  2  8  
WCM BETEIL.U.GRUNDBESITZ AG  3  7  
1/2 codetermination to no codetermination 3     
CURANUM AG  1 1 4 4 
VARTA AG  5  5  
W.E.T. AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS AG  5  5  
1/3 codetermination to 1/2 codetermination 9     
D+S EUROPE AG   6 2  
EDSCHA AG   4 1  
GRAMMER AG   2 8  
HUGO BOSS AG   7 3  
MÜNCHENER RÜCKVERSICHER-
UNGS-GES. AG   1 9  
SARTORIUS AG   4 6  
STO AG   4 6  
VOGT ELECTRONIC AG   5 5  
VOSSLOH AG   4 5  
1/2 codetermination to 1/3 codetermination 12     
AGIV REAL ESTATE AG  2 1 3  
CURANUM AG  1 1 4 4 
DEUTSCHE STEINZEUG AG   2 8  
DYCKERHOFF AG   2 8  
ELEXIS AG   6 3  
HERLITZ AG   1 8 1 
HOLSTEN BRAUEREI AG   1 7  
IVG AG   2 8  
MOEBEL WALTHER AG   1 9  
TA TRIUMPH-ADLER AG   3 7  
VOGT ELECTRONIC AG   5 5  
VOSSLOH AG   6 4  
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4.3. Conclusion 
 This unique data set on the composition of German supervisory board allows to advance 
research on corporate governance in many fields. Research based on this data set (e.g., sec-
tions 5,6 and 7 of this thesis as well as Bermig & Frick (2011a), Bermig & Frick 2011b), 
Balsmeier et al. (2011) ) have shown interesting results. Further additions to the data set cre-
ate even more potential to detail the current research on German corporate governance. En-
hancing the data by managing board member data or even further detailing the information on 
supervisory board members (e.g., age, education) would provide an even larger ground for 
further research. 
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5. Board Size, Board Composition and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from 
Germany 
5.1. Introduction 
In this paper we analyze the effect of board size and board composition on the valuation 
and performance of German companies during the period 1998-2007. Our main result is that 
no consistent effect can be demonstrated. Moreover, the results are rather sensitive to the 
model specification used. Overall, we argue that due to the sensitivity of our results, recom-
mendations relying on previous empirical research on the influence of board size and compo-
sition are premature at best. Thus, more empirical work is urgently required to inform and 
guide the political debate.  
 The influence of board size and board composition on firm valuation and performance 
has been an issue in the financial as well as the organizational economics literature (for a re-
cent review see Adams, et al. (2010)). Most of the research has focused on the optimal size 
and structure of corporate boards in the US market as a value-creating mechanism because a 
board structure approaching the optimum is assumed to reduce agency costs caused by the 
separation of ownership and control (i.e., Shleifer & Vishny (1997)). Research from Germany 
has so far mainly focused on two aspects of board composition: First, on employee represen-
tation and, second, on the role of bank representatives in supervisory boards (for a review see 
Frick & Lehmann (2005)).  
 Employee representation on corporate boards, also known as codetermination, has been 
discussed for quite some time (Jensen & Meckling (1979)), but only a few empirical studies 
exist that examine this issue (see e.g., Baums & Frick (1998); Fauver & Fuerst (2006); Gorton 
& Schmid (2004)). Most of these empirical studies are either based on small samples with a 
limited number of observations or on cross-sectional data that does not allow to control for 
unobserved firm effects8. In addition, none of these studies examine the impact of codeter-
mined boards on operational performance and the market valuation of the same panel of 
firms. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that the available evidence remains ambiguous at 
best.  
                                                           
8 As criticized by FitzRoy and Kraft (2005). 
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 The role of bank representatives on German boards has also been an area of continuing 
debate in the finance and organization literature. Early studies discussed possible advantages 
of the German bank-based system over the Anglo-Saxon market-based financial system. 
Banks were considered to have a longer term view on investment and, at the same time, to 
provide financial market expertise and better corporate governance (see e.g., Mayer (1988)). 
The more recent literature, in turn, studied in more detail the role of banks in corporate gov-
ernance (Gorton & Schmid (2000)), especially in the aftermath of recent initiatives of the 
German government to dissolve the “Deutschland AG” (i.e., to reduce equity cross-holdings, 
especially of bank and insurance companies in non-financial firms, as documented by 
Dittmann et al. (2010)).  
 In contrast to these two topics, related areas such as board size or the role of former 
managing board members have received little attention in research. However, since the en-
actment of the German Corporate Governance Codex in 2002 and the introduction of the Eu-
ropean stock corporation (Societas Europaea) in 2004, these topics have become part of a 
heated political debate as well.  
 The purpose of our paper is twofold: We first want to make a methodologically con-
vincing contribution to a body of literature that suffers from a number of shortcomings. We 
analyze a large and comprehensive dataset including some 300 listed German companies over 
a period of ten years (1998-2007) to provide a better and more thorough basis for discussion. 
Second, we try to contribute to the recent political debate on whether the size and the compo-
sition of company boards can reduce agency costs by improving the boards’ efficiency, there-
by improving the companies’ operating performance as well as their market valuation. 
 The German system of corporate governance differs fundamentally from its Anglo-
American counterpart: while the latter system has as its main goal the maximization of the 
returns to the firm’s shareholders and thus to mitigate agency problems (Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997)), the German system also tries to take into account the views of the remaining stake-
holders and to include their different views in corporate decision making processes (Fauver & 
Fuerst (2006)). More specifically, a publicly held German company (Aktiengesellschaft) is 
characterized by a two-tier board structure, consisting of the management board (Vorstand) 
and the supervisory board (Aufsichtrat). The management board consists of the executive di-
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rectors and is responsible for running the firm on a day-to-day basis and developing its strate-
gy. The supervisory board has, to a large extent, similar duties as the US board of directors as 
it is responsible for the remuneration of the management board and the appointment of its 
members. However, the fundamental difference is that the management board reports to the 
supervisory board and no management board member can at the same time be a member of 
the supervisory board. We agree nevertheless with Fauver & Fuerst (2006) who argue that the 
duties and responsibilities of German and American and British supervisory boards are quite 
similar.  However, whether the conclusions that have been derived from research conducted in 
the Anglo-Saxon world can be transferred to other countries or legal environments remains to 
be seen. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides a brief survey of the 
existing literature. Section 5.3 describes the legal environment in Germany and section 5.4 the 
dataset we use in our analyses. Section 5.5 summarizes the methodology and section 5.6 re-
ports our empirical findings. Finally, section 5.7 concludes.  
5.2. Board Size, Board Composition and Employee Representation:  
A Review of the Literature 
 While a lot of research on the impact of board size and board composition on firm per-
formance has been published in the US, the German literature has – as mentioned above – so 
far focused on two "idiosyncrasies” that are characteristic for its financial and industrial rela-
tions system: First, employee representation (“codetermination”) and, second, bank represen-
tation on supervisory boards. In the following section we provide a brief review of the most 
recent research on the effectiveness of supervisory boards that differ in size and composition 
and then proceed with a summary of the available research on codetermination in general and 
at the supervisory board level in particular as well as on bank representation on German 
boards. 
5.2.1. Board Size, Board Composition, and Board Effectiveness 
Previous studies on group decision-making show that it is generally more difficult for 
larger groups to reach an agreement (e.g., Kogan & Wallach (1966)). Thus, final decisions of 
larger groups usually require more compromises and, therefore, tend to be less extreme than 
those made by smaller groups (Kogan & Wallach (1966
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
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Furthermore, with respect to supervisory boards we assume that smaller boards are more ef-
fective at monitoring top managers due to lower co-ordination costs and are, therefore, better 
able to generate a superior firm performance.  This is indeed confirmed by various studies 
examining boards in US companies (e.g., Eisenberg, et al. (1998); Yermack (1996))9. Howev-
er, this view has recently been challenged by other researchers (e.g., Coles et al. (2008) and 
Dalton et al. (1999)) who argue that larger boards may improve the performance of firms re-
quiring more advice (e.g., particularly complex firms that operate in multiple segments). 
Raheja (2005) therefore argues that "optimal board size and composition are functions of the 
directors' and the firm's characteristics".  
Apart from its size, the composition of the board should also be considered when ana-
lyzing these advice requirements. Due to the clear-cut distinction between outside and inside 
directors in the “one-tier systems” that is characteristic for most Anglo-Saxon countries, re-
search has so far focused on board structure and board composition as potential determinants 
of firm performance. Assuming that independent (i.e., outside) directors are better able and 
have more incentives to monitor and supervise the firm’s top executives, the percentage of the 
firm’s outside directors is one of the “traditional” measures of board composition. As Her-
malin & Weisbach (2003) demonstrate in their survey of the literature, no statistically signifi-
cant impact of a firm’s number and/or percentage of outside directors on firm performance 
(be it accounting measures, share prices or firm valuation) has yet been found. Although new 
rules and regulations passed in the year 2002 require companies that are listed at US stock 
exchanges to have a majority of independent directors, the major weakness of the available 
research on the impact of “independent” directors on firm performance has been and contin-
ues to be that the degree of independence is unobservable and that the choice of directors is 
endogenous (Hermalin & Weisbach (2003)). In their survey of the most recent research, Coles 
et al. (2008) confirm the persistence of these problems and again fail to find a statistically 
significant influence of board composition on firm performance. This is once more consistent 
with Raheja (2005) who argues that "the optimal board structure is determined by the trade-
off between maximizing the incentive for insiders to reveal their private information, mini-
mizing coordination costs among outsiders and maximizing the ability of outsiders to reject 
inferior projects". 
                                                           
9 Kini et al. (1995) demonstrate that board size is usually reduced following a takeover. 
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The “missing link” between board size, board composition, and firm performance may 
be board effectiveness. While most of the research on board effectiveness in the US reports 
mixed findings (e.g., Bange & Mazzeo (2004);  Kaplan (1994); Morck, et al. (1989)) shows 
that German supervisory boards are effective in the sense that they quickly replace executives 
when firm performance has been poor or started to deteriorate.  
5.2.2. Employee Representation on Corporate Boards 
5.2.2.1. Conflicting Theoretical Positions 
 Since the early 1950s the size and the composition of German supervisory boards is to a 
large extent regulated by law (see section 5.3). Not surprisingly, this regulation has always 
been and remains to be a highly controversial issue. Two broad arguments have been directed 
against laws that mandate the participation of employee or union representatives in the deci-
sion-making of corporate boards. One argument rests on political economy considerations, the 
other on the logic of profit maximization. The political economy argument for rejecting legal 
intervention has been summarized by Furubotn (1988: 178) as follows: 
“Efforts by governments to … reshape the firm have not led to particularly desirable re-
sults. The approach taken has emphasized the “political” aspect of the firm and the im-
portance of corporate governance while failing to give much attention to broader economic 
issues and to the relation between the firm’s total property-rights structure and its perfor-
mance. By granting workers major control rights without regard to their actual investment 
position in the firm, state programs have violated an important rule for ensuring rational al-
location – namely, the rule that those making decisions should bear the full costs of the de-
cisions they make. This defect, together with the costly system used to apportion the firm’s 
quasi rents between workers and stockholders, means that the orthodox co-determined firm 
does not possess a truly efficient organizational structure”. 
The market-oriented case against mandated codetermination is nicely summarized in the 
following quote from Jensen and Meckling’s seminal paper (1979: 474):  
„If codetermination is beneficial to both stockholders and labor, why do we need laws 
which force firms to engage in it? Surely, they would do so voluntarily. The fact that 
stockholders must be forced by law to accept codetermination is the best evidence we have 
that they are adversely affected by it”. 
However, there are equally plausible arguments that even though mandated codetermi-
nation may be able to provide gains to both workers and firms, it could still be underprovided 
by the market. If, for example, workers invest in the acquisition of firm-specific human capi-
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tal (i.e., if they engage in “durable reliance investments”) the firm’s profits are likely to in-
crease. In a world of informational asymmetries, however, the firm may be unable to check on 
the extent to which workers are making that kind of an investment. Moreover, workers may 
be reluctant to invest in firm-specific skills for an obvious reason: 
„Workers who undertake durable reliance investments commit themselves to the firm for 
some time into the future and are, therefore, vulnerable. The distribution of the firm’s qua-
si-rents and the value of the labor assets can be affected by the behavior of other members 
of the coalition. Hence, the possibility exists that worker-investors, if unprotected by insti-
tutional or contractual safeguards, may be exploited and suffer serious economic injury” 
(Furubotn 1988: 167). 
This view has been further developed by Levine & Tyson (1990) who argue that worker 
participation will be underprovided by the market if firms find themselves in a prisoner’s di-
lemma: All firms would benefit if they introduced worker participation, but codetermined 
firms require – among other things – a compressed wage structure to encourage “group cohe-
siveness” and dismissal protection to increase workers’ time horizon. Traditional firms, on the 
other hand, motivate their employees through the fear of dismissal and a sharply differentiated 
wage structure. It is unlikely that under these circumstances a participative equilibrium will 
emerge: The viability of a single codetermined firm will be threatened by adverse selection (it 
will attract the less motivated job-seekers) and an externality (its best workers will be poached 
away by traditional firms). Hence, the market will be systematically biased against codeter-
mined firms and the economy will be locked in a socially suboptimal position. Mandated co-
determination has the potential to overcome this dilemma by requiring all firms (above a cer-
tain size threshold) to introduce participatory machinery. 
“In distributional conflicts about contractually unprotected quasi-rents, it is at least opti-
mistic, if not naive, to expect an efficient voluntary agreement about the firm’s constitu-
tion. A selfish rational agent will prefer a constitution that strengthens his absolute position 
in ex post bargaining, even if this is detrimental to the firm value. One cannot then expect 
an efficient constitution of the corporation as a result of a bargaining process between co-
specialised investors” (Sadowski, et al. (1999)). 
Summarizing, theory offers no definitive guidance as to the likely effects of mandated 
codetermination, i.e., worker representation on corporate boards. The beneficial and the det-
rimen tal effects of codetermination must therefore be demonstrated empirically. Before turn-
ing to our empirical investigation (sections 5.4-5.6 below) we first provide a brief summary of 
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the existing literature (sections 5.2.2.2. and 5.2.3.) and a description of the institutional set-up 
(section 5.3). 
5.2.2.2. Employee Representation on Corporate Boards: The Evidence  
 Given the highly controversial discussion it is certainly surprising that so far only a lim-
ited number of studies have been published that analyze the impact of employee representa-
tives on corporate boards on company performance. The majority of the available studies 
have major shortcomings, such as the use of cross-sectional data that does not allow to control 
for firm-specific effects (see FitzRoy & Kraft (2005)). This section provides an review of the 
recent literature on codetermination and employee representation at the board level (see also 
Table 5; a comprehensive survey of the earlier literature can also be found in Baums & Frick 
(1998), who argue that the results of most studies are "controversial and inconclusive"). 
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Table 5: Summary of current research on the impact of employee representation (code-
termination) on firm performance in Germany 
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More recent research about codetermination in Germany yields the same mixed results: 
Based on an event study (n=28 court decisions) Baums & Frick (1998) report that the expan-
sion of codetermination does not lead to financial losses for shareholders. Schmid & Seger 
(1998), however, find a negative impact of codetermination (n=160 firms). According to their 
estimates firms with codetermined boards (i.e., those with half of the members being employ-
ee representatives) are valued 18% less than firms with one-third codetermination. Similar 
effects are found by Gorton & Schmid (2000) who examine two samples of companies before 
1975 and after 1986 the introduction of the codetermination law in 1976 (Mitbes-
timmungsgesetz). Here the market-to-book ratio turns out to be almost 16% lower in codeter-
mined firms than in one-third codetermined ones. In a further empirical study Gorton & 
Schmid (2004) find even stronger negative results of codetermination: Using a dataset that 
includes the 250 largest listed German companies over the period 1989-1993 they estimate 
that the value of codetermined firms is – on average – 31% lower than that of firms that are 
subject to one-third codetermination only. On the other hand, FitzRoy & Kraft (2005) find a 
significantly positive and economically relevant effect of codetermination on sales growth 
(their sample includes 179 German firms over the years 1972-1976 and 1981-1985). Using a 
sample of 500 listed German companies in the years 2000-2004, Vitols (2006) finds that co-
determination neither has a significant effect on market valuation nor on return on equity. 
More surprising – and contrary to Schmid & Seger (1998) as well as Gorton & Schmid (2000, 
2004) – he finds that codetermined firms have significantly higher market valuations than 
firms that are subject to one-third codetermination. Similar results are reported by Fauver & 
Fuerst (2006). Based on a large dataset including 786 German firms in the year 2002, they 
find that, first, codetermination has a positive effect on market valuation and, second, that the 
optimal level of codetermination is below 50%. Finally, Renaud (2007) shows that an in-
crease of codetermination from one-third to parity has a positive impact on productivity as 
well as on profitability (his sample is particularly large with n > 12,000 firm-year-
observations). 
The two most recent studies of German codetermination once more produce incon-
sistent results: Vulcheva (2008) shows that the probability as well as the magnitude of earn-
ings management is lower for firms with employee representatives on their boards (her sam-
ple includes 672 firms in the years 1998-2006 with 3,251 firm-year-observations). Petry 
(2009), in turn, demonstrates a negative impact of codetermination in his event study that uses 
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a sample of 140 firms before and after 1976. He finds that share prices of companies that were 
affected by the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976 experienced negative returns. Moreover, using 
another sample with 90 firms in the years 1998-2008, he finds negative announcement effects 
for firms that increased the number of employee representatives on their boards and finds pos-
itive announcement effects for companies that reduced that number. Summarizing the availa-
ble evidence, it appears that a clear picture of the economic effect of codetermination on 
company performance and market valuation is still lacking.10 
5.2.3. Bank Representatives on Corporate Boards 
 The German banking system with its strong linkages between financial and non-
financial companies has been discussed extensively in the literature. This strong linkage is 
mainly due to the fact that banks take numerous roles in their relationship with non-financial 
firms: First, they act in their "typical" role as lenders, second, they are often equity owners of 
non-financial companies, and third, they exercise proxy votes from shares deposited at the 
banks by their customers. Due to their role as equity owners, banks usually place their own 
representatives on the supervisory boards of listed companies. In their role as equity owners 
and lenders, bank representatives are often considered as better monitors due to their privi-
leged access to information. Consistent with this argument, Gorton & Schmid (2000), Ed-
wards & Nibler (2000) as well as Lehmann & Weigand (2000) find that bank ownership and 
bank representation on the supervisory board positively affect firm performance. More recent 
research, however, yields different results: Dittmann et al. (2010) do not find any evidence 
that bankers are better monitors but show that bank representatives have a negative impact on 
valuation. One explanation for these incompatible findings is the changes in the institutional 
landscape in Germany. Due to a change in capital gains taxation in 2002, the average equity-
ownership of banks in non-financial companies declined from 4.1% in 1994 to 0.4% in 2005 
(Dittmann et al. (2010)). This also caused a decline in the number of board seats held by bank 
representatives from 9.6% to 5.6% between 1994-2005 as well as in the number of boards 
with bank representatives (from a high 51% to a low 33%) ((Dittmann et al. (2010)). The da-
taset we use to estimate the models presented below corroborates these results: First, the per-
                                                           
10  A rather interesting fact, which we will not discuss in more detail, is found by Boneberg (2009) and Troch 
(2009): only half of the German manufacturing and service companies with limited liability (GmbH) with 
employees from 500 to 2,000 actually do have a supervisory board.  
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centage of boards with bank representatives in all non-financial companies11 declined from 
54% in 1997 to 34% in 2007 and, second, the average number of board seats held by bankers 
decreased too (from 7.9% in 1997 to 4.5% in 2007). 
5.3. Legal Framework 
 Generally, the law for stock corporations (Aktiengesetz) stipulates a minimum number 
of 3 and a maximum of 21 seats on corporate boards depending on statutory equity capital.  
Furthermore, a set of different codetermination laws determines the size and the composition 
of the supervisory board of all private limited liability corporations  (GmbH) and publicly 
listed companies (Aktiengesellschaft)12: The Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951 requires 
that companies with more than 1,000 employees operating in the steel, mining and coal sector 
are subject to a 50% employee and 50% shareholder representation on the supervisory board 
(usually called “one-half” and/or “parity” codetermination). Depending on the statutory equity 
capital of the company and the number of its employees, the size of the board is set to either 
11, 15 or 21, always including one "neutral" member, i.e., a member that is neither a repre-
sentative of the employees nor of the shareholders. For boards with 15 and 21 members, two 
or three union members are part of the employees’ representatives. In 1976, the Montanmit-
bestimmungsgesetz was extended to companies in other industries. The new law (“Mitbes-
timmungsgesetz”) stipulates that in public companies with more than 2,000 domestic employ-
ees half of their board seats have to be filled by employee representatives. The chairperson of 
the board has two votes in a tied situation and remains a shareholder representative. Thus, this 
form of codetermination is called "quasi-parity" codetermination. To simplify the discussion, 
we will refer to this form of codetermination also as “parity” or “one-half” codetermination as 
research has demonstrated that most decisions are made in unison and that the chairperson 
rarely uses his/her second vote to outvote the employee representatives (Kommission Mitbes-
timmung (1998)). Depending on the number of employees the size of the board is either 12, 
16, or 20 for companies with domestic employment ranging from 2,000 to less than 10,000, 
10,000 to less than 20,000 and more than 20,000 respectively. Moreover, depending on the 
size of the board, two or three seats are reserved for union representatives, i.e., the seats must 
not be given exclusively to members of the works council. One of the employee representa-
                                                           
11  All companies except those with SIC industry group 6 (banks, insurance and real-estate companies); on aver-
age 199 observations per year; only domestic companies were considered. 
12  All companies which primary business is in the field of media or religious, union or political activities are not 
subject to these codetermination laws. 
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tives must also be a member of “middle management” (leitender Angestellter). Finally, all 
public companies (with the exception of those that are family-owned), which employ between 
500 and 2,000 persons, are subject to the Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz of 2004, requiring these 
companies to have at least one-third of their board seats filled with employee representatives.  
5.4. Sample Composition and Data Sources 
Our data includes all publicly listed German companies that were listed for at least one 
year in one of the three main German indices - DAX, MDAX, or SDAX which are constituted 
of the German public companies with the largest market capitalization – during the period 
1998-2007. Furthermore, only those companies with at least two years of available data were 
included in the database. As we were not able to obtain annual reports for one or more years 
for seven companies, the initial sample consists of 2,476 observations from 306 companies. 
From this initial sample we drop all companies that are incorporated as Kommanditgesell-
schaft auf Aktien (KGaA), as this is a hybrid organizational form between a partnership and a 
stock corporation, and all foreign companies as these are not subject to German law. This 
leaves us with 2,382 observations from 294 firms in our final dataset.  
All data on supervisory board composition was hand-collected from annual reports. Re-
ports not available from the company's website were obtained from the annual report database 
of the Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V. as well as various archives in Germany 
(Archive of the Bavarian Chambers of Commerce, Archive of the University of Bremen, Ar-
chive of the University of Cologne). Finally, if no reports were available, data for supervisory 
board composition was assembled using the Hoppenstedt Jahrbuch der Großunternehmen. 
Measures of accounting performance as well as business and geographic segment data were 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Accounting data that was missing in 
Worldscope was taken from the companies’ annual reports. The data on market capitalization 
comes from Datastream. Finally, we added information on specific company events (restruc-
turings, mergers & acquisitions) following an extensive press search.  
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5.5. Methodology 
 In this section we present and discuss the variables used in our estimations as well as 
the econometric model.  
5.5.1. Variables 
Our analysis comprises a series of fixed effects regressions using different measures of 
market valuation and firm performance to identify the impact of board size and board compo-
sition. To ensure the robustness of our results we use different measures of performance, 
which we assume to be complements rather than substitutes. 
As dependent variables and our preferred measures of capital market performance we 
use Tobin's Q13 (Tobin_Q) and total shareholder return (tot_ret_ind; total return including 
capital gains as well as possible dividend payments14) in our estimations; consistent with pre-
vious studies (e.g., Cheng (2008); Coles, et al. (2008); Eisenberg, et al. (1998)) we use To-
bin’s Q to measure corporate value, total shareholder return to measure stock performance 
and return on equity15 (ROE) and return on invested capital16 (ROIC) to measure accounting 
performance. The low correlation between Tobin’s Q, total share return and our accounting 
measures show that they measure different aspects of corporate performance (see table 13). 
As independent variables we use first of all board size (size) which is the absolute num-
ber of members of the supervisory board at the end of the financial year (as documented in the 
annual report). As discussed in section 5.2.1 we expect a negative effect of board size on val-
uation and performance (as demonstrated by e.g., Yermack (1996)). For boards of particularly 
complex firms, however, we expect a positive relationship between board size and valuation 
as well as performance. Most previous studies using data from Germany do not take board 
size into consideration as it is largely determined by law (see section 5.3 above). However, 
companies seem to have quite some discretion and flexibility with regard to the size of the 
                                                           
13  Calculated as follows: assetsofvalueBook
equityofvalueBookassetsofvalueBookequityofvalueMarket
sQTobin
−+
='
 
14  Total return to shareholders equals total return index on Worldscope. For easier interpretation of our results 
we re-based the index to 100 in the first year of observation 
15  Calculated as follows: Return on equity - (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Re-
quirement) / Last Year's Common Equity * 100. 
16  Calculated as follows: (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capi-
talized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s (Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term 
Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt). 
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board. Gerum & Debus (2006) for example find that 25% of listed German companies have 
larger supervisory boards than required. We make the same observation in our dataset: In eve-
ry single year of our observation period, between 24% and 28% of the boards are larger than 
required17 (with an average of 4.0 to 4.8 additional board members).  
 As measures of board composition we first discuss the variables indicating the level and 
the degree of codetermination: Union_Rep indicates the percentage of total board seats held 
by union representatives, Woco_Rep the share of works council representatives and, finally, 
Ind_Rep the respective percentage of independent employee representatives18. As the sum of 
these measures for codetermination indicates the type of codetermination (e.g., if the sum 
equals to 0.5 the company is parity-codetermined), we did not include a further measure for 
codetermination type19. With regard to the effects of codetermination on company perfor-
mance, two predictions are equally plausible: On one hand, codetermination may have a posi-
tive influence on valuation and performance because of the pronounced incentives of employ-
ee representatives to monitor management (as mentioned in section 5.2.2.). On the other, 
mandated codetermination may have a negative effect since it invites rent-seeking activities of 
employee representatives. Thus, we are unable to predict the likely outcome and have to leave 
it to the estimations.  
 To measure the influence of bank representatives who are supervisory board members 
on company performance we use in our estimations the percentage of the seats filled by bank-
ers (Bank_Rep)20. Since this available evidence is rather mixed (see section 5.2.3) we refrain 
from predicting the sign of the coefficient. As our final measure of board composition we use 
the percentage of former management board members (Former_BM). As in the case of em-
ployee representatives, their impact on capital market valuation as well as operating perfor-
mance can be either positive or a negative. Specifically, a positive impact is to be expected if 
                                                           
17  We calculated the required size based upon total employees, which include domestic and international em-
ployees; domestic employees only though are used to determine the size base on the legal requirements; thus, 
we expect this number to be lower than the actual value. 
18  Independent representatives are those who are not classified as either union representatives or works council 
representatives in the respective annual reports. 
19  We included measures for type of codetermination (one halt and one third codetermination) as additional 
variables – the results were very similar to our results described below without these measures; only the 
measure for one-half codetermination showed a significant (at 5% level) positive effect, further differences 
were only observed with the share of works council representatives which show a negative effect (significant 
at the 5% level). These results are available from the authors upon request.  
20  We call bank representatives all board members who are declared as employee of a bank or have "Banker" as 
their job title in the annual report. 
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former board members use their insider knowledge to act as diligent monitors and knowl-
edgeable advisors. Conversely, if former top managers are primarily interested in hiding mis-
takes they have made in the past, they may neglect their duties as monitors and advisors. In 
the latter case we expect a negative influence of the percentage of former board members on 
valuation and performance. 
 Assuming that monitoring skills increase with experience we control for the specific 
human capital of board members using a count variable measuring all outside supervisory 
board memberships the individual members of a particular supervisory board hold in the re-
spective year in other DAX-, MDAX- and SDAX-companies (exp_datab). 
 Company size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (log_ass) and by total 
sales (sales). Leverage measures the firm's capital structure (short term and long term debt 
divided by total assets) to control for the disciplining effect of debt (see Jensen (1986)). To 
control for growth opportunities as well as for profitability we use the share of capital expend-
itures to sales (Capex_Sales) and the operating margin (Operating_Margin). As numerous 
previous studies for the German market have repeatedly shown, companies with a more con-
centrated ownership structure are valued more highly (see e.g., Gorton and Schmid (2000)). 
Therefore, we control for “blockholding” using three different dummy variables (block_25, 
block_50, and block_75). If total ownership of blockholders (i.e., shareholders with at least 
5% of the total shares) exceeds 25%, the variable block_25 assumes the value of one (zero 
otherwise). Block_50 (block_75) assumes the value one if total blockholder ownership ex-
ceeds 50% (75%) and zero otherwise. The structure of these ownership variables is similar to 
the one used by Franks  and Mayer (2001) who argue that these three levels of ownership are 
important thresholds in Germany: ownership in excess of 25% creates a blocking minority 
which can be used, for example, to avoid issuing new shares or to dismiss supervisory board 
members. If ownership is more than 50%, it allows complete control of management, and 
with more than 75% no other blocking minority is possible.  
Since Fauver & Fuerst (2006) document a significant diversification discount for Ger-
man companies (for both, business segment and geographic diversification), we use the same 
measures (which have also been used in an earlier study on diversification discounts around 
the world by Lins & Servaes (1999)): the dummy variable ind_divers assumes the value of 
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one if less than 90% of a company’s sales can be attributed to a single four-digit SIC segment. 
To measure geographic diversification we use the dummy variable geo_divers, which as-
sumes the value of one if less than 90% of a company’s sales can be attributed to one geo-
graphic segment as defined by Worldscope. We control for industry concentration and compe-
tition with a sales-based Herfindahl-index (herfindahl) measuring the degree and the intensity 
of competition in the main industry segment of the companies21. 
 Finally, we control for the occurrence of exceptional events with two additional dummy 
variables: Restruct assumes the value one if the company is in a phase of restructuring while 
m_and_a assumes the value one if the company has been taken over in the year of interest. In 
addition to the control variables discussed above we also enter in our estimations industry 
dummies based on two-digit SIC codes to control for industry-specific effects and year dum-
mies to control for any changes over time. Table 6 provides a description of the main varia-
bles used, table 7 provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables. 
Extremely small values are caused by holding companies, companies that have just been 
founded or even companies that are in financial distress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
21  We calculated this sales-based Herfindahl index using the sales of the all companies, which were available on 
Worldscope for the respective year. The calculation is based on the main SIC-segment of all companies. 
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Table 6: Description of main variables 
 
V
a
r
ia
b
le
 
N
a
m
e
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 
n
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
 
 
 
T
ob
in
's
 Q
 
to
bi
n_
q 
(M
ar
ke
t c
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n 
+
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s 
- 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r's
 e
qu
it
y)
 / 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e/
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
T
ot
al
 r
et
ur
n 
to
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
to
t_
re
t_
in
d 
In
de
xe
d 
to
ta
l r
et
ur
n 
to
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
(i
nd
ex
 s
et
 to
 1
00
 in
 f
ir
st
 y
ea
r)
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s:
 
to
ta
l r
et
ur
n 
(t
) 
=
 to
ta
l r
et
ur
n 
(t
-1
) 
* 
(p
ri
ce
(t
) 
/ p
ri
ce
 (
t-
1)
)*
 (
1+
di
vi
de
nd
 
yi
el
d)
*(
1/
nu
m
be
r 
of
 w
or
ki
ng
 d
ay
s)
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e/
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 e
qu
it
y 
ro
e 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 e
qu
it
y 
- 
(N
et
 I
nc
om
e 
be
fo
re
 P
re
fe
rr
ed
 D
iv
id
en
ds
 -
 P
re
fe
rr
ed
 
D
iv
id
en
d 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t)
 / 
L
as
t Y
ea
r's
 C
om
m
on
 E
qu
it
y 
* 
10
0 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 in
ve
st
ed
 c
ap
it
al
 
ro
ic
 
(N
et
 I
nc
om
e 
be
fo
re
 P
re
fe
rr
ed
 D
iv
id
en
ds
 +
 (
(I
nt
er
es
t E
xp
en
se
 o
n 
D
eb
t -
 
In
te
re
st
 C
ap
it
al
iz
ed
) 
* 
(1
-T
ax
 R
at
e)
))
 / 
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
L
as
t Y
ea
r's
 a
nd
 C
ur
re
nt
 
Y
ea
r’
s 
(T
ot
al
 C
ap
it
al
 +
 L
as
t Y
ea
r's
 S
ho
rt
 T
er
m
 D
eb
t &
 C
ur
re
nt
 P
or
ti
on
 o
f 
L
on
g 
T
er
m
 D
eb
t)
 *
 1
00
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
 
 
 
S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 s
iz
e 
si
ze
 
S
iz
e 
of
 s
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
un
io
n 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s 
un
io
n_
re
p 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
un
io
n 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s 
of
 to
ta
l b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
w
or
ks
 c
ou
nc
il
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s 
w
oc
o_
re
p 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
w
or
ks
 c
ou
nc
il
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
to
ta
l b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s 
in
d_
re
p 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t e
m
pl
oy
ee
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
to
ta
l b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
ba
nk
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 
ba
nk
_r
ep
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
ba
nk
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
to
ta
l b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
fo
rm
er
 b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
 
fo
rm
er
_b
m
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
fo
rm
er
 m
an
ag
in
g 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
to
ta
l b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 
C
um
ul
at
ed
 n
um
be
r 
of
 f
ur
th
er
 s
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 m
em
be
rs
hi
ps
 o
f 
al
l m
em
be
rs
 
in
 li
st
ed
 G
er
m
an
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 (
D
A
X
, M
D
A
X
, S
D
A
X
) 
in
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
e 
ye
ar
 
23
82
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
T
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
lo
g_
as
se
ts
 
L
og
ar
it
hm
 o
f 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
S
al
es
 
sa
le
s 
N
et
 s
al
es
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
In
du
st
ri
al
 d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
on
 
in
d_
di
ve
rs
if
ie
rd
 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 m
ax
. 9
0%
 o
f 
to
ta
l s
al
es
 a
re
 f
ro
m
 o
ne
 S
IC
-
se
gm
en
t 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e/
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
on
 
ge
o_
di
ve
rs
if
ie
d 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 m
ax
. 9
0%
 o
f 
to
ta
l s
al
es
 a
re
 f
ro
m
 o
ne
 g
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
se
gm
en
t (
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 b
y 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e)
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e/
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
C
om
pe
ti
ti
ve
 in
te
ns
it
y 
he
rf
in
da
hl
 
S
al
es
-b
as
ed
 H
er
fi
nd
ah
l-
in
de
x 
ba
se
d 
on
 2
-d
ig
it
 S
IC
 in
du
st
ry
-c
od
es
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e/
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
 
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   
 
Page 49
 
 T
ab
le
 2
 (
co
nt
in
ue
d)
 
 
 
 
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 
N
a
m
e
 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 
n
 
S
o
u
rc
e 
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
(c
o
n
t’
d
) 
 
 
 
 
B
lo
ck
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
>
25
%
 
ho
ld
in
gs
 
bl
oc
k_
25
 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 t
he
 c
um
ul
at
ed
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
bl
oc
kh
ol
de
rs
 
(s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
>
5%
 h
ol
di
ng
s)
 is
 la
rg
er
 t
ha
n 
25
%
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
B
lo
ck
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
>
50
%
 
ho
ld
in
gs
 
bl
oc
k_
50
 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 t
he
 c
um
ul
at
ed
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
bl
oc
kh
ol
de
rs
 
(s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
>
5%
 h
ol
di
ng
s)
 is
 la
rg
er
 t
ha
n 
50
%
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
B
lo
ck
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
>
75
%
 
ho
ld
in
gs
 
bl
oc
k_
75
 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 t
he
 c
um
ul
at
ed
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
bl
oc
kh
ol
de
rs
 
(s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
>
5%
 h
ol
di
ng
s)
 is
 la
rg
er
 t
ha
n 
75
%
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
F
in
an
ci
al
 le
ve
ra
ge
 
le
ve
ra
ge
 
(S
ho
rt
 te
rm
 d
eb
t +
 lo
ng
 te
rm
 d
eb
t)
 / 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e/
 o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
/c
ap
it
al
 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
 
ca
pe
x_
sa
le
s 
C
ap
it
al
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 n
et
 s
al
es
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
O
pe
ra
ti
ng
 m
ar
gi
n 
op
er
at
in
g_
m
ar
gi
n 
O
pe
ra
ti
ng
 n
et
 i
nc
om
e 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 n
et
 s
al
es
 
23
82
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
R
es
tr
uc
tu
ri
ng
 
re
st
ru
ct
 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 is
 i
n 
a 
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g 
ph
as
e 
23
82
 
P
re
ss
 s
ea
rc
h 
M
er
ge
rs
 a
nd
 a
cq
ui
si
ti
on
s 
m
_a
nd
_a
 
D
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
, e
qu
al
s 
1 
if
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 is
 b
ei
ng
 ta
ke
n 
ov
er
 
23
82
 
P
re
ss
 s
ea
rc
h 
 
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   
 
Page 50
Table 7: Descriptive statistics (without year and industry dummies)
22
  
 Note: Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and main independent variables of our 
model. The total number of observations for ROIC is slightly reduced due to missing values. Tobin's Q is de-
fined as the market values of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity divided by the 
book value of assets, total return index is the total shareholder return (defined as capital gains as well as possible 
dividends paid; the index is re-based to 100 when the company enters the database), ROE is the return on equity 
(calculated as net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividends requirements divided by last 
year's common equity multiplied by 100), ROIC is the return on invested capital (defined as net income before 
preferred dividends + ((interest expense on debt - interest capitalized) * (1-tax rate))) divided by average of last 
year's and current year’s (total capital + last year's short term debt and current portion of long term debt). Board 
size is the size of the board, share of union representatives is the share of union representatives of total board 
members, share of works council representatives is the share of works councils representatives, and share of 
independent employee representatives the share of  independent employee representatives. Share of bank repre-
sentatives is the share of bank representatives and share of former managing the share of former managing board 
members. Further supervisory board experience is the total number of outside board memberships of  all mem-
bers in the respective year. Total assets (log) is the logarithm of total assets, sales is total sales for the respective 
year, financial leverage is defined as short term and long term debt divided by total assets, capex-to-sales ratio is 
capital expenditures divided by sales, operating margin is defined as operating income divided by sales. Block-
holders >25% equals one when blockholders (defined as shareholders with at least 5% ownership) own at least 
25%, blockholders >50% and  blockholders >75% are similarly defined. Industrially diversified equals one if the 
company is industrially diversified (not more than 90% of sales in one four-digit SIC segment) and geograph-
ically diversified equals one if the company is geographically diversified (nor more than 90% of sales in one 
geographic segment as defined by Worldcsope). Industry competitiveness is measured via the herfindahl index, a 
concentration measure for the main industry in which the company mainly operates; it is calculated based on the 
two-digit main SIC segment sales using all German  companies available on Worldscope for the respective year. 
The dummy for mergers and ac assumes one if the company if the company is in the process of being taken over, 
the dummy for restructuring assumes one if the company is in a phase of restructuring. The sample consists of all 
German companies listed in the DAX, MDAX, and SDAX for the years 1998 to 2007 with at least two years of 
available data. 
                                                           
22 The 5 extreme values at both ends of the dependent variables as well as of operating margin (i.e., the 5 high-
est and the 5 lowest values) were reduced/increased to respective 6th value; this was done to reduce the effect 
of outliers (“winzorizing”). The results of our estimations though remained similar. Appendix table 1 shows 
which values were reduced/increased and table 2 gives an example of regression results using both 
winzorized and non-winzorized values. 
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5.5.2. Econometric Methodology 
 To estimate the effect of board size and board composition on capital market valuation 
and operating performance, we estimate the following general model23:  
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 One of the main advantages of our dataset is that we observe companies over an extend-
ed period of time (up to ten years). During this time period many of the companies have expe-
rienced changes in the characteristics relevant to employee representation and board size, i.e., 
either increased or decreased the number of employees around the different legal threshold 
levels (see Tables 8 and 9). These companies are of particular interest in our context: First, the 
changes around the legal thresholds show that companies do not actively manage the number 
                                                           
23 To analyze sector specific effects of board size and composition, we extend the model to include a series of 
interaction terms (for further details see section 5.6.2.). 
Variable   Mean St.-dev. 
1. 
Quartile Median 
3. 
Quartile Minimum Maximum 
         
Tobin's Q  1.52 1.23 1.00 1.16 1.53 0.47 11.54 
Total return index  145.44 283.01 58.87 100.00 142.67 0.67 4,153.48 
ROE  -1.25 91.02 1.95 9.79 16.40 -1,162.06 482.98 
ROIC  6.68 19.56 2.69 7.45 12.58 -189.33 97.94 
Board size  9.94 5.94 6.00 9.00 12.00 3.00 21.00 
Share of union representatives  0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.30 
Share of works council representatives  0.09 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.35 
Share of independent employee 
representatives  0.15 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.50 
Share of bank representatives  0.07 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Share of former managing board members  0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.50 
Further supervisory board experience  4.17 6.64 0.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 43.00 
Total assets (log)  13.57 2.47 11.82 13.20 14.97 3.83 21.42 
Sales  5,947,970 16,500,000 144,051 563,031 2,924,071 0 162,000,000 
Financial leverage  0.27 0.21 0.09 0.24 0.40 0.00 1.71 
Capex-to-sales ratio  0.10 0.90 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.66 40.46 
Operating margin  2.13 28.28 -0.03 3.81 8.24 -341.15 94.58 
Blockholders >25%  0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Blockholders >50%  0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Blockholders >75%  0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Industrially diversified  0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Geographically diversified  0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Industry competitiveness (Herfindahl)  0.53 7.90 0.14 0.21 0.42 0.04 272.78 
Mergers & acquisition dummy  0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Restructuring dummy   0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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of employees to completely avoid or to reduce the level of codetermination. Second, the con-
siderable number of companies changing their “codetermination status” allows us to use 
fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved heterogeneity. As many authors before us, 
who used cross-sectional data or longitudinal data covering rather short periods of time, we 
would not have been able to apply this approach if relevant variables (i.e., employee represen-
tation and board size) would have been constant over time. The change of the relevant varia-
bles over time is also displayed in Table 10, which shows the overall, between and within 
variation. While the between variation is in most cases larger, we see considerable within var-
iation as well.  
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics on changes in the number of employees, size of  
supervisory board, and employee representation 
 Note: Table 8 provides descriptive statistics on changes in the number of employees, size of supervisory 
board, and employee representation for a sample consisting of all German firms listed in the DAX, MDAX, or 
SDAX for the years 1998 to 2007. The board size and composition data is obtained from annual reports, data on 
the number of employees is obtained from Datastream. Number of employees is total number of employees, thus 
including both domestic and international employees. Domestic employees though is the only relevant number 
for laws requiring a certain size and composition of the board; therefore, we expect more companies with chang-
es to employee representation. Thresholds for size and employee representation are below 500, between 500 and 
2,000, and above 2,000 employees. 
Type of change 
# compa-
nies     
      
Change in number of employees from …       
less than 500 to more than 500 24     
less than 500 to more than 2,000 1     
less than  2,000 to more than 2,000 34     
more than 2,000 to less than 2,000 23     
more than 2,000 to less than 500 2     
more than 500 to less than 500 11     
Total 95     
      
Change in size of supervisory board       
Increase in size 56     
Decrease in size 47     
Total 103     
      
Change in employee representation from …       
no representation to one-third representation 3     
one-third representation to no representation 3     
no representation to one-half representation 7     
one-half representation to no representation 3     
one-third representation to one-half representation 9     
one-half representation to one-third representation 12     
Total 37     
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Table 9: Companies with changes in the form of codetermination during the  
years 1998-2007 
  
Number of years (duration of 
cluster affiliation)   
Type of change / company Total 
No code-
termina-
tion 
1/3 code-
termina-
tion 
1/2 code-
termina-
tion 
Other form 
of codeter-
mination 
No codetermination to 1/3 codetermination 3     
DAB BANK AG  1 3  5 
GERRY WEBER AG  1 9   
HACH AG  1 2   
1/3 codetermination to no codetermination 3     
ADCAPITAL AG  5 5   
AGIV REAL ESTATE AG  2 1 3  
LOEWE AG  7 2   
No codetermination to 1/2 codetermination 7     
CINEMAXX AG  1  9  
DÜRR AG  3  7  
KAMPS AG  1  4  
MATERNUS KLINIKEN AG  4  6  
MEDICLEAN AG  2  6  
SCHLOTT AG  2  8  
WCM BETEIL.U.GRUNDBESITZ AG  3  7  
1/2 codetermination to no codetermination 3     
CURANUM AG  1 1 4 4 
VARTA AG  5  5  
W.E.T. AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS AG  5  5  
1/3 codetermination to 1/2 codetermination 9     
D+S EUROPE AG   6 2  
EDSCHA AG   4 1  
GRAMMER AG   2 8  
HUGO BOSS AG   7 3  
MÜNCHENER RÜCKVERSICHER-
UNGS-GES. AG   1 9  
SARTORIUS AG   4 6  
STO AG   4 6  
VOGT ELECTRONIC AG   5 5  
VOSSLOH AG   4 5  
1/2 codetermination to 1/3 codetermination 12     
AGIV REAL ESTATE AG  2 1 3  
CURANUM AG  1 1 4 4 
DEUTSCHE STEINZEUG AG   2 8  
DYCKERHOFF AG   2 8  
ELEXIS AG   6 3  
HERLITZ AG   1 8 1 
HOLSTEN BRAUEREI AG   1 7  
IVG AG   2 8  
MOEBEL WALTHER AG   1 9  
TA TRIUMPH-ADLER AG   3 7  
VOGT ELECTRONIC AG   5 5  
VOSSLOH AG   6 4  
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Table 10: Overall, between and within variation of main variables 
Variable   Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Tobin's Q overall 1.5 1.23 0.47 11.54 
 between  0.94 0.57 8.08 
 within  0.86 -2.54 10.96 
      
Total return 
index overall 145.4 283.01 0.67 4153.48 
 between  218.51 15.11 2974.00 
 within  190.98 -2728.56 2645.74 
      
ROE overall -1.3 91.02 -1162.06 482.98 
 between  44.87 -393.00 199.34 
 within  80.32 -1065.95 483.36 
      
ROIC overall 6.7 19.56 -189.33 97.94 
 between  11.14 -61.76 48.28 
 within  16.34 -169.01 128.76 
      
Board size overall 9.9 5.94 3.00 21.00 
 between  5.84 3.00 21.00 
 within  1.25 0.34 16.34 
      
union_rep overall 0.1 0.08 0.00 0.30 
 between  0.07 0.00 0.24 
 within  0.02 -0.11 0.20 
      
woco_rep overall 0.1 0.12 0.00 0.35 
 between  0.12 0.00 0.35 
 within  0.03 -0.15 0.31 
      
ind_rep overall 0.1 0.14 0.00 0.50 
 between  0.14 0.00 0.43 
 within  0.04 -0.25 0.41 
      
bank_rep overall 0.1 0.11 0.00 1.00 
 between  0.10 0.00 0.67 
 within  0.06 -0.35 0.65 
      
former_bm overall 0.0 0.08 0.00 0.50 
 between  0.07 0.00 0.33 
 within  0.04 -0.23 0.34 
      
experience overall 4.2 6.64 0.00 43.00 
 between  6.44 0.00 40.50 
  within   2.20 -10.83 20.17 
 
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   
 
Page 56
5.6. Results 
5.6.1. Descriptive Results 
 Table 11 and Table 12 provide a detailed description not only of the size structure, but 
also the composition of supervisory boards in German companies. Since we are the first to 
distinguish between the three different types of employee representatives (works council, un-
ion, and independent representatives), we first take a closer look at the respective shares. In 
our sample, about 65% of the firm-year-observations have boards with independent employee 
representatives (mean board size is 12.8 members). About 40% of our observations are firm 
years with works council representatives (these boards are somewhat larger with 13.9 mem-
bers). Finally, 46% of our firm-year-observations are for boards that have union representa-
tives on them. These latter boards are by far the largest (with 15.3 members). 
Banks are represented on 43% of the supervisory boards (with an average board size of 
12.2). Moreover, about 29% of all supervisory boards have former managing board members 
on them (the average size is again 12.2). As expected, companies with larger boards have a 
higher percentage of employee and bank representatives as well as former managing board 
members.  
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Table 11: Characteristics of German supervisory board size and supervisory board  
composition 
 Note: This includes boards of all German listed companies, except foreign companies, KGaAs and finan-
cial services firms. (as part of a union or representative of the executive employees). 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics on the size and composition of German corporate boards 
 Note: Table 12 provides descriptive statistics on the size and the composition of supervisory boards for a 
sample consisting of all German firms listed in the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX for the years 1998 to 2007. The 
board size and composition data is obtained from annual reports. In this table observations for firms with inde-
pendent employee representatives, works council representatives, union representatives, bank representatives, 
and former managing board members do not sum up to the number of observations for all firms as some firms 
have all of these representatives while others do not. 
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 This finding is confirmed by the Pearson correlation coefficient (see Table 13 for this 
one and for further correlations). Moreover, the size of the board is negatively correlated with 
market valuation (Tobin_Q), which is in line with prior research and our general expectations. 
Our measures of employee representation (union_rep, woco_rep, and ind_rep24) are positively 
correlated with board size and other measures of firm size (sales, log_assets), something we 
expected since the minimum levels of employee representation are determined by size and 
regulated by law. It is, therefore, not a surprise either, that the codetermination measures are 
also highly correlated with each other.   
                                                           
24  All measures of codetermination always add up to the respective form of codetermination, e.g., in the case of 
parity-codetermination to 0.5 
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Table 13: Pearson correlation 
 Note: Table 13 provides Pearson correlations between the main variables used in our model. Values in 
parentheses show the significance level **, **, and * imply statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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5.6.2. Estimation Results 
 Given the descriptive as well as the univariate evidence presented above, we expect a 
negative impact of board size and our various employee representation variables on market 
valuation and no statistically significant impact of either bank representatives or former board 
members. However, the evidence presented so far does not consider other factors that may 
have an impact on Tobin's Q or total shareholder returns, such as firm size, age, financial 
structure, operating margin, growth opportunities, diversification, and ownership structure. In 
the following section we therefore present the results of various fixed-effects regressions25 
including these controls to separate the effect of board size and board composition on firm 
valuation and performance from the impact of the “control variables”. 
 The results of our first model are displayed in Table 14, columns (1)-(4). Irrespective of 
the concrete specification of the model, board size seems to have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on Tobin's Q. The impact of an additional board member is quite signifi-
cant: based on the average Tobin’s Q of 1.52 (see table 7) an additional board member in-
creases Tobin’s Q on average by 2.9%. This result is at odds with the findings reported by 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) who both find a negative impact of board size on 
valuation in a sample of US companies. However, it confirms the results by Coles et al. 
(2008) who find that particularly complex firms with greater advising requirements benefit 
from larger boards. 
Regarding the coefficients of our control variables we can confirm a geographic but not 
an industrial diversification effect (as reported by e.g., Fauver & Fuerst (2006)); geographical 
diversification has a negative impact on valuation indicating a diversification discount (on 
average Tobin’Q is reduced by ~11% if the company  is geographically diversisified). Fur-
thermore, we are only able to find a significant, negative effect of concentrated ownership (as 
                                                           
25  Random effects estimations and OLS regressions (the latter with heteroskedasticity robust t-values) yield 
more or less identical results. These are, of course, available from the authors upon request. The same applies 
to the models we estimated using 2SLS and the Hausman-Taylor estimator to control for (potential) endoge-
neity of the codetermination variables; additionally, quantile regressions, dynamic panel estimations and the 
significance of groups of measures of board composition have been tested yielding similar results (once 
again, these are available from the authors upon request). An estimation using a clustered fixed effects esti-
mation yields similar results with less/no significance for our variables of board size and composition (size is 
not any longer significant with Tobin’s Q and Total return index as dependent variables; the same holds for 
independent employee representatives with Tobin’s Q as dependent variable; results are displayed in the ap-
pendix table 3).   
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   
 
Page 62
reported by e.g., Gorton & Schmid (2004)) for blockholders above 25% (block_25; on aver-
age Tobin’s Q is reduced by 15% if ownership is concentrated above 25%) but not for block-
holders above 50% or 75%; this could be due to the fact that concentrated ownership above 
25% is sufficient to gain certain influence and is not ‘expanded’ by ownership above 50% or 
75%. The remaining independent variables are in line with our expectations. 
 Model (2) is different from model (1) insofar as it includes our different measures of 
board composition in addition to board size. Perhaps surprisingly, the results are almost iden-
tical to the ones of model (1). Regarding our measures of employee representation, we only 
observe a statistically significant and negative effect of the percentage of independent em-
ployee representatives (ind_rep); the coefficient of the share of works council representatives 
is also negatively signed, but not significantly different from zero; the same applies to the 
share of union representatives though positively signed. Thus, according to our point estimate, 
replacing a union or a works council member of the supervisory board by an independent em-
ployee representative on a board with 10 members would be associated with a 7.5% lower 
Tobin's Q. Moreover, the percentage of former managing board members on the supervisory 
board is also statistically significant and negative implying that former board members tend to 
be less devoted and less diligent monitors. The addition of a further former managing board 
member leads – on average – to reduction of 11% in Tobin’s Q. 
 In model (3) we address the question whether the effect of board size is different across 
industries. As mentioned above, Coles et al. (2008) find that “complex firms, which have 
greater advising requirements than simple firms, have larger boards”. Since we do not have 
detailed information on the “complexity” of individual firms, we assume that particularly 
complex firms mainly occur in complex industries. We therefore introduce in our estimates a 
series of interaction terms (multiplicative combinations of board size and industry dummies, 
i.e., manufacturing (SIC 28-29 and 33-39; size_manu), trade (SIC 40-49; size_trade), and 
transport (SIC 50-59; size_transp). These industries have been identified by Fauver and 
Fuerst (2006) as sectors that are particularly complex, that is, require “greater coordination, 
labor involvement, and more specialized employee skill set”. Our results (column (3) in Table 
10) demonstrate that none of the interaction terms is statistically significant while the remain-
ing independent variables retain their magnitude as well as their level of significance. 
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Finally, in model (4) we analyze the effect of board composition on market valuation in 
particularly complex industries by again constructing interaction terms (multiplicative combi-
nations of our measures of board composition (i.e., union_rep, woco_rep, ind_rep, bank_rep, 
and former_bm) and the aforementioned industry dummies (manufacturing, trade, and 
transport)26. Only two out of 15 interaction terms are statistically significant: The share of 
former board managing board members has a significantly positive effect in manufacturing 
(former_bm_manu) as well as in trade (former_bm_trade); thus, the addition of a former 
managing board member to a board of a company in the manufacturing sector increases the 
Tobin’s Q quite significantly by 15.3% on average, and even by 30.9% for companies in the 
trade business. This confirms our expectation that in complex industries companies benefit 
from the insider knowledge of former managing board members making them diligent moni-
tors and valuable advisors.  
Considering our measures of board composition, we see that the share of works council 
representatives has a negative significant effect: the addition of a further works council repre-
sentative (as a replacement of another employee representative) leads to a reduction in To-
bin’s Q of 13.1% on average. Again the share of independent employee representatives as 
well as former managing board members is negative (with an average negative effect on To-
bin’s Q with an additional respective member of 8.4% for independent employee representa-
tives and 18.4% for former managing board members). 
The remaining independent variables once more retain their magnitude and their statis-
tical significance. 
  
                                                           
26  Yielding the following interaction terms: union_manu, union_trade, and union_transp for union representa-
tives in manufacturing, trade, and transportation respectively; woco_manu, woco_trade, and woco_transp for 
works council representatives in the three industries; ind_manu, ind_trade, and ind_transp for independent 
employee representatives in the respective industries; bank_manu, bank_trade, and bank_transp for bank 
representatives in the respective industries; finally, former_bm_manu, former_bm_trade, and for-
mer_bm_transp for former managing board members in the respective industries. 
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Table 14: Fixed-effects regression of Tobin's Q on board size and composition 
 Note: Models 1-4 of table 14 provide the results of fixed-effects regressions with Tobin's Q (defined as 
the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book 
value of assets) on variables of board size and composition and several control variables. All models include 
dummy variables for year and industry.  Z-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Tobin's Q     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
size 0.0398*** 0.0366** 0.0522*** 0.0491** 
 (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0218) 
union_rep  0.933  1.555 
  (0.901)  (1.171) 
woco_rep  -0.588  -1.989** 
  (0.700)  (0.985) 
ind_rep  -1.138**  -1.268* 
  (0.565)  (0.725) 
bank_rep  -0.386  -0.619 
  (0.327)  (0.429) 
former_bm  -1.670***  -2.798*** 
  (0.393)  (0.507) 
exp_datab  -0.00463  -0.00653 
  (0.00837)  (0.00848) 
log_ass -0.493*** -0.499*** -0.491*** -0.508*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0403) 
sales 1.48e-08** 1.48e-08** 1.50e-08** 1.47e-08** 
 (6.41e-09) (6.40e-09) (6.41e-09) (6.40e-09) 
ind_divers -0.0530 -0.0492 -0.0507 -0.0499 
 (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0563) (0.0569) 
geo_divers -0.169** -0.177** -0.172** -0.177** 
 (0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0760) (0.0767) 
herfindahl -0.00155 -0.00137 -0.00161 -0.000494 
 (0.00242) (0.00242) (0.00243) (0.00248) 
block_25 -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.234*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0661) (0.0659) (0.0661) (0.0662) 
block_50 0.0531 0.0608 0.0539 0.0552 
 (0.0723) (0.0723) (0.0725) (0.0725) 
block_75 0.00164 -0.0337 -0.000431 -0.0465 
 (0.0858) (0.0860) (0.0860) (0.0868) 
leverage -0.245 -0.199 -0.246 -0.235 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
capex_sales -0.000347 -0.00192 -0.000687 -0.00273 
 (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0216) 
operating_margin -0.00106 -0.00114 -0.00102 -0.00116 
 (0.000726) (0.000724) (0.000728) (0.000724) 
restruct -0.554*** -0.558*** -0.554*** -0.560*** 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209) 
m_and_a 0.409*** 0.362** 0.413*** 0.359** 
  (0.141) (0.143) (0.141) (0.145) 
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Table 14 (continued)       
  Dependent variable: Tobin's Q     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
size_manu   -0.0405 -0.0529 
   (0.0335) (0.0450) 
size_trade   -0.0273 0.104 
   (0.0622) (0.124) 
size_transp   -0.0173 0.0385 
   (0.0514) (0.0859) 
union_manu    -0.103 
    (2.064) 
union_trade    -6.263 
    (5.133) 
union_transp    1.390 
    (6.288) 
woco_manu    2.425 
    (1.539) 
woco_trade    2.933 
    (5.715) 
woco_transp    0.148 
    (4.365) 
ind_manu    0.866 
    (1.299) 
ind_trade    -0.793 
    (5.340) 
ind_transp    -2.233 
    (3.341) 
bank_manu    0.0369 
    (0.808) 
bank_trade    0.601 
    (1.184) 
bank_transp    1.453 
    (0.995) 
former_bm_manu    2.325*** 
    (0.896) 
former_bm_trade    4.702*** 
    (1.453) 
former_bm_transp    2.056 
    (2.352) 
Constant 8.137*** 8.507*** 8.174*** 8.537*** 
 (0.546) (0.557) (0.547) (0.576) 
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 
R² 0.165 0.175 0.166 0.186 
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 To evaluate the effect of board size and composition on performance we replace Tobin's 
Q by another measure of capital market performance, the total return to shareholders 
(tot_ret_ind). The results of the four models (that are identical to the ones reported in Table 
14) are displayed in Table 15. The result is quite surprising insofar as the effect of board size 
is completely different from the one in our estimation with Tobin's Q as the dependent varia-
ble. In model (1) to (3) board size has a significantly negative effect on total return to share-
holders (on average the total return index is 4.6% lower when an additional member is added 
to the board). This is in line with our expectations and with the findings of Yermack (1996) 
and Eisenberg et al. (1998). Another puzzling result is the statistically significant and negative 
effect of leverage and the operating margin on total shareholder return (the increase of finan-
cial leverage by one percentage point decreases the total return index by 1% on average). We 
do not have a convincing explanation for these effects and can, therefore, only refer to similar 
results reported by Loderer & Waelchli (2009).   
 In model (2) we find a similar sized statistically significant and negative effect of board 
size on total shareholder return (as mentioned above). Board composition, however, seems to 
be of minor importance, because only the percentage of former managing board members 
(former_bm) seems to affect shareholder returns in a significant and positive way (the effect 
of an additional former managing board member increases the total return index by 9.0% on 
average). This latter finding is in line with our prediction that companies may benefit from the 
insider knowledge of former managing board members, especially in their role of advisors 
(see above). The coefficients of the remaining independent variables are in line with the ones 
in model (1). 
 In model (3) we observe about the same effects as in model (2). Contrary to the findings 
reported in Table 14, however, none of the interaction terms between board size and the 
dummies for complex industries reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. 
 Finally, model (4) yields similar results as models (2) and (3). Regarding the interaction 
terms between board composition and industry, we again do not observe any statistically sig-
nificant effect of our interaction terms. The remaining interaction variables are all statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 15: Fixed-effects regression of total return to shareholders on board size and 
composition 
 Note: Models 1-4 of table 15 provide the results of fixed-effects regressions with total return to share-
holders (defined as total return including capital gains as well as possible dividend payments) on variables of 
board size and composition and several control variables. All models include dummy variables for year and 
industry.  Z-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Total Return Index     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
size -8.613*** -8.489** -8.359** -6.949 
 (2.910) (3.800) (3.657) (4.560) 
union_rep  -48.57  -205.2 
  (187.1)  (244.5) 
woco_rep  7.357  -55.18 
  (145.5)  (205.7) 
ind_rep  67.93  136.8 
  (117.4)  (151.3) 
bank_rep  62.14  31.86 
  (67.99)  (89.50) 
former_bm  112.6  138.4 
  (81.55)  (105.9) 
exp_datab  1.468  1.314 
  (1.739)  (1.771) 
log_ass 181.6*** 181.9*** 181.7*** 182.5*** 
 (8.326) (8.351) (8.342) (8.421) 
sales -1.88e-06 -1.80e-06 -1.87e-06 -1.79e-06 
 (1.32e-06) (1.33e-06) (1.33e-06) (1.34e-06) 
ind_divers 11.33 10.81 11.42 11.40 
 (11.60) (11.66) (11.63) (11.88) 
geo_divers 13.31 14.44 13.06 16.57 
 (15.61) (15.67) (15.71) (16.01) 
herfindahl -0.178 -0.210 -0.178 -0.161 
 (0.501) (0.502) (0.503) (0.517) 
block_25 -14.57 -14.84 -14.65 -15.47 
 (13.65) (13.69) (13.67) (13.82) 
block_50 2.466 2.297 2.395 1.791 
 (14.95) (15.02) (14.99) (15.13) 
block_75 -2.088 0.939 -2.219 1.975 
 (17.74) (17.86) (17.78) (18.11) 
leverage -162.1*** -164.3*** -162.2*** -163.7*** 
 (30.96) (31.14) (31.00) (31.42) 
capex_sales 8.572* 8.831** 8.557* 8.943** 
 (4.488) (4.494) (4.492) (4.511) 
operating_margin -0.258* -0.249* -0.257* -0.253* 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) 
restruct 24.75 23.46 24.61 25.06 
 (42.98) (43.11) (43.04) (43.66) 
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Table 15 (continued)    
  
Dependent variable: Total Return 
Index     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
m_and_a 42.28 49.84* 42.41 42.84 
 (29.19) (29.69) (29.22) (30.24) 
size_manu   -1.233 -5.303 
   (6.925) (9.394) 
size_trade   -0.129 -7.635 
   (12.87) (25.93) 
size_transp   0.489 -0.387 
   (10.62) (17.93) 
union_manu    433.8 
    (430.9) 
union_trade    579.9 
    (1,072) 
union_transp    418.6 
    (1,313) 
woco_manu    -5.187 
    (321.3) 
woco_trade    981.0 
    (1,193) 
woco_transp    -269.5 
    (911.2) 
ind_manu    -210.4 
    (271.2) 
ind_trade    460.4 
    (1,115) 
ind_transp    -237.3 
    (697.4) 
bank_manu    -6.642 
    (168.6) 
bank_trade    221.1 
    (247.2) 
bank_transp    130.3 
    (207.6) 
former_bm_manu    -32.29 
    (187.0) 
former_bm_trade    -144.8 
    (303.3) 
former_bm_transp    -202.4 
    (490.9) 
Constant -2,126*** -2,153*** -2,126*** -2,164*** 
 (112.8) (115.7) (113.1) (120.3) 
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 
R² 0.280 0.282 0.280 0.284 
 
Overall, we find no consistent impact of either board size or board composition on the 
market valuation of listed German companies. The significant differences in the magnitude 
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and the direction of our explanatory variables suggest a high degree of sensitivity of our re-
sults: Replacing one measure of market valuation by another (Tobin’s Q vs. total shareholder 
return) leads to completely different findings. This, in turn, suggests that the incompatible 
results that have been presented in the literature so far are not really surprising, but may the 
result of a number of theoretical as well as methodological shortcomings. To provide addi-
tional evidence on the impact of board size and board composition on company performance 
we now replace in our estimations the market valuation measures by measures of a company’s 
operating performance, i.e., accounting data such as return on equity (ROE) and return on 
invested capital (ROIC).  
Table 16 displays the results of the four different models with return on equity (ROE) as 
the dependent variable. In model (1) only the logarithm of total assets (log_ass), leverage, the 
operating margin, and the dummy variable indicating restructuring (restruct) turn out to be 
statistically significant. While the impact of total assets suggests higher return on equity for 
larger companies, we again observe the negative effect of leverage. Furthermore, both the 
positive effect of operating margin and the negative effect of restructuring activities on return 
on equity are in line with our expectations.  No other right-hand side variable approaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Model (2) is quite similar; the only difference 
here is the significantly negative effect of former board members on return on equity; an addi-
tional former managing board member leads to a reduction 81% of median RoE. As men-
tioned above, this could be due to the fact that the former managing board members are leni-
ent monitors and poor advisors. Model (3) is again similar to models (1) and (2) with the ex-
ception that industrial diversification (ind_divers) has a statistically significant, negative ef-
fect on RoE (on average industrially diversified companies reduces median RoE by 93%). 
With regard to the interaction terms (board size and industry dummies), we observe a signifi-
cantly negative effect of board size in trade, suggesting that a larger board might not be bene-
ficial in the (presumably complex) trade industry (not in line with Coles et al. (2008)); the 
effect is quite significant as median RoE is on average reduced by 10.2% when an additional 
board member is added. Finally, in model (4) we find a significant and positive effect of code-
termination in trade; all three measures of union, works council, and independent employee 
representatives have a significant positive effect (an addition of an additional union member 
in the trade industry leads to an increase in median RoE of 118% on average, 78% for an ad-
ditional works council member and 59% for an additional independent employee representa-
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tive). The remaining independent variables show similar significance and direction as in mod-
el (3).  
Table 16: Fixed-effects regression of return on equity (ROE) on board size and  
composition 
 Note: Models 1-4 of table 16 provide the results of fixed-effects regressions with return on equity (de-
fined as net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividends divided by last year's common equity) 
on variables of board size and composition and several control variables. All models include dummy variables 
for year and industry.  Z-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Return on Equity     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
size 1.472 1.178 2.432 2.854 
 (1.333) (1.740) (1.672) (2.074) 
union_rep  54.33  2.315 
  (85.65)  (111.2) 
woco_rep  -71.50  -94.24 
  (66.60)  (93.55) 
ind_rep  -48.88  -39.84 
  (53.75)  (68.80) 
bank_rep  -19.24  -5.612 
  (31.13)  (40.70) 
former_bm  -79.44**  -126.0*** 
  (37.33)  (48.14) 
exp_datab  0.188  0.193 
  (0.796)  (0.805) 
log_ass 7.391* 7.186* 7.493** 7.658** 
 (3.814) (3.823) (3.813) (3.830) 
sales 4.11e-07 4.36e-07 4.24e-07 4.56e-07 
 (6.07e-07) (6.09e-07) (6.06e-07) (6.07e-07) 
ind_divers -8.333 -8.615 -9.073* -8.640 
 (5.314) (5.336) (5.318) (5.404) 
geo_divers -10.47 -10.56 -10.09 -9.574 
 (7.151) (7.176) (7.179) (7.280) 
herfindahl 0.154 0.153 0.0978 -0.0423 
 (0.229) (0.230) (0.230) (0.235) 
block_25 -5.623 -5.429 -5.824 -4.421 
 (6.253) (6.267) (6.251) (6.283) 
block_50 8.354 8.671 8.732 9.047 
 (6.847) (6.875) (6.851) (6.882) 
block_75 9.793 8.119 9.545 7.291 
 (8.127) (8.175) (8.130) (8.238) 
leverage -78.27*** -76.27*** -76.92*** -75.54*** 
 (14.18) (14.26) (14.17) (14.29) 
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Table 16 (continued)       
  
Dependent variable: Return on 
Equity     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
capex_sales -3.051 -3.087 -3.047 -3.004 
 (2.055) (2.058) (2.053) (2.051) 
operating_margin 1.075*** 1.073*** 1.079*** 1.071*** 
 (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0687) 
restruct -35.06* -34.97* -33.06* -28.38 
 (19.69) (19.73) (19.67) (19.86) 
m_and_a -16.35 -17.06 -15.86 -20.15 
  (13.37) (13.59) (13.36) (13.75) 
size_manu   0.590 -1.104 
   (3.166) (4.272) 
size_trade   -16.58*** -57.38*** 
   (5.881) (11.79) 
size_transp   -2.492 -1.741 
   (4.854) (8.153) 
union_manu    125.2 
    (196.0) 
union_trade    1,931*** 
    (487.3) 
union_transp    50.35 
    (597.0) 
woco_manu    -46.61 
    (146.1) 
woco_trade    1,275** 
    (542.6) 
woco_transp    82.62 
    (414.4) 
ind_manu    12.23 
    (123.3) 
ind_trade    960.2* 
    (507.0) 
ind_transp    -20.07 
    (317.2) 
bank_manu    -58.64 
    (76.67) 
bank_trade    -62.70 
    (112.4) 
bank_transp    9.568 
    (94.42) 
former_bm_manu    127.7 
    (85.03) 
former_bm_trade    116.2 
    (137.9) 
former_bm_transp    197.9 
    (223.3) 
Constant -89.27* -70.07 -81.77 -67.42 
 (51.65) (52.96) (51.71) (54.69) 
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 
R² 0.146 0.149 0.150 0.162 
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 We now turn to a discussion of our final set of regressions with return on invested capi-
tal as the dependent variable (see Table 17). In model (1) board size remains statistically in-
significant while firm size (as measured by the logarithm of total assets log_ass) once again 
turns out to affect firm performance positively. Furthermore, we once again find a positive 
effect of our measure for industry concentration (herfindahl) indicating that the return on in-
vested capital is higher in concentrated industries (the effect is minimal though: a 1% increase 
in the index leads to a 0.03% increase in ROIC); this is in line with our expectations. Again, 
we replicate the significantly negative effect of leverage and the ratio of capital expenditures 
to sales (capex_sales). The positive effect of the operating margin, however, is once again in 
line with our expectations. Model (2) yields similar results with only two of the variables 
measuring board composition reaching statistical significance: the share of works council rep-
resentatives as well as of former managing board members have a significant and negative 
impact on return on invested capital; the addition of a further works council representative 
reduces the ROIC on average by 39%, the addition of a further former managing board mem-
ber by 27%.  
 Model (3) shows an almost identical pattern of results. While almost all control varia-
bles retain their magnitude and level of significance, none of the interaction terms turns out to 
be statistically significant.  
Finally, model (4) leads to virtually identical results as the previous models. While the 
coefficient of board size is statistically significant (at the 10% level) and positive in general, it 
retains its negative impact in the trade sector; i.e., increasing the size of the board by one 
member leads to an increase of 10.6% in ROIC on average, in the trade sector this effect is 
negative with a decrease of 8.6% on average. While the remaining independent variables of 
model (3) show the same magnitude and level of significance none of the interaction terms 
show any significance.  
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Table 17: Fixed-effects regression of return on invested capital (ROIC) on size and 
board composition 
 Note: Models 1-4 of table 17 provide the results of fixed-effects regressions with return on invested capi-
tal (defined as net income before preferred dividends plus interest expense on debt minus interest capitalize 
times one minus tax rate divided by average of last year's and current year's total capital plus last year's short 
term debt and current portion of long term debt) on variables of board size and composition and several control 
variables. All models include dummy variables for year and industry. The number of observations is slightly 
lower due to data availability issues. Z-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Return on Invested Capital   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
size 0.303 0.470 0.373 0.707* 
 (0.262) (0.342) (0.329) (0.409) 
union_rep  -8.540  -1.218 
  (16.82)  (21.93) 
woco_rep  -25.85**  -49.52*** 
  (13.08)  (18.45) 
ind_rep  -1.569  -5.758 
  (10.55)  (13.57) 
bank_rep  3.579  8.884 
  (6.111)  (8.026) 
former_bm  -17.84**  -21.60** 
  (7.330)  (9.494) 
exp_datab  0.0339  0.0355 
  (0.156)  (0.159) 
log_ass 3.109*** 3.175*** 3.136*** 3.236*** 
 (0.750) (0.751) (0.751) (0.755) 
sales 2.99e-08 3.61e-08 3.10e-08 3.59e-08 
 (1.19e-07) (1.20e-07) (1.19e-07) (1.20e-07) 
ind_divers -1.066 -1.211 -1.121 -1.214 
 (1.045) (1.048) (1.047) (1.066) 
geo_divers -1.876 -1.774 -1.990 -1.796 
 (1.406) (1.409) (1.414) (1.436) 
herfindahl 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.174*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0464) 
block_25 -1.799 -1.636 -1.865 -1.529 
 (1.230) (1.231) (1.231) (1.239) 
block_50 1.635 1.484 1.590 1.385 
 (1.346) (1.350) (1.349) (1.357) 
block_75 -0.273 -0.421 -0.384 -0.695 
 (1.598) (1.605) (1.601) (1.625) 
leverage -14.25*** -13.71*** -14.17*** -13.98*** 
 (2.789) (2.799) (2.791) (2.818) 
capex_sales -0.836** -0.809** -0.842** -0.812** 
 (0.404) (0.404) (0.404) (0.405) 
operating_margin 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0136) 
restruct 2.902 2.701 2.995 2.733 
 (3.871) (3.875) (3.875) (3.915) 
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Table 17 (continued)       
  Dependent variable: Return on Invested Capital   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
m_and_a 0.671 0.670 0.764 0.707 
  (2.629) (2.669) (2.631) (2.712) 
size_manu   -0.192 -0.303 
   (0.623) (0.842) 
size_trade   -1.455 -5.363** 
   (1.158) (2.326) 
size_transp   0.612 -0.0605 
   (0.956) (1.608) 
union_manu    -23.18 
    (38.65) 
union_trade    176.6* 
    (96.10) 
union_transp    17.14 
    (117.7) 
woco_manu    34.94 
    (28.82) 
woco_trade    118.7 
    (107.0) 
woco_transp    68.03 
    (81.72) 
ind_manu    19.40 
    (24.32) 
ind_trade    49.01 
    (99.98) 
ind_transp    10.87 
    (62.54) 
bank_manu    -8.626 
    (15.12) 
bank_trade    -24.64 
    (22.17) 
bank_transp    -8.791 
    (18.62) 
former_bm_manu    14.99 
    (16.77) 
former_bm_trade    9.691 
    (27.20) 
former_bm_transp    22.80 
    (44.03) 
Constant -32.07*** -31.09*** -31.26*** -30.86*** 
 (10.16) (10.40) (10.18) (10.78) 
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 
R² 0.202 0.207 0.203 0.213 
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 Summarizing, board size and board composition seem to have consistent, yet statistical-
ly insignificant and economically irrelevant effects on the two different accounting measures 
of performance that we use in our estimations: Neither return on equity nor return on invested 
capital is affected by the size of corporate boards in German companies. Moreover, board 
composition seems to be irrelevant too. If anything, the percentage of former managing board 
members and the percentage of works council representatives seem to have a significantly 
negative, yet economically weak impact in some of the specifications. 
5.7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Using the by far largest and most comprehensive data set available, we analyze the im-
pact of board size and board composition on the capital market as well as the operating per-
formance of German companies. Irrespective of the concrete model specification and the es-
timation technique employed we fail to find a consistent and economically relevant influence 
of both, board size and board composition. While we find a significantly positive influence of 
board size on Tobin’s Q, the impact on total shareholder return is significantly negative. With 
respect to operating performance (measured by return on equity and return on invested capi-
tal) we end up with insignificant coefficients of board size, suggesting that it is completely 
irrelevant in this respect. Board composition, in turn, seems to have no pronounced effect on 
our measures of operating performance either.  
 Explaining these unexpected results – which may be disputed by both, proponents as 
well critics of mandated employee representation on supervisory boards – is not trivial. We 
suggest the following route: To the extent that worker readiness to invest in the acquisition of 
firm specific skills requires the existence of particular “safeguards” that protect them against 
employer opportunism, worker representatives on corporate boards may not only increase the 
individual worker’s motivation and loyalty, but also to foster investments that, upon comple-
tion, increase productivity only in a particular firm, but nowhere else. Without an institutional 
arrangement that deters employer opportunism, under-investment is likely to occur. Thus, 
although a voluntary introduction of participatory institutions in general and of codetermina-
tion in particular is not to be expected, firms and workers are likely to benefit both from man-
datory employee participation in terms of an increasing joint surplus. How this surplus will in 
each particular case be shared and whether the process of “dividing the pie” will lead to (addi-
tional) conflicts is difficult to predict. It is safe to conclude, however, that the highly complex 
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German system of labor relations firms has played an important role in shaping worker moti-
vations and expectations. This complexity is due to the interplay of a large number of com-
plementary elements (including e.g., detailed regulations related to initial as well as further 
training, dismissal protection legislation, workplace health and safety regulations, etc.) that 
form a consistent system. Particular changes of or amendments to this system are likely to 
result in unintended side effects that are, in turn, detrimental to firms and workers alike (see 
e.g., Milgrom & Roberts (1990) and (1995)). Although plausible, we are far from saying that 
this is the only possible explanation for the relative success of the German variant of “stake-
holder capitalism”. Further empirical analyses are urgently required to convincingly demon-
strate the explanatory power of our approach. Moreover, what also needs to be investigated 
theoretically as well as empirically is whether and to what extent “internal governance mech-
anisms” – such as worker representatives on supervisory boards – are substitutes for underde-
veloped “external governance mechanisms” (e.g., the capital market). 
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6. Who is the Better Monitor? The Impact of Female Board Directors, Board Composi-
tion, and Board Size on Earnings Management 
6.1. Introduction 
 
 Workforce diversity – be it at the shop floor or at the (top) management level – is a top-
ic that is currently receiving a lot of attention not only in political debates and the popular 
press, but also in the social sciences in the field of corporate finance and accounting. While 
this is particularly true for the United States, systematic research remains limited in Europe. 
At the same time, however, top managers seem to be on the forefront of the discussion in 
(Western) Europe:  
 
"The management board consists of white males only. Our top 600 managers are pre-
dominantly white German males. We are too one-dimensional" (Peter Löscher, CEO 
Siemens AG, in: Financial Times, June 24th 2008). 
 
"Sweden begins effort to get more women onto company boards" (Wall Street Journal, 
September 9th 2009). 
 
"More female supervisory board members are necessary. Their appointment, however, 
should be based on qualification, not on quotas" (Christian Strenger, member of the 
German Corporate Governance Codex Commission, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, November 16th 2009). 
 
 Thus, while the attention in politics and the popular press is quite high, the issue has not 
been discussed in detail in academia, something that is especially the case for Germany. Re-
search on the impact and the consequences of workforce diversity in general remains limited 
and is – so far – completely absent when it comes to diversity of management and/or supervi-
sory boards. However, board diversity has for years already been of interest to many econo-
mists and management scholars studying the Anglo-Saxon “one-tier system” of corporate 
governance. 
The main goal of our paper is to contribute to the discussion of the impact of gender di-
versity on the behavior of corporate boards in Germany, i.e., a country with a two-tier system, 
where simultaneous membership on the management and the supervisory board is strictly 
forbidden and where – at least in large companies – worker representatives are guaranteed a 
certain number of seats on the supervisory boards. Thus, we are particularly interested in the 
impact of board size, board composition and board diversity on earnings management in large 
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German firms. Our data set includes almost all companies that have been listed in one of the 
large German indices (DAX, MDAX and SDAX) for at least two consecutive years in the 
period 1998-2007 (n=294 firms with 2,334 firm-year-observations). Our main result is that 
female board members are associated with less earnings management and thus seem to be 
more diligent monitors. Female employee representatives, not female shareholder representa-
tives are mainly responsible for this positive effect. More specifically, it is female independ-
ent employee representatives and not female union or works council representatives that ac-
count for this result. With regard to board size and other variables of board composition (e.g., 
auditors, lawyers) do not find any consistent evidence. 
 Women are still underrepresented on corporate boards around the world. This is particu-
larly true for supervisory boards in Germany. While the percentage of women on the supervi-
sory boards of the largest German listed companies (members of the indices DAX, MDAX, 
SDAX) has slightly increased from 7.0% in 1998 to 7.8% in 2007, it still remains low com-
pared to e.g., the US with 15% female members in Fortune 500 boards in 2007 (Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) or Norway with 42% and Sweden with 27% (Holst and Wiemer (2010); Cata-
lyst (2009)). Furthermore, most female board members (about 80%) in Germany are employ-
ee representatives. This means that at most 20% of the already low percentage of female 
board members are shareholder representatives.  
 Given the recent increase in the percentage of women on corporate boards across Eu-
rope (from e.g., 32% to 42% in Norway, 6% to 15% in the Netherlands and 4% to 10% in 
Spain) the current situation is likely to change in Germany as well: An increasing number of 
politicians as well as (male) top managers seem to favor a binding quota, a step that has al-
ready been taken by a number of European governments already: The Swedish government 
for example announced that firms failing to reserve 25% of their board seats for females will 
be dissolved (see Medland (2004)). The Norwegian government has already enacted a law 
requiring all listed companies to fill 40% of their board seats with female directors. Finally, 
the Spanish government requires all companies to increase the percentage of female directors 
to 40% in 2015. From a policy perspective it is, therefore, interesting to see whether a higher 
percentage of female board members is associated with a better company performance as this 
would make the arguments of the proponents of a quota system more convincing.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 includes a brief review 
of the available literature on board diversity and earnings management while section 6.3 de-
scribes the legal background of corporate boards in Germany. Section 6.4 presents the data 
and section 6.5 the empirical methodology. Our results are displayed in section 6.6 while sec-
tion 6.7 concludes the paper.  
6.2. Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Earnings Management 
6.2.1. Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
"Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers" (Healy and Wahlen (1999)). 
 It is a generally accepted opinion in financial management and financial economics that 
the discounts companies have to incur for their inability to meet or beat analyst expectations is 
the main reason for earnings management27. Following the increase in the number of corpo-
rate scandals around the world – very often attributed to a “failure” of the governance and 
monitoring system implemented in the various economies – the academic literature started to 
take a closer look at the relationship between “good governance” and its effect on accounting 
discretion. In one of the first studies, Beasley (1996) shows that based on a sample of 75 fraud 
and 75 comparable no-fraud firms in the period of 1980-1991 no fraud firms have a signifi-
cantly higher percentage of outside directors. The author takes this as prima facie evidence 
come that outside directors increase a board’s effectiveness in monitoring the management 
team. Moreover, he observes that the likelihood of financial statement fraud increases with 
board size. This confirms Jensen's (1993) view that generally smaller boards are better in 
monitoring. Vafeas (2000), in turn, suggests that companies with smaller boards are more 
closely monitored and that, therefore, investors expect these firms to publish more “informa-
tive” earnings figures. While the former author does not find a relationship between the per-
centage of outside directors and earnings management, Klein (2002) documents a statistically 
significant negative relationship between board independence and abnormal accruals, suggest-
                                                           
27  In a somewhat outdated, yet still very interesting review of the relevant literature Fields and Keys (2003) 
collect evidence that the percentage of firms beating analyst estimates has considerably increased in the last 
two decades. 
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ing that more independent boards are better monitors. This latter finding is corroborated by 
Xie, et al. (2003) who find that board members with a corporate or finance background are 
associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals.  
 These results are confirmed by more recent research: Cornett, et al. (2008) find that the 
quality of the reported earnings increases with the quality of the monitoring in place. The 
quality of monitoring, in turn, increases c.p. with the percentage of independent outside direc-
tors on the board. Similar results are found by Cornett, et al. (2009), who observe for large 
U.S. bank holding companies that board independence is positively related to earnings and 
negatively related to earnings management28.  
6.2.2. Gender Diversity and Earnings Management 
 To the best of our knowledge, the only study that is available on this topic is the one by 
Parsons and Krishnan (2006): Based on a sample including 770 firm-year-observations from 
353 Fortune 500 companies in the years 1996-2000, the authors find that "earnings quality is 
positively associated with gender diversity in senior management" (Parsons and Krishnan 
(2006)).  
6.2.3. Gender Diversity and Corporate Governance 
 
 Gender diversity in the workforce has received (and continues to receive) enormous 
attention, both in academia and in the popular press. While the initial research addressed the 
existence of a “glass ceiling”, i.e., the reasons why women in lower and middle management 
positions had poor advancement opportunities, the more recent research has started to analyze 
the careers and the behavior of women in top management and on corporate boards (e.g., 
Kesner (1988), Bilimoria and Piderit (1994), Daily and Dalton (1994), Carter, et al. (2003)). 
 To date, only few studies exist that analyze the link between corporate governance and 
gender diversity (for a survey of the early literature see Fields and Keys (2003)). As already 
mentioned above, this is surprising insofar as this topic receives high attention in the political 
debate. Using a cross-section of large US firms (Fortune 1000) with 797 observations, Carter 
                                                           
28  Additionally, García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2009) provide a comprehensive summary over the recent 
 research in the area of corporate governance and earnings management. 
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et al. (2003) find a significantly positive relationship between the percentage of women and 
ethnic minorities on the board and firm value.  
 Farrell and Hersch (2005) take a different perspective and estimate the probability of a 
particular firm to appoint a female board member. Based on 2,974 observations from Fortune 
500 and Service 500 firms for the years 1990-1999, the authors find that adding another direc-
tor to the board is not gender neutral: The probability of adding a female director to the board 
is, first, negatively affected by the number of women already serving on the board. Second, 
the probability of adding a female member is increased if a woman leaves the board.  
 The a more recent study, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have a 
significantly positive impact on “board inputs and firm outcomes”. Using a large sample of 
US firms covering a period of more than fifteen years (1996-2003 with more than 8,000 firm-
year-observations) they show that, first, female directors have better attendance records at 
board meetings than men and that, second, a higher percentage of female directors is associat-
ed with a better attendance record of male directors too. Moreover, CEO turnover is more 
sensitive to share price performance in companies with a higher percentage of female board 
members. The same holds true for equity-based compensation, i.e., the higher the percentage 
of female directors, the higher the percentage of performance-related pay of the top managers. 
However, contrary to findings that have been quoted over and over again in the popular press 
(e.g., Catalyst (2007)) documenting a superior performance of companies with more female 
board members, Adams and Ferreira (2009) are unable to find such a relationship when con-
trolling for the endogeneity of gender diversity. They only find a significantly positive effect 
on performance for firms whose owners suffered from weak governance in the past29. 
6.3. Legal and Institutional Background 
 
 The German system of corporate governance is fundamentally different from the Anglo-
Saxon one: while the latter system has as its main goal the maximization of the returns to 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), the German system tries to take the interests of all 
stakeholders into account with management trying to include the respective groups’ varying 
views in its corporate decision making (Fauver and Fuerst (2006)). More specifically, a pub-
licly held German company (Aktiengesellschaft) is governed by a two-tiered board structure, 
consisting of the management board (Vorstand) and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The 
                                                           
29  Terjesen, et al. (2009) provide a good overview of further recent research on corporate governance  and 
gender diversity. 
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management board consists of the executive directors who are responsible for running the 
firm on a day-to-day basis and for developing and implementing its strategy. The supervisory 
board has, to a large extent, similar duties as the US board of directors as it is responsible for 
appointing the members of the management board and for their remuneration. The fundamen-
tal difference between the German and the US system is that, first, the management board 
reports to the supervisory board and, second, that no management board member can be a 
member of the supervisory board.  
 The size and the composition of the supervisory board is to a great extent dictated by 
law: Depending on the number of employees, the legal form of the company, and the statutory 
equity, board size varies between 3 and 21 seats. Moreover, again depending on the number 
of employees and the industry affiliation of the company, employee representation can take 
three different forms: No mandatory representation, one-third representation and one-half-
representation. The composition of the group of employee representatives is further regulated 
by law: Depending on the number of employee representatives, one, two, or three union rep-
resentatives have to be appointed members of the supervisory board. 
With regard to gender, no such regulation exists. Although an increasing number of 
German politicians and even top managers support the implementation of a mandated quota 
like in Norway or Spain, the most recent version of the German corporate governance codex 
of June 2009 only gives a vague recommendation with regard to the composition of the su-
pervisory board: "Furthermore, attention shall also be paid to […] diversity" (Regier-
ungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (2009)). 
6.4. Sample and Data Sources 
6.4.1. Sample Composition 
 Our initial data set includes all publicly listed German companies that were listed for at 
least one year in one of the three largest German indices – DAX, MDAX, or SDAX – during 
the period 1998-2007. In a first step, we deleted all companies for which only one year of 
information was available (n=7). This resulted in a sample including 306 companies with 
2,476 observations. Second, we deleted all companies that are incorporated as Kommanditge-
sellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA), as this is a hybrid organizational form between a partnership 
and a stock corporation, and all foreign companies as these are not subject to the German law. 
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This leaves us with a final data set that comprises 2,334 observations from 292 different 
firms. 
6.4.2. Data Sources 
 The data on supervisory board composition is hand-collected from annual reports. Re-
ports not available from the respective company’s website were obtained from the annual re-
port database of the Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V. (German Association for the 
Protection of Shareholders) and from various archives in Germany (Archive of the Bavarian 
Chamber of Commerce, Archive of the University of Bremen, Archive of the University of 
Cologne). Finally, if no reports were available, data for supervisory board composition was 
assembled using the Hoppenstedt Jahrbuch der Großunternehmen (Hoppenstedt Annual Re-
view of the Largest German Companies). Measures of accounting performance as well as 
information on business and geographic segments were obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope. Missing accounting data in Worldscope was added from the companies’ annual 
reports. Data on market capitalization was obtained from Datastream. Finally, we also added 
information concerning special company specific events (restructurings, mergers & acquisi-
tions) based on an extensive press search.  
 
6.5. Methodology 
6.5.1. Variables 
 
Our analysis consists of a series of fixed effects regressions to determine the impact of 
board size and board composition (particularly of gender diversity) on measures of earnings 
management.  
 As a measure of earnings management we consider discretionary accruals: Similar to 
Leuz, et al. (2003) and Burghstahler, et al. (2006) we assume that earnings are temporarily 
inflated due to accrual choices while at the same time cash flow remains unaffected. Thus, we 
use the value of accruals divided by the cash flow from operations as our preferred measure of 
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earnings management (acc_cfo). We calculate accruals similar to Dechow, et al. (1995) as 
follows30:  
 
Accrualsit = (∆CAit −∆Cashit ) − (∆CLit −∆STDit ) −DEPit      (1) 
 
where ∆CAit = change in total current assets, ∆Cashit = change in cash and cash equivalents, ∆CLit = 
change in total current liabilities, ∆STDit = change in short term debt, and DEPit = depreciation and amor-
tization expense for firm i in year t. If a company does not report short-term debt, we assume the change 
to be zero.  
  
Due to data availability issues and the limited number of industry-specific observations 
we are unfortunately not able to use further measures of earnings management as suggested 
by Leuz, et al. (2003) and Burghstahler, et al. (2006) to ensure the robustness of our results 
and to reduce the influence of potential errors.  
To deal with possible shortcomings of only one measure of earnings management we use a 
slightly modified measure of accrual discretion. As suggested by Dechow, et al. (1995) we 
scale total accruals by lagged total assets instead of cash flow from operations (acc_sca). Fol-
lowing Burghstahler, et al. (2006) we have truncated (“winzorized”) both earnings manage-
ment measures, reducing the top 10% values to the next highest value.  
 As independent variables we use in our estimations a number of variables measuring 
female representation on the supervisory board. First, perc_fem is the percentage of female 
directors31. Second, we further distinguish between female employee representatives 
(emp_fem) and female shareholder representatives (share_fem). Finally, we make an addition-
al distinction and classify the female employee representatives according to the institution that 
nominated them, e.g., female union representatives (union_fem), female works council repre-
sentatives (woco_fem) and female independent employee representatives (ind_fem). General-
ly, we expect a positive effect of female board members on earnings management (i.e., less 
earnings management) as Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that “gender-diverse boards allo-
cate more effort to monitoring”32. 
                                                           
30  Due to data availability issues we left out changes in income taxes payable as included in the work of Leuz, 
et al. (2003).  
31  Calculated as the absolute number of female directors divided by the board size at the end of the financial 
year (as reported in the annual report)  
32  This effect, however, could be limited by “excessive” gender diversity because this is said to lead to “over-
monitoring” (see Adams and Ferreira (2009)). 
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 As measures of board size and composition we first use the absolute number of board 
seats at the end of the financial year (board_size and board_size2) as displayed in the annual 
report. In line with previous research (see section 6.2.1 above) we expect that smaller boards 
have a superior monitoring technology and that, therefore, the management of companies with 
smaller boards is less susceptible to earnings management. As further measures of board 
composition we include the percentage of bank representatives on the board (bank_rep33) be-
cause in line with Xie, et al. (2003) we expect a positive effect of bank representatives on 
earnings measurement. In an extended model – again similar to Xie, et al. (2003) – we include 
additional measures to control for the presence of board members with a (presumably) superi-
or monitoring technology and/or particular monitoring incentives. Thus, we use the percent-
age of auditors (auditor), the percentage of lawyers (lawyer) and the percentage of principal 
investors (p_invest; e.g., private equity or venture capital firms). Moreover, we also include in 
some of our estimations the percentage of either active or former managing board members of 
the largest German companies34 (afm_board) as well as the percentage of consultants and 
academics (consultant and professor)35. 
Similar to e.g., Burghstahler, et al. (2006) we control for potential sources of variation 
in our earnings management measure by including in our estimations measures of firm size, 
firm growth, financing structure, accounting standards, and cross listing at other major stock 
exchanges. We measure firm size by the natural logarithm of total assets (log_assets) while 
firm growth is equal to the annual percentage change in revenues (sales_g). We use leverage 
to control for the financing structure of the firm and to assess the disciplining effect of debt 
(see Jensen (1986)), which is defined as total debt divided by total assets. We also control for 
the use of international accounting standards (either IFRS or US GAAP) with a dummy varia-
ble that assumes a value of one if the firm uses an international accounting standard and zero 
otherwise; inter_acc)36. In addition, we use a dummy variable (denoted cross_listing) that 
                                                           
33  We call bank representatives all board members who are listed as “employee of a bank” or have “banker” as 
their job title in the annual report. 
34  These board members are either a member of a management board of one of the largest German companies 
listed in either the DAX or MDAX index or their company has revenues in excess of EUR 1 billion (in any 
year of the sample period).  
35  The board members were classified according to their job titles and/or job descriptions as displayed in the 
annual reports of the firms. These classifications are not mutually exclusive, e.g., a lawyer can also be a con-
sultant or a professor. 
36  As previous research shows mixed effects of the use of international accounting standards on earnings man-
agement (see e.g., Ball, et al. (2003), Barth, et al. (2007)), we hesitate to predict the sign of the coefficient of 
this variable. 
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assumes a value of one if the firm is cross-listed either on a major United States stock ex-
change (NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) or the London Stock exchange37. In line with previous 
research (e.g., Lang, et al. (2006)) we expect less earnings management in companies that are 
cross-listed in markets that are known for their stronger investor protection. Finally, we in-
clude a series of year dummies in our analysis to capture changes over time. 
6.5.2. Regression Model 
 
 To estimate the effect of gender diversity on earnings management we use the following 
general model:  
 
titi
tititititi
tititititi
dummiesyear
listingcrossaccerrepbankleveragegsales
asssizeboardsizeboardfemperccfoacc
,,
,9,8,7,6,5
,4,3,2,10,
_
__int__
log_2____
ε
ααααα
ααααα
++
+++++
++++=
  (2) 
 One of the main advantages of our dataset is that we can observe companies for a rela-
tively long period of time (up to ten years). During this time period many of the firms in our 
sample experienced considerable changes in the size and the composition of their supervisory 
boards (particularly with respect to gender diversity). The presence of these companies in our 
data set allows us to use cluster robust fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity in the estimations38. We would not have been able to use this approach if relevant 
variables (i.e., female representation and board size) would have been constant over time.  
6.6. Results 
6.6.1. Female Directors on German Supervisory Boards: Descriptive Evidence 
 As already mentioned above, the percentage of female directors has increased in large 
German companies from 7.0% in 1998 to 7.8% in 2007. The share reached its maximum in 
2005 with 8.2%, followed by a considerable decline in 2006 when it reached only 7.6%  (see 
Table 18).  
                                                           
37  We do not consider companies listed on the AIM (alternative investment market) as this market has weaker 
investor protection due to lower admission standards.  
38 Cluster fixed effects regressions were used to better deal with extreme values. Additionally, the significance 
of groups of measures of board composition have been tested yielding similar results (these are available 
from the authors upon request). 
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Table 18: Female directors on German corporate supervisory boards 
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It is worth mentioning that almost 80% of all female directors are employee representa-
tives of whom the majority are independent employee representatives, i.e., with no union or 
works council affiliation. While the average number of female independent employee repre-
sentatives as well as female union representatives has remained almost constant over the last 
10 years, the number of female works council representatives has increased by almost 50% 
from 1998 until 2007. This most likely reflects the increasing percentage of female works 
councilors that, in turn, is due the increasing percentage of women in the workforce. Looking 
at supervisory board members with a PhD it turn out that only 10% of the female board direc-
tors, but 33% of their male colleagues hold that kind of an academic degree39. What is also 
worth mentioning is the steep increase in the number of “connected” female directors, i.e., 
women with three or more further outside board memberships (as listed in the annual reports). 
This increase is certainly an indicator that the “supply” of female directors is limited and that 
they remain a scarce resource40.  
While the percentage of boards with no female director remains stable at around 50%, 
the share of boards with only one female director decreased during our period of investigation 
(from 28% to 24%). This could be evidence that “tokenism” is decreasing (see also Bourez 
(2005)) because at the same the percentage of boards with two or more female directors has 
been steadily increasing. Finally, with regard to board size we observe a widening gap: while 
boards with female directors have on average 12 to 13 members41, average size for boards 
with no female directors decreases from 8.9 to 6.6 members in our sample period. These vari-
ations in the percentage of female board directors as well as the variation in board size allow 
us to use cluster robust fixed-effects regressions (see Table 19 for arrivals and departures of 
female and male directors as well as for changes in board size). This finding is confirmed 
when considering the between and within variation as displayed in Table 20: while most vari-
ables show larger between variation we still observe considerable within variation. 
                                                           
39  The number of supervisory board members holding a PhDs is again derived from the annual report, where 
these individuals are usually listed with their titles. Since we are unable to distinguish between “real” and 
“honorary” doctorates, the different percentage shares of men and women are difficult to explain (the proba-
bility of receiving a honorary doctorate increases with age and the female supervisory board members are – 
on average – younger than their male counterparts).  
40  A similar observations has been made by Farrell and Hersch (2005) for the US. They find that 30% of all 
individuals holding multiple directorships were women. 
41  This is mainly due to mandated codetermination, because larger companies usually have larger supervisory 
boards (in about 25% of all firms the supervisory board is larger – i.e., has more seats - than is required by 
law).  
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics on female and male director arrivals and departures and 
on changes in size 
  
 Note: Table 19 provides descriptive statistics on changes in the number of female and male supervisory 
board members and on changes in supervisory board size for a sample including all German firms listed in the 
DAX, MDAX, or SDAX during the years 1998 to 2007. Data on female board members and board size were 
obtained from annual reports. 
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Table 20: Overall, between and within variation of main variables 
 
Variable   Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
acc_cfo overall 6.4 69.64 0.0 2,041.3 
 between  25.70 0.0 257.1 
 within  64.93 -250.5 1,819.2 
      
acc_sca overall 0.2 1.58 0.0 58.4 
 between  0.67 0.0 9.9 
 within  1.46 -9.7 48.7 
      
perc_fem overall 0.1 0.11 0.0 0.7 
 between  0.09 0.0 0.6 
 within  0.05 -0.2 0.6 
      
emp_fem overall 0.1 0.09 0.0 0.5 
 between  0.08 0.0 0.3 
 within  0.04 -0.2 0.3 
      
share_fem overall 0.0 0.06 0.0 0.7 
 between  0.05 0.0 0.3 
 within  0.03 -0.3 0.4 
      
union_fem overall 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.2 
 between  0.02 0.0 0.1 
 within  0.01 -0.1 0.1 
      
woco_fem overall 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.3 
 between  0.03 0.0 0.2 
 within  0.02 -0.1 0.1 
      
indep_fem overall 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.5 
 between  0.06 0.0 0.3 
 within  0.03 -0.2 0.3 
      
board_size overall 9.9 5.94 3.0 21.0 
 between  5.85 3.0 21.0 
  within   1.25 0.3 16.3 
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6.6.2. Univariate Results  
   
 Table 21 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics (without year and industry dummies) 
 
 Note: Table 21 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and main independent variables of our 
model. Acc_cfo is the absolute value of accruals scaled by cash flow from operations. Accruals are calculated as 
follows: (Change in total current assets - change in cash and cash equivalents) - (change in in total current liabili-
ties - change in short term debt) - depreciation. Acc_sca is the absolute value of accruals divided by lagged total 
assets. Perc_fem is the share of female directors of total board members, emp_fem is the share of female em-
ployee representatives, union_fem is the share female union representatives, woco_fem is the share of female 
works council representatives, indep_fem is the share of independent employee representatives. Share_fem is the 
share of female shareholder rerpresentatives on the board. Connected fem is the share of female board members 
with 3 or more outside board memberships. Board_size is the size of the board, board_size2 its square. Log_ass 
is the logarithm of total assets, sales_g is the annual percentage growth of sales. Leverage is defined as short 
term and long term debt divided by total assets, bank_rep is the share of bank representatives of total board 
members, inter_acc is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm uses an international accouting standard (either 
US GAAP or IFRS), cross_listing is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is cross listed at a major stock 
exchange in the UK or US. The sample consists of all German companies listed in the DAX, MDAX, and SDAX 
for the years 1998 to 2007 with at least two years of available data.  
      
Variable   Mean St.-dev. 
1. Quar-
tile Median 
3. Quar-
tile Minimum Maximum 
         
acc_cfo  3.17 9.68 0.30 0.76 1.76 0.00 76.26 
acc_sca  0.11 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.95 
perc_fem  0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.67 
emp_fem  0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.50 
union_fem  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 
woco_fem  0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 
indep_fem  0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.50 
share_fem  0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
connected_fem  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 
board_size  9.94 5.94 6.00 9.00 12.00 3.00 21.00 
board_size2  134.14 138.66 36.00 81.00 144.00 9.00 441.00 
log_ass  13.57 2.47 11.82 13.20 14.97 3.83 21.42 
sales_g  1.30 47.58 -0.03 0.06 0.16 -6.65 2,290.55 
leverage  0.27 0.21 0.09 0.24 0.40 0.00 1.71 
bank_rep  0.07 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 
inter_acc  0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
cross_listing   0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 In Table 22, we present the results of a comparison of firm characteristics for firms that 
have at least one female director on their supervisory boards and firms that have not a single 
female director on their boards. The results of the comparison show that firms in years when 
they have female directors have a significantly larger board (as already mentioned in section 
6.1), have significantly higher sales, are significantly larger in terms of total assets and oper-
ate in more different sectors (as measured by 2-digit SIC codes). In terms of profitability, 
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firms with female directors have a higher return on equity (ROE42), a smaller return on assets 
(ROA43), and a higher return on invested capital (ROIC44). When it comes to market valua-
tion, companies with female directors show a significantly lower valuation as measured by 
Tobin's Q. The differences in these firm specific characteristics suggest that firms could be 
influenced by these characteristics when making choices about the gender composition of 
their boards.  
Table 22: Comparison of firms with and without female directors on  
their supervisory board 
 
 This table displays comparisons of means of firm-level characteristics for firm-years in which firms have 
female directors and firm-years without female directors. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Firm Characteristic 
Mean of firm-year-
observations with female di-
rectors (n=1,141) 
Mean of firm-year-observations 
without female directors 
(n=1,241) Difference   
     
Board Size 12.80 7.32 5.48 *** 
Sales 8,981,076 3,159,273 5,821,803 *** 
Log Assets 14.52 12.70 1.82 *** 
Number of Sectors 5.14 3.82 1.32 *** 
ROE 5.97 2.88 3.09 * 
ROA 0.03 0.12 -0.09  
ROIC 8.44 5.06 3.38 *** 
Tobin's Q 1.47 1.63 -0.17 ** 
Risk  4.29 4.15 0.14   
 
The results of the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 23: 
As expected we observe a positive and but not significant correlation between our two 
measures of earnings management (acc_cfo and acc_sca) indicating that acc_sca will be suit-
able as an additional variable as both variables are conceptually related and with low correla-
tion; acc_sca shows furthermore significantly negative correlation with company size (meas-
ured by total assets, log_ass) and is positively correlated with the leverage of the company; 
additionally, (and already mentioned above), we observe a significantly positive correlation 
between board size and the percentage of female directors on the supervisory board; this is 
                                                           
42  Calculated as follows: (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement) / Last 
Year's Common Equity * 100. 
43  Calculated as follows: (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement) / Last 
total assets. 
44  Calculated as follows: (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capi-
talized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s (Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term 
Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt). 
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also holds true for the percentage of female directors and the size of the company. Also nota-
ble is the negative correlation between the share of bank representatives and the share of fe-
male directors.  
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Table 23: Pearson correlation 
 
 Note: Table 23 provides Pearson correlation coefficients of the main variables used in our estimations.  
***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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These univariate results give us an idea about the interrelations between the percentage 
of female directors and earnings management as well as firm and board characteristics. The 
following multivariate analysis will shed further light on this relationship taking into consid-
eration a wide range of control variables.  
6.6.3. Econometric Evidence 
6.6.3.1. Gender Diversity, Board Size, and Earnings Management 
 In a first series of cluster fixed effects regressions, the results of which are displayed in 
Table 24, we analyze the effect of female board directors on our two measures of earnings 
measurement. In our first model we observe a statistically significant negative effect of fe-
male directors on earnings management, implying that an increase in the percentage of female 
directors leads to a reduction in accruals and thus earnings management; thus, the addition of 
a female director to a 20-member board reduces the average level of accruals by 19%. This is 
in line with our expectations and with prior research (e.g., Adams and Ferreira (2009)). Con-
trary to our expectations, however, we do not find an effect of board size on earnings man-
agement, but instead find a significantly positive effect of sales growth on earnings manage-
ment; this suggests that firms with higher growth are related to higher levels of earnings man-
agement. This might be caused by the efforts of the management of high growth companies to 
meet their financial targets.  Finally, we find that the adoption of international accounting 
standards (as opposed to German principles) leads to level of accruals and thus higher earn-
ings management. While this might be surprising, Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find the 
same effect. They argue that German companies use accruals to manage their earnings instead 
of building “hidden reserves” once they have adopted international accounting standards (hid-
den reserves per se are usually not included in accruals, our preferred earnings measure).  
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Table 24: The impact of board size and gender diversity on earnings management (clus-
tered fixed effects regression) 
 
 Note: Models 1-6 provide the results of various clustered fixed effects regressions with two different 
measures of earnings management: acc_cfo (defined as the absolute value of accruals divided by absolute value 
of operating cash flows) and acc_sca (defined as the absolute value of accruals divided by the absolute value of 
lagged total assets). All models include dummy variables for the year of observation. Standard errors in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 acc_cfo acc_sca acc_cfo acc_sca acc_cfo acc_sca 
              
perc_fem -48.75* -0.0194     
 (28.76) (0.635)     
emp_fem   -81.11** -0.152   
   (37.91) (0.838)   
share_fem   -1.110 0.176 -2.029 0.161 
   (46.38) (1.025) (46.43) (1.026) 
union_fem     10.13 -0.867 
     (101.8) (2.250) 
woco_fem     -12.96 0.150 
     (79.84) (1.765) 
indep_fem     -124.2*** 0.00274 
     (47.99) (1.061) 
board_size 6.029 0.142* 6.610* 0.144* 6.257 0.145* 
 (3.875) (0.0856) (3.900) (0.0862) (3.906) (0.0863) 
board_size2 -0.242 -0.00348 -0.263 -0.00357 -0.258 -0.00358 
 (0.165) (0.00364) (0.166) (0.00366) (0.166) (0.00366) 
log_ass -0.981 -0.404*** -0.898 -0.404*** -0.862 -0.404*** 
 (3.562) (0.0787) (3.562) (0.0787) (3.562) (0.0787) 
sales_g 0.00562 0.000846 0.00629 0.000848 0.00584 0.000850 
 (0.0325) (0.000718) (0.0325) (0.000718) (0.0325) (0.000719) 
leverage -18.38 0.841*** -17.97 0.842*** -18.10 0.844*** 
 (12.62) (0.279) (12.62) (0.279) (12.62) (0.279) 
bank_rep 48.76* -1.281** 46.36* -1.290** 45.32 -1.291** 
 (28.09) (0.620) (28.15) (0.622) (28.16) (0.623) 
inter_acc 10.10* 0.204* 10.18* 0.204* 10.04* 0.205* 
 (5.199) (0.115) (5.199) (0.115) (5.200) (0.115) 
cross_listing -4.212 -0.0478 -4.523 -0.0491 -3.855 -0.0432 
 (16.04) (0.354) (16.04) (0.354) (16.07) (0.355) 
constant -8.046 4.736*** -11.38 4.723*** -8.983 4.713*** 
 (48.72) (1.076) (48.78) (1.078) (48.81) (1.079) 
       
Observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 
R² 0.013 0.026 0.014 0.026 0.015 0.026 
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 When using our second measure of earnings measurement (acc_sca) as dependent vari-
able, we end up with similar results (see model (2) in Table 24). While we again observe a 
negative effect of female directors on accruals (i.e., less earnings management), this effect is 
not statistically significant. With regard to board size, we do not find a significant effect; as in 
model (1) we are not able to confirm the available research (mainly US based) for Germany – 
suggesting that a smaller board is more efficient in monitoring and thus responsible for a re-
duction in earnings management. Furthermore, we observe similar significant effects of sales 
growth and the adoption of international accounting standards on earnings management.  
 In our third model (model (3)) we take closer look at the impact of various sub-groups 
of female board directors on earnings management by estimating the separate influence of 
female employee representatives (emp_fem) and female shareholder representatives 
(share_fem). We observe a significant negative effect of both variables with the effect of fe-
male employee representatives being twice as strong and with higher statistical significance 
than female shareholder representatives; this means that the addition of a female employee 
representative to a 20-member board reduces the level of accruals (and thus earnings man-
agement) by 23% vs a 12% reduction with the addition of a female shareholder representative. 
The findings seem to suggest that the positive monitoring effect, that is realized by female 
directors, is dominantly induced by the presence of female employee representatives. A pos-
sible explanation is that employees often take a more long-term perspective than shareholder 
representatives, as job security is their main concern and are, therefore, less interested in 
short-term earnings management. All other effects are similar to the ones obtained in estima-
tions (1) and (2).  
Model (4) displays the results of the same regression with our alternative measure of 
earnings management (acc_sca) as the dependent variable. Once again, we do not find a sig-
nificant effect of the percentage of female board directors, all other effects are similar to the 
ones in model (2).  
 Finally, in model (5) we divide the sub-group of female employee representatives even 
further by distinguishing between female union representatives (union_fem), female works 
council representatives (woco_fem) and independent female employee representatives (in-
dep_fem). While the observe a similar negative effect of female shareholder representatives 
on accruals, we see that the negative effect of employee representatives was solely driven by 
independent female employee representatives; the addition of an independent female employ-
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ee representatives reduces average accruals by 35% versus 12% with the addition of a female 
shareholder representative. Thus, the “female monitoring effect” is mainly driven by female 
board members, who have neither been appointed by the respective union nor by the firm’s 
works council. The remaining independent variables show the same direction and level of 
statistical significance as in previous models. The result of our estimation (6) is once again 
similar to the previous modes with our alternative measure of accruals: we observe the same 
direction of our variables of female board representation but observe no significance while all 
other results are in line with prior models.  
Summarizing, we confirm our main prediction that a higher percentage of (a specific 
group of) female board directors is associated with lower levels of accruals and thus less earn-
ings management. Although our results differ marginally between the two different measures 
of earnings management that we use in our estimations, we are confident of not having pro-
duced statistical artifacts, but robust findings on which policy recommendations can (and 
should) be based. 
6.6.3.2. Board Composition, Board Size, and Earnings Management 
 
 In a second series of regressions, the results of which are displayed in Table 25, we ana-
lyze the effect of board composition on earnings management. Similar to Xie, et al. (2003) we 
take a closer look at the composition of the supervisory board by occupation and its possible 
impact on earnings management. Our model (1) reveals that in this context the only statistical-
ly significant variable of board composition is the percentage of principal investors: we find a 
significantly negative effect for the percentage of board members representing the principal 
investor(s) (p_invest). This suggests that principal investors are associated with lower levels 
of earnings management; this result is in line with Xie, et al. (2003) who find that supervisory 
board members with a corporate or finance background are associated with less earnings 
management; in our case the addition of a principal investor to a 20-member board reduces 
the level of accruals by almost 11%.45. 
Looking at model (2) with our alternative measure of earnings management (acc_sca) 
as the dependent variable, we end up with different results: While the coefficient of the per-
centage of principal investors does not retain its level of statistical significance, we now find a 
                                                           
45  Again, the coefficients of the remaining variables are in line with our expectations with effects that are simi-
lar to the ones documented in our first set of regressions already. 
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significant positive impact with the percentage of auditors. This is rather counterintuitive and 
suggests that more auditors are associated with more earnings management (we expected to 
find the opposite, i.e., a negative effect); the addition of an auditor to a 20-member board in-
creases the level of average accruals by 9%. One possible explanation is that auditors as ex-
perts in accounting rules are also specialists in the use of accounting discretion. With regard 
to board size we once again do not find any significant effect46.  
Overall, we can only partly confirm prior research (Xie, et al. (2003)) finding that su-
pervisory board members with a corporate or finance background are associated with less 
earnings management. In the German context this is at best true for certain sub-groups (like 
principal investors) but can certainly not be generalized as we also observe more earnings 
management with a higher percentage of auditors on the supervisory board.  
  
                                                           
46  The remaining variables have similar effects as the ones we observe in our first series of regressions.  
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Table 25: The impact of board size and board composition on earnings management 
(clustered fixed effects regression) 
 
 Note: Models 1 and 2 provide the results of clustered fixed-effects regressions with two different 
measures of earnings management: acc_cfo (defined as the absolute value of accruals divided by absolute value 
of operating cash flows) and acc_sca (defined as the absolute value of accruals divided by the absolute value of 
lagged total assets). All models include dummy variables for the year of observation. Standard errors are in pa-
rentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
accruals_cfo accruals_scaled 
      
auditor 4.821 0.204* 
(4.679) (0.107) 
lawyer -4.561 0.0357 
 
(3.872) (0.0586) 
p_invest -6.732** 0.0953 
 
(3.268) (0.106) 
board_large 1.910 -0.00168 
(3.917) (0.0473) 
consultant -1.235 0.0731 
(5.139) (0.0548) 
professor -2.398 -0.0508 
 
(7.349) (0.115) 
board_size -0.555 0.00649 
 
(0.799) (0.0128) 
board_size2 0.0286 -0.000228 
(0.0391) (0.000437) 
log_ass -0.614 -0.00137 
(0.596) (0.0140) 
sales_g 0.00181** 0.000250*** 
 
(0.000833) (3.41e-05) 
leverage 2.369 -0.0186 
 
(2.565) (0.0299) 
bank_rep 0.686 -0.0878 
(4.277) (0.0643) 
inter_acc 2.191*** 0.0332*** 
(0.654) (0.00948) 
cross_listing -2.753 -0.0178 
 
(2.159) (0.0450) 
constant 11.24 0.118 
 
(8.032) (0.193) 
Observations 2,334 2,334 
R² 0.018 0.043 
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6.7. Conclusion 
 
 Using the by far largest and most comprehensive dataset on German supervisory boards 
we find that female board members contribute to “good governance” i.e., are better monitors 
inducing less earnings management. More specifically, this result is mainly driven by the per-
centage of independent employee representatives and female shareholder representatives. The 
perhaps most important implication is, therefore, that the evidence presented above cannot be 
used to advocate quota-based policy initiatives as it is not the quantity of female directors per 
se that improves the quality of monitoring leading to less earnings management. Apparently, 
it is the independence and the long-term perspective of a specific sub-group of employee rep-
resentatives that turns out to be the most important driver for good governance and diligent 
monitoring. The size of this sub-group, however, can not (and should not) be regulated by 
law. 
 With regard to board size, we do not find any evidence that small boards are more effi-
cient monitoring in the sense that they are associated with lower levels of earnings manage-
ment. These findings do not support recent interventions to reduce the size of German super-
visory boards. This is in line with prior research (see e.g., Coles, et al. (2008)) who also can 
not show consistent positive effects of smaller boards but rather demonstrate that larger 
boards are beneficial in certain industries and/or under specific conditions (complex indus-
tries, diversified firms, etc.). 
Finally, the same holds for other variables of board composition where we are not able 
to find consistent results for specific groups of board members as set forth in prior research by 
e.g., Xie, et al. (2003).  
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7. Cash Holdings, Board Size and Composition: Empirical Evidence from Germany 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 "Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are es-
pecially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow" (Jensen (1986), p. 
323) 
 One of the central questions of agency theory is the one of the use of internal funds 
(cash) as part of the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990)): managers must 
take strategic decisions on whether to spend the funds internally, i.e., by investing in fixed 
assets (capital expenditures) or in intangible assets (research and development), spend funds 
externally for acquisitions, or disgorge cash to shareholders, either via dividends or share re-
purchases.  
 Thus, cash holdings and the associated agency problems have been discussed extensive-
ly in academia. Only in recent years though the debate has been extended to include explicit 
corporate governance measures as ways to mitigate this conflict: "Good corporate govern-
ance is the shareholders' defense against inefficient use of corporate assets by managers" 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), p. 600). This string of research has mainly focused on the 
Anglo-American one tier board system and has not considered the board composition in de-
tail. I expect that this detail of board composition will give me more insight on what really 
matters in corporate governance with regards to boards. While research on firm-level govern-
ance in the US mainly focuses on management and family control rights, as prior research 
(e.g., Kalcheva and Lins (2007)) assumes, that this group is responsible for operational and 
financial decisions, I – for the first time – focus on measures of board composition which give 
a more detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance for German firms. I perform this 
analysis using a comprehensive data set of the largest German listed companies for the period 
from 1998 until 2007, considering the effects of board size and board composition on the lev-
el of cash holdings. The main result is that employee representation is associated with lower 
levels of cash holdings; independent employee representatives mainly drive this result. While 
I find that larger boards are associated with lower levels of cash holdings, I am not able to 
find stringent results with regards to other measures of board composition.   
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 Furthermore, I enhance shortcomings of country-level studies (e.g., Dittmar, et al. 
(2003), Kalcheva and Lins (2007)) that do not consider country-specific constellations such as 
codetermination in Germany which – as indicated in prior research – is considered to lead to 
lower shareholder power in certain cases. Additionally, I also provide more up to date evi-
dence as international studies were mainly based on data from 1996 and earlier; significant 
development has occurred since then, i.e., improvements in corporate governance and trans-
parency in Western Europe and Germany (e.g., introduction of German corporate Governance 
Code in 2002), that was not covered by prior research.  
Finally, Germany provides an excellent ground for this analysis, as shareholder protec-
tion is considered to be rather weak and thus shareholders might not be able to force man-
agement to disgorge excess cash to them; such shareholder power is assumed in countries like 
the US where shareholder protection is considered as strong (see La Porta, et al. (2000)). Such 
lower shareholder protection would make it even more important to have good monitors in 
place.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents a review of ex-
isting literature on board diversity and earnings management, and section 7.3 describes the 
legal background in Germany. Section 7.4 discusses the data, the empirical methodology em-
ployed is explained in section 7.5. The results are displayed in section 7.6, section 7. 7 con-
cludes the paper.  
7.2. Cash Holdings and Corporate Governance 
7.2.1. Optimal Levels of Cash Holdings and Agency Theory 
 Early research on cash holdings aimed on finding the optimal level of cash in a firm – 
from a firm perspective. Ideally, the level of cash is such that "the marginal benefit of cash 
holdings equals the marginal cost of those holdings" (Opler, et al. (1999), p. 4). As costs for 
holding cash are generally seen the lower rates of return versus other asset classes and possi-
ble tax disadvantages. The motives of cash holdings were already describes by Keynes (1936) 
and pointedly summarized by Opler, et al. (1999): “First, the transaction cost motive building 
on the fact that the firm saves transaction costs when it does not have to externally raise funds 
or liquidate assets, and second, the precautionary motive, which stands for the possibility of 
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firms to use cash holdings to finance investments and activities in case outside funding is not 
available or costly.”  
 While a lot of further research focused on finding the optimal level of cash holdings 
considering the above mentioned trade-offs (e.g., Mulligan (1997), Miller and Orr (1966)), a 
level optimal in terms of shareholder wealth maximization, this does not consider any con-
flicts between shareholders and managers: "The problem is how to motivate managers to dis-
gorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organiza-
tion inefficiencies" (Jensen (1986), p. 323) 
 The conflicts between shareholders and managers associated with cash flow and cash 
holdings have received a great deal of discussion in agency theory. Generally, payouts to 
shareholders reduce the power of managers as available resources under their control are re-
duced. If these resources are not readily available anymore, managers have to raise outside 
capital and thus receive increased monitoring by the capital markets (Jensen (1986)). As Jen-
sen (1986) points out that there are numerous incentives for managers to have relatively high 
cash holdings as this enables them to grow their companies (even beyond optimal size) to 
increase their power and potentially even compensation (when dependent on sales or sales 
growth).  
 Jensen (1986) additionally mentions that a way to mitigate these principle agent con-
flicts is debt as it is effectively reduces the conflict between shareholders and managers; if 
managers take on debt to repurchase shares they make a credible promise to shareholders to 
pay out future cash flow. This is specifically true for companies with high free cash flow (de-
fined as cash flow in excess of what is required to fund all investments that are value creating) 
and low growth prospects. The author provides evidence for this as he observes that share 
prices increase following an increase in leverage and decrease when leverage is reduced and 
thus more cash available for managers. Jensen furthermore states that the same applies to lev-
eraged buyouts as he argues that many of the benefits of leveraged buyouts are due to the con-
trol function of debt.  
 Stulz (1990) builds on this and argues that in general financing policy matters to reduce 
agency cost of managerial discretion. He sees two different agency costs which arise due to 
managerial discretion: first, overinvestment cost which is caused by too much investment, i.e., 
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investment in non-value creating projects, and second, underinvestment cost which is caused 
by a lack of credibility of management when arguing that it can not fund value-creating pro-
jects with the current cash flow. Therefore, Stulz argues that there is a unique solution for 
each firm's capital structure. This is also true with regards to timing of financing decisions, as 
he argues that cash flow volatility should be low in order to have foreseeable funds to engage 
in value-creating investments.  
 Building on the research of optimal cash holdings and agency theory, Opler, et al. 
(1999) show, based on a sample of all publicly traded US firms from the period 1971 to 1994 
(n=87,117), that, on the one hand, firms with strong growth opportunities, firms operating 
riskier businesses, and small firms have higher cash holdings; on the other hand, firms with 
better access to capital markets, i.e., large firms or firms with credit ratings, have lower cash 
holdings. This supports the view that managers hoard cash if they have the chance to do so 
out of precautionary motives. Furthermore, the authors do not find evidence that excess cash 
has a significant impact on dividends or repurchases, capital expenditures, and acquisition 
spending in the short run.  
Any research about corporate governance with regards to cash holdings should address 
the above mentioned conflicts; thus, I consider next the existing research in the field of corpo-
rate governance and cash holdings.  
7.2.2. Cash Holdings and Corporate Governance 
 While earlier research on cash holdings has mainly considered one measure of govern-
ance, insider ownership (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Harford (1999)), first attempts to 
include further corporate governance measures were performed on an international level: by 
comparing the levels of cash holdings across several countries Dittmar, et al. (2003) find, 
based on a sample of some 11,000 companies from 45 countries for the year 1998 (n=11,414), 
strong effects of corporate governance on cash holdings: even after controlling for industry 
effects and firm characteristics, the authors find that firms in countries with the lowest level of 
shareholder protection have cash holdings which are more than 100% larger than the holdings 
of firms in countries with the highest level of shareholder protection. To measure shareholder 
protection the authors use a shareholder rights measure developed by La Porta, et al. (1998); 
this measure evaluates the strength of minority shareholders in corporate governance.  
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 Pinkowitz, et al. (2006) extent this research as they consider the impact of cash holdings 
on firm value using time series data for the period of 1988 to 1998 from 35 countries. They 
find that minority shareholders value cash holdings less for firms that incorporate in countries 
with lower shareholder rights and that they value dividends more for firms in such countries 
compared to firms in high protection countries.  
 Kalcheva and Lins (2007) further build on this as they consider the benefits and costs of 
cash holdings on an international level. Based on a sample of 5,102 firms from 31 countries 
for the year 1996 (n=5,102) the authors consider country-level and firm-level corporate gov-
ernance; their measure of managerial entrenchment, i.e., firm level corporate governance, is 
the share of control rights available to the management group and their families and the exist-
ence of possible other strong blockholders. The authors find that agency problems and high 
cash holdings are negatively related to firm value; this finding is independent of country-level 
shareholder protection.  
 Faulklender and Wang (2006) examine the marginal value of cash holdings on a firm-
level for US companies in relation with governance-related measures: based on a sample of 
US companies from 1971 to 2001 (n=82,187) they find that the marginal value of cash is low-
er with higher cash levels, higher leverage, better access to capital markets as well as for firms 
that disgorge cash via dividends rather than share repurchases.  
 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) take a more detailed look on firm-level corporate gov-
ernance and cash holdings and its impact on valuation on a national level, i.e., the US. Using a 
sample of all US publicly traded firms for the years 1990 to 2003 with 1,952 firms and 13,095 
observations, the authors find that the value of an additional Dollar of cash is worth between 
$0.42 and $0.88 in a poorly governed firm and that this value doubles for firm with "good" 
governance, which is evaluated with multiple measures based on managerial entrenchment 
and on the existence of takeover defenses as well as the monitoring effect of large sharehold-
ers.   
 Harford, et al. (2008) build on this and use multiple measures of corporate governance 
(i.e., ownership concentration (managerial and institutional), executive compensation, board 
composition, and an index of shareholder rights as developed by Gompers, et al. (2003)) and 
thus agency problems for US firms. Based on a sample of 11,645 firm-year observations of 
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1,872 firms for the years 1993 to 2004, the authors observe that firms with higher ownership 
concentration, especially insider ownership, have higher cash holdings, while firms with 
weaker shareholder rights have lower cash holdings. These firms with weaker shareholder 
rights with higher cash holdings spend less cash on research and development (R&D) and 
spend more on capital expenditures (capex) as well as acquisitions. With regards to distribu-
tions to shareholders, weaker shareholder rights firms prefer repurchases in order to avoid 
future commitments with regards to payouts to shareholders. The opposite is true for firms 
with stronger shareholder rights; these prefer to increase dividends, thereby committing high-
er payouts in the long term.  
 Klasa, et al. (2009) consider cash holdings from a different perspective: based on a 
sample with 34,042 observations of US manufacturing firms from 1983 to 2004, they find that 
firms, which operate in highly unionized industries, hold less cash in order to strengthen their 
bargaining position in negotiations with unions. With this perspective they introduce another 
cost of holding large cash reserves – the weakened position in negotiations with unions.  
 Considering the severity of agency problems, Chi and Scott Lee (2010) find, based on a 
sample of US companies from 1990 to 2005 (n=17,222) that higher quality of corporate gov-
ernance has a positive effect on firm value for firms that have high free cash flow. On the con-
trary, they find that lower or no impact of governance for firms with low free cash flow. In 
their research, free cash flow is taken as a proxy for agency conflicts. Furthermore, the au-
thors find that board size and board independence has a negative effect on firm value for 
companies with more severe agency problems (i.e., higher free cash flow); however, this find-
ing does not hold when controlling for other governance mechanisms.  
 Ferreira and Vilela (2004) provide evidence about cash holdings on a European level 
(using data from EMU companies from 1987 to 2000 with 6,387 observations): they find that 
both investment opportunities and cash flows have a positive effect on cash holdings, while 
asset liquidity, leverage, size, bank debt have a negative impact. Furthermore, they also find 
that stronger investor protection and concentrated ownership also leads to lower cash levels as 
well as capital markets development. Schauten, et al. (2008) consider the value of excess cash 
of large European firms. Based on a sample of 271 large European firms from 1990 to 2005 
(n=3,831) they find that, out of a range of governance variables considering shareholder 
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rights, takeover defenses, disclosure and board functioning, only takeover defenses have a 
significant and positive effect on the value of excess cash. In addition, they find that poorly 
governed firms spend excess cash more quickly resulting in negative effects on their operating 
performance.  
 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) provide research for Europe on a country-level as they consid-
er the UK market with a sample of 1,029 UK firms from 1984 to 1999 with 12,960 observa-
tions. They find that managerial ownership has a non-monotonic effect on cash holdings; cash 
holdings fall as managerial ownership increases to 24%, it rises as it increases to 64%, and 
falls again at higher ownership levels. While they do not find any effect of board composition 
and the presence of ultimate controllers, they observe that family-controlled companies tend 
to have higher levels of cash holdings. Furthermore, they find that growth opportunities, cash 
flows, liquid assets, and bank debt have significant effects on cash holdings.  
With regards to the German market I was not able to find any prior research on cash 
holdings and corporate governance. Thus, I want to fill this gap with my study and also pro-
vide more detail on the effects of more granular measures of board composition. This is espe-
cially motivated by the unique environment present in the German market which I explain in 
more detail in section 7.3.   
7.2.3. Research Hypotheses 
 Based on prior research I have two broad hypotheses with regards to the level of cash 
holdings and my measures of board size and board composition. I generally expect a negative 
relationship between board size and cash holdings as I assume that larger boards are more 
effective monitors with regards to the rather complex area of cash holdings, which requires - 
in my perspective - more expertise that is more likely to be prevalent in large boards; this is a 
result found in prior research by Coles, et al. (2008) as they point out that larger boards are 
more effective for more complex tasks. Thus my first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with larger boards are more effectively monitored and thus have lower 
levels of cash holdings. 
 With regards to board composition, I generally expect the same relationship as I assume 
lower cash holdings with better governance.  
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Hypothesis 2: Firms with better governance, caused by certain characteristics of board com-
position, have lower levels of cash holdings. 
 I break this main hypothesis down on board composition in several sub-hypotheses: 
Considering employee representation I expect lower levels of cash holdings; however, this 
could be driven by two reasons (as laid out by above mentioned prior reseach): first, employ-
ee representatives are more independent from management and have high operational 
knowledge and thus might be more diligent monitors. Second, lower levels of cash could be 
driven by the managements desire to have lower levels as an argument when negotiating with 
unions. Thus, my first sub-hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with employee representation have lower levels of cash. 
 With regards to further measures of board composition (the share of bank representa-
tives, former managing board members, auditors, and lawyers) I expect, along the main hy-
pothesis 2 that better monitoring of these members will lead to lower levels of cash and higher 
valuations; I do not establish a sub-hypothesis for each of these variables.  
 Finally, regarding female representation on the board I expect - along the lines of prior 
research (see section 5.2.2 for a comprehensive overview of existing research) - better moni-
toring of female members and thus lower levels of cash.  
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with female directors have lower levels of cash. 
7.3. Legal and Institutional Background 
 The German system of corporate governance differs fundamentally from the Anglo-
American one: while the latter has the main goal to maximize the return to the shareholder 
and thus provide an efficient system to mitigate any agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997)), the German system tries to take all stakeholders into account and to include their 
varying views in its corporate decision making (Fauver and Fuerst (2006)). More specifically, 
a publicly held German company (Aktiengesellschaft) is governed by a two-tiered board struc-
ture, consisting of the management board (Vorstand) and the supervisory board (Aufsichtrat). 
The management board consists of the executive directors and is responsible for running the 
firm on a day-to-day basis and setting its strategic direction. The supervisory board has, to a 
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large extent, similar duties as the US board of directors as it is responsible for the remunera-
tion of the management board and the appointment of its members. However, the fundamental 
difference is that the management board reports to the supervisory board and no management 
board member can be a simultaneous member of the supervisory board.  
Generally, the law for stock corporations (Aktiengesetz) sets the size of the supervisory 
board – with a minimum size of 3 and a maximum of 21 depending on statutory equity capi-
tal.  Furthermore, a set codetermination laws determines the size and composition of the su-
pervisory board of nearly all47 private limited liability corporations (GmbH) and publicly 
listed companies (Aktiengesellschaft): The Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951 requires 
that companies with more than 1,000 employees operating in the steel, mining and coal sector 
are subject to a 50% employee and 50% shareholder representation on the supervisory board 
(one-half or parity codetermination). Depending on the statutory equity capital of the compa-
ny and the number of its employees, the size of the board is set to 11, 15 or 21, always includ-
ing one "neutral" member, i.e., a member that is neither a representative of the employees nor 
of the shareholders. For boards with 15 and 21 members, respectively two or three union 
members are part of the employee representatives; the remaining employee representatives 
can either be part of the so called works council, a form of employee representation on the 
shop floor or a representative independent of unions or works councils. The Montanmitbes-
timmungsgesetz was extended to companies from all other industries in 1976 with the Mitbes-
timmungsgesetz, which sets the size of the board and its composition for public companies 
with more than 2,000 domestic employees. This requires companies fitting these specifica-
tions to give half of their board seats to employee representatives.  The chair of the board, 
which has two votes in a tied situation, remains a shareholder representative. Thus, this form 
of codetermination is called "quasi-parity" codetermination. To simplify the discussion,  I will 
also call this form of codetermination “parity” or “one-half” codetermination as research has 
shown that most decisions are made in unison and the chairman rarely uses his two votes to 
outvote the employee representatives (Kommision Mitbestimmung (1998)). Depending on the 
number of employees the size of the board is set to 12, 16, or 20 members for companies with 
domestic employees between 2,000 and 10,000, 10,000 and 20,000 and more than 20,000 
respectively. Furthermore, union representation as part of this employee representation is set 
                                                           
47  All companies which primary business is in the field of media or religious, union or political activities are not 
subject to these codetermination laws. 
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to two or three members depending on the size of the board. One of the employee representa-
tives must be from the middle management (leitender Angestellter). Finally, all public com-
panies, except those which are family-owned, with 500 to 2,000 employees are subject to the 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz of 2004 which requires these companies to have at least one-third of 
their board seats filled with employee representatives. 
7.4. Data 
7.4.1. Sample Formation 
 My data consists of all publicly listed German companies that were listed for at least 
one year in one of the three largest German stock market indices - DAX, MDAX, or SDAX – 
during the period 1998-2007. Furthermore, only those companies with at least two years of 
available data were included in the dataset. As I was not able to obtain annual reports for one 
or more years for seven companies, the initial sample consists of 2,476 observations from 306 
companies. From this initial sample I drop all companies that are incorporated as Kom-
manditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA), as this is a hybrid organizational form between a part-
nership and a stock corporation, and all foreign companies as these are not subject to the 
German law. Finally, I exclude all firms that operate in the financial industry (SIC codes 6000 
to 6999) as inventories include marketable securities and thus liquidity is hard to assess. This 
leaves me with 1,904 observations from 231 firms in my final dataset.  
7.4.2. Data Sources 
 All data on supervisory board composition is hand-collected from annual reports. Re-
ports not available from the company's website were obtained from the annual report database 
of the Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V. as well as various archives in Germany 
(Archive of the Bavarian Chamber of Commerce, Archive of the University of Bremen, Ar-
chive of the University of Cologne). Finally, if no reports were available, data for supervisory 
board composition was culled from the Hoppenstedt Jahrbuch der Großunternehmen. 
Measures of accounting performance as well as business and geographic segment data were 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Missing accounting data in Worldscope was 
complemented with data from annual reports. I obtained data on market capitalization from 
Datastream. Finally, I added data for special company conditions (restructurings, mergers & 
acquisitions) from an extensive press search.  
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7.5. Methodology 
7.5.1.  Variables 
My analysis comprises a series of cross-sectional multivariate regressions to determine 
the impact of board size and board composition on the level of cash. To ensure the robustness 
of my results I use scale cash by different measures, which I assume to be complementary to 
each other and measure essentially the same.  
 Similar to Harford, et al. (2008) I regard cash holdings as an important part of the opera-
tions of the firm as it is, at least partly, a component of  working capital of the firm. As work-
ing capital is usually regarded in a close relationship to sales, I scale cash holdings48 by sales 
as my measure of cash holdings (cash_sales). Furthermore, I alternatively use cash divided by 
net assets49 (cash_net_assets) as well as an industry-adjusted measure of cash to sales (indus-
try_adj_cash) as used in prior research (e.g., Opler, et al. (1999), Harford, et al. (2008)). The 
industry-adjusted measure is considered as I believe that the industry has a significant effect 
on the required level of cash. This measure is derived as follows: I first calculate the mean 
levels of cash holdings to sales for each of the one-digit SIC industries and then calculate each 
firm's value by subtracting the respective industry mean from the firm-specific cash holding.  
 As measures of firm specific governance I use board size and several variables indicat-
ing the composition of the supervisory board. I measure board size with the variable size, 
which indicates the absolute number of board members. An overview of the development of 
the average board size in Germany is provided in Table 26. Prior evidence on the effect of 
board size is mixed: while e.g., Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) believe that smaller boards 
can reach agreements more efficiently and thus are better in monitoring, Harris and Raviv 
(2006) find that large boards will provide better monitoring for firms which provide ample 
opportunities to managers for private consumption. While literature on the German market 
(section 5 and 6) is not able to find consistent effects of board size with regards to more effi-
cient monitoring, I still expect a negative effect of board size on cash holdings (as also estab-
lished in my research hypotheses) as I believe that larger boards are more capable in monitor-
ing on rather complex area of cash holdings.  
                                                           
48 Defined as cash and cash equivalents as in prior research (e.g., Harford, et al. (2008), Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007)) 
49 Total assets minus cash and cash equivalents 
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 When considering board composition I consider first the general impact of the share of 
employee representation (measured by the variable emp_rep, which indicates the share of 
employee representatives over total board members). With regard to the effect of employee 
representation on cash levels I expect a positive effect; prior research (e.g., Gorton and 
Schmid (2004) and Klasa, et al. (2009)) finds that companies increase leverage to decrease 
cash holding in order to improve their bargaining position with labor unions. Thus, with em-
ployee representation on the supervisory board I expect a contrary effect, i.e., that I observe 
higher cash levels with more employee representatives on the board. To research further de-
tails of employee representation I consider its components as the representatives are either 
union representatives, works council representatives, or independent representatives (as men-
tioned in section 7.3). Thus, I measure with the variables union_rep, woco_rep, and ind_rep 
the respective shares of these representatives of total board members. I expect a similar effect 
as my main variable emp_rep.  
 Furthermore, I consider variables of board composition on the shareholder representa-
tives' side as the annual report mentions the job title for shareholder representatives; I research 
the specific effect of the following groups: former managing board members, bank representa-
tives, auditors, and lawyers. I measure the share of former managing board members of total 
board members with the variable former_bm; on average 6% of shareholder representatives 
on the supervisory board are former managing board members. I can imagine two different 
effects of this measure: first, a positive effect would be likely if former board members use 
their insider knowledge to be very diligent monitors and knowledgeable advisors. Conversely, 
if they are primarily interested in their reputation ( i.e., they desire their own work as man-
agement board members be regarded positively or they try to cover mistakes from the past 
and thus want to have as much cash reserves as possible to absorb the effects of mistakes) or 
in their power as supervisory board members (i.e., grow the company with NPV-negative 
projects), I expect a negative effect of the share of former board members on cash holdings as 
they might neglect their duties as thorough monitors and valuable advisors. 
 The share of bank representatives is measured by bank_rep (on average 9.4% of share-
holder representatives are bank representatives); with regards to its effect on cash holdings I 
expect a positive of bank representatives as I assume – in line with prior research (e.g., 
Dittmann, et al. (2010)) that bankers want firms to meet their interest payments and debt cov-
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enants and thus keep higher levels of cash out of a precautionary motive. Auditor measures 
the share of auditors and lawyer the share of lawyers. These board members were classified as 
listed with their job descriptions in the annual reports of the firm. These classifications are not 
mutually exclusive, e.g., a lawyer could also an auditor or a former board member. I am not 
able to predict the effect of either of these variables as I could imagine lower cash holdings 
due to better monitoring in terms of efficiency as well as higher cash holdings out of a trans-
action or precautionary motive.  
Finally, I regard the effect of female board members by using several variables: first, I 
measure the general share of female directors with female; second, I regard details of female 
representatives: union_female measures the share female union representatives, works_female 
works council representatives, ind_female independent female employee representatives and 
shareholder_female female shareholder representatives. I expect lower cash levels with fe-
male board members as Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that "gender-diverse boards allocate 
more effort to monitoring". This effect could be limited to a certain "amount" of gender diver-
sity though as also Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that too much gender diversity could 
lead to "overmonitoring". My prediction with regards to the effect of female board representa-
tion on cash holdings is generally positive as observed in previous research (e.g., Catalyst 
(2007), section 5 and 6). The share of female board members is on average 8.1.% - a detailed 
breakdown of female directors and its development in German supervisory boards is shown in 
Table 26.  
. 
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Table 26: Development of female directors in German corporate supervisory boards 
 Note: This includes boards of all German listed companies, except foreign companies and KGaAs and 
financial services firms 
 
 As firm-level control variables I use variables similar to Harford, et al. (2008) and 
Opler, et al. (1999) when analyzing the level of cash holdings: first, I use the logarithm of 
assets (log_assets) as a proxy for firm size, generally also considered as a takeover deterrent. 
Leverage measures the firm-specific leverage (short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets); debt plays an important role when determining the level of liquid assets: first, infor-
mation asymmetries might make it difficult and expensive for firms to raise debt and thus 
these companies prefer to hold liquid assets or reduce investments to avoid costs of financial 
distress (Myers and Majluf (1984)); second, agency costs of debt emerge when the interests of 
shareholders differ from those of the debtholders making it very expensive to raise additional 
funds which might lead to asset substitution and underinvestment (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). Tobin's Q (tobin_q50) is used, similar to the market-to-book ratio, as a proxy for prof-
itable investment opportunities (Opler, et al. (1999)); I would expect firms with a high Tobin's 
Q to have higher cash holdings as the cost of not investing in profitable projects is high. The 
ratio of cash flow to assets (cash_flow_na), calculated as earnings after interest, dividends and 
taxes but before depreciation divided by net assets, is an important factor in determining the 
                                                           
50 Calculated as follows: 
assetsofvalueBook
equityofvalueBookassetsofvalueBookequityofvalueMarket
sQTobin
−+
='  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Board size 10.58 10 9.48 9.61 9.78 9.46 9.56 9.44 9.23 9.16
Percent women on the board 7.00% 7.00% 6.70% 7.00% 7.20% 7.70% 8.00% 8.20% 7.60% 7.80%
Average number of women on the board 0.78 0.74 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.89
Female employee representatives 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.64 0.71 0.78 0.77 0.71 0.69
Female union representatives 0.14 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14
Female works council representatives 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.2 0.2 0.22 0.23 0.2
Female independent employee representatives 0.33 0.31 0.3 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.36
Female shareholder representatives 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19
Female members with PhD 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
share of female board members 9% 7% 7% 8% 9% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9%
Male members with PhD 3.44 3.09 2.94 2.91 2.88 2.77 2.86 2.86 2.8 2.74
share of male board members 35% 33% 34% 33% 32% 32% 33% 34% 33% 33%
Connected female directors 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04
Percentage of firms with no women on the board 51.7% 52.2% 53.9% 53.1% 52.3% 49.6% 45.4% 46.9% 48.8% 49.2%
Percentage of firms with one woman on the board 28.0% 28.5% 25.5% 24.4% 23.6% 25.4% 30.3% 27.2% 25.4% 24.4%
Percentage of firms with two women on the board 9.2% 9.2% 11.1% 11.8% 10.1% 10.5% 9.7% 10.9% 9.4% 10.1%
Percentage of firms with more than two women on the board 9.2% 8.0% 6.6% 7.7% 10.5% 10.9% 11.3% 11.7% 11.9% 11.8%
Average size of board with female director 12.9 12.61 12.58 12.58 12.96 12.73 12.91 12.97 12.95 12.81
Average size of board with no female director 8.91 8.08 7.51 7.68 7.75 7.06 6.49 6.36 6.53 6.59
Observations 203 244 263 263 249 239 230 231 233 227
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level of cash and also as a measure of the severity of agency problems (as measured by free 
cash flow by Chi and Scott Lee (2010)). Furthermore, as a risk proxy, the standard deviation 
of free cash flows51 in the past 10 years is considered (free_cf_stdev). Also similar to Opler, et 
al. (1999) I use the ratio of net working capital to net assets52 (net_wc_na) to measure liquid 
asset substitutes which e.g., exist due to factoring of receivables. The ratio of research and 
development expenses to sales (r_d_sales) is taken as a proxy for the cost of financial distress 
because R&D expenses are an investment where information asymmetries play an important 
role; thus, I expect higher cost of financial distress for firms with higher R&D expenses (see 
Opler, et al. (1999) and Opler and Titman (1994)). As a proxy for expansive investment of 
management the ratio of capital expenditures to sales (capex_sales) is used, similar to Har-
ford, et al. (2008).  
Furthermore, to control for cross-listings I use a dummy variable cross_listing which 
assumes one if the firm is cross-listed either on a United States stock exchange (NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ) or the London Stock exchange53; as in prior research (Frésard and Sal-
va (2009)), I expect that being cross-listed will reduce the risk of insiders using cash holdings 
for private benefits due to higher shareholder protection at the stock exchanges where the 
firms cross-list. With my variable dividend_paid I include a dummy variable that assumes the 
value of one if the company paid a dividend in the respective year. In addition, I consider 
ownership with the cumulative share of employee ownership (emp_held) and institutional 
ownership (invest_held)54. I control for ownership as prior research on cash holdings for in-
ternational markets (e.g., Opler, et al. (1999)) as well as the German market (e.g., Gorton and 
Schmid (2004); Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003)) has shown the importance of insider and institu-
tional ownership on cash holdings. Finally, assuming that cash holdings are specific to time 
periods, I control for the time period with year dummies.  
7.5.2. Econometric Methodology 
 In my analysis I estimate the effect of board size and board composition on the level of 
cash holdings using the following general model:  
                                                           
51 Calculated as funds from operations minus capital expenditures minus cash dividends paid  
52 Current assets (net of cash and equivalents) minus current liabilities divided by net assets 
53 I do not consider companies listed on the UK AIM (alternative investment market) as this market has weaker 
investor protection due to lower admission standards.  
54 Due to the lower availability including these variables slightly reduces the number of observations made.   
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 One of the big advantages of my dataset is that I can observe companies in my dataset 
for a relatively long period of time (up to ten years). During this time period many of the 
firms show changes in the characteristics relevant to board size and board composition (see 
Table 27 and Table 28). These companies are of particular interest to my research as changes 
in their board characteristics allow me to use firm fixed-effects regressions to control for un-
observed heterogeneity55. I would not have been able to use this approach if relevant variables 
would have been constant over time.  
7.6. Results 
7.6.1. Supervisory Boards and Cash Holdings in Germany 
 Table 27 provides an overview on the development of board size and board composition 
of the largest German listed non-financial companies in the years from 1998 to 2007: while 
the average board size has decreased from 10.7 members in 1998 to 9.8 members in 2007, the 
average number of employee representatives on boards has also decreased from 4.7 to 4.0 in 
this time period. With regards to shareholder representatives on German supervisory boards 
the most significant change happened to the number of bank representatives: while in 1998 
almost one bank representative was part of the supervisory board its number has reduced by 
one third to 0.6 average members in 2007.  
  
                                                           
55 An estimation using a clustered fixed effects estimation to control for extreme values yields similar results 
with slightly less statistical significance for the variables of board size and composition; the significance of 
groups of measures of board composition has also been tested yielding similar results, suggesting not to elimi-
nate any of the tested variables; these results are, of course, available from the author upon request 
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Table 27: Characteristics of German supervisory board size and supervisory board 
composition 
 Note: This includes boards of all German listed companies, except foreign companies, KGaAs and finan-
cial services firms. Lawyer is in 23 cases a employee representative (as part of a union or representative of the 
executive employees). 
 
 These changes on an overall level are also considerable on a firm level over time as the 
within variation for our dataset shows (displayed in Table 28). While the between standard 
variation is larger for nearly all variables, I still observe considerable variation within the 
firms allowing me to use fixed-effects estimations (as previously mentioned in section 7.5.2).  
 
  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Entire sample
Board size 10.7 10.3 9.9 10 10.1 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.8 10
Employee representatives 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4 4 4.2
Union representatives 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Works council representatives 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Independent employee representatives 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6
Shareholder representatives
Auditor 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Lawyer 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
Bank representatives 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6
Former managing board member 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Female representatives 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Female employee representatives 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Female union representatives 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Female works council representatives 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Female independent employee representatives 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Female shareholder representatives 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Observations 166 197 211 210 200 192 183 182 184 179 1,904
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Table 28: Overall, between and within variation of main variables 
 
      
Variable   Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
cash_sales overall 0.10 0.19 0.00 3.77 
 between  0.13 0.00 0.99 
 within  0.14 -0.69 3.19 
      
cash_assets overall 9.73 10.93 0.00 75.25 
 between  9.28 0.03 50.73 
 within  6.17 -24.06 54.62 
      
size overall 10.02 5.63 3.00 21.00 
 between  5.57 3.00 21.00 
 within  1.13 0.42 16.42 
      
union_rep overall 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.25 
 between  0.07 0.00 0.18 
 within  0.02 -0.10 0.21 
      
woco_rep overall 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.35 
 between  0.12 0.00 0.35 
 within  0.03 -0.14 0.32 
      
ind_rep overall 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.50 
 between  0.13 0.00 0.40 
 within  0.04 -0.25 0.41 
      
auditor overall 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.33 
 between  0.06 0.00 0.33 
 within  0.03 -0.28 0.24 
      
lawyer overall 0.08 0.13 0.00 1.00 
 between  0.11 0.00 0.67 
 within  0.06 -0.38 0.62 
      
female overall 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.67 
 between  0.09 0.00 0.57 
  within   0.05 -0.22 0.45 
 With regards to cash holdings of German companies from my sample, Table 29 pro-
vides an overview:  The development of cash levels – both scaled by net assets and sales – 
shows only some variation with high levels of cash divided by net assets in the years 1999 
and 2006. Both, total assets as well as absolute levels of cash holdings are growing. With re-
gards to cash to net assets the German level is in line with prior research considering the 
German market (e.g., Schauten, et al. (2008), Ferreira and Vilela (2004)) and is with an aver-
age of 0.13 below the European average reported as 0.15 by both Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
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and Schauten, et al. (2008); this is at the US average of 1990 (0.13), clearly below the US 
average of 2003 (0.41 – both observed by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)) and at about the 
international average of 0.12 as reported by Kalcheva and Lins (2007).  
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Table 29: Cash holdings in Germany 
 Note: This includes boards of all German listed companies, except foreign companies and KGaAs and 
financial services firms. 
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 Furthermore, Table 29 shows the mean cash to net assets and cash to sales rates per in-
dustry. The industry with the highest level of cash holdings is services, followed by Mining. 
Wholesale and retail trade show the lowest levels of cash holdings. As I am estimating all of 
my equations with firm fixed effects, I do not worry about time-invariant industry effects. All 
yearly effects are controlled for by my year dummies included in my regressions.  
7.6.2. Univariate Results 
 Table 30 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in my analysis.  
Table 30: Descriptive statistics (without year and industry dummies) 
 
     Note: Table 30 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and main independent variables of my model. 
Cash/sales is the ratio of cash and equivalents to sales, cash/assets is the ratio of cash and equivalents to net 
assets (total assets minus cash and equivalents), size is the size of the supervisory board, emp_rep is the share of 
employee representatives of total board members, union_rep is the share of union representatives, woco_rep is 
the share of works council representatives, and ind_rep is the share of independent employee representatives. 
Bank_rep is the share of bank representatives of total board members, former_bm is the share of former manag-
ing board members, auditor the share of auditors, lawyer the share of lawyers, female the share of female direc-
tors, union_female the share of female union representatives, works_female the share of female works council 
representatives, ind_female the share of female independent employee representatives, and shareholder_female 
is the share of female shareholder rerpresentatives. Assets is the value of total assets and sales the value of total 
sales (both in EUR '000). Leverage is the leverage of the company defined as the ratio of total debt divided by 
total assets, tobin_q is the Tobin's Q calculated as follows: (market value of equity + book value of assets - book 
value of equity) / book value of assets, cash_flow_na is the cash flow (calculated as earnings after interest, divi-
dend and taxes but before depreciation) divided by net assets, free_cf_stdev is the standard deviation of free cash 
flow for the past ten years, net_working_capital_net_assets is the ratio of working capital to net assets, r_d_sales 
is the ratio of R&D expenses to sales, capex/sales is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales, cross_list is a 
dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is cross listed at a major stock exchange in the UK or US, dividend_paid 
is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a dividend was paid in the respective year, emp_held is the cumulative owner-
ship of employees, inst_held is the cumulative ownership of institutional investors. The sample consists of all 
German companies listed in the DAX, MDAX, and SDAX for the years 1998 to 2007 with at least two years of 
available data, except firms from the financial services industry (SIC code 6) and KGaAs. 
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Variable   Mean St.-dev. Min 
25th Per-
centile Median 
75th 
Percen-
tile Max 
         Cash/sales 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.11 3.77 
Cash/net assets 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.14 3.04 
Board Size 
 
10.02 5.63 3.00 6.00 9.00 12.00 21.00 
emp_rep 0.32 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.50 
union_rep 
 
0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.25 
woco_rep 
 
0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.35 
ind_rep 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.50 
bank_rep 
 
0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.67 
former_bm 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.50 
auditor 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 
lawyer 
 
0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 
female 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.67 
union_female 
 
0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 
works_female 
 
0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 
ind_female 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
sharehold-
er_female 
 
0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
Assets (€ '000) 
7,027,98
8 
24,200,00
0 46 139,844 
504,05
6 
2,016,06
6 
234,676,00
0 
Sales (€ '000) 
 
5,563,86
0 
16,200,00
0 0 174,083 
621,63
3 
2,453,82
8 
162,400,00
0 
Leverage 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.38 1.71 
Tobin's Q 
 
1.54 1.62 0.20 1.00 1.19 1.54 51.80 
Cash Flow/assets 
 
0.15 3.66 -3.35 0.05 0.08 0.12 159.62 
FCF_stdev 141,124 424,672 0 7,714 23,657 80,414 8,603,270 
Working Capi-
tal/assets 
 
0.08 0.23 -2.08 -0.03 0.08 0.22 0.75 
R&D/sales 0.02 0.03 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27 
CapEx/Sales 
 
0.06 0.14 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 4.94 
cross_list 
 
0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Dividend paid 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
emp_held 
 
17.49 24.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.50 99.00 
invest_held   2.76 8.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.00 
As prior research (e.g., Harford, et al. (2008)) finds a relationship between firm size and 
the level of cash holdings as well as governance variables I expect a similar relationship for 
German firms. To assess this relationship, I assign all firms into four size classes according to 
the four quartiles of total assets. I am able to observe the same for German firms: all variables 
considered in Table 31 show significantly different medians for the first and fourth quartile, 
i.e., for the smallest and largest firms. As shown in Table 31 I observe higher level of cash 
holdings, both measured by the ratio of cash to sales as well as the ratio of cash to net assets, 
with larger companies. This difference in medians is significant across the first and second 
quartile and the third and fourth quartile as the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test show. 
With regards to board size and my variables of employee representation (union_rep, 
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woco_rep, and ind_rep) I observe the expected outcome as the German law regulates size and 
composition (see section 7.3). Finally, the share of female directors is higher with larger com-
panies.  
Table 31: Cash holdings and board size/characteristics relative to firm size 
 
 Note: I examine cash holdings and board size as well as board composition variables based on firm size 
(as measured by total assets). I sort firms into size quartiles each year and report median levels of cash holdings, 
board size and board composition within the quartiles. I use Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to examine weather the 
medians are significantly different between the observed and the next higher quartile. ***,**, and * imply statis-
tical significance at the 0.01 significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 The results of the pairwise Pearson correlation are shown in Table 32: interestingly, I 
observe negative correlations between the level of cash and my variables of employee repre-
sentation, indicating lower cash levels with smaller boards as well as with rising levels of em-
ployee representation on the board. Surprisingly, higher levels of cash are associated with 
auditors on the board whereas lower levels of cash are observed with lawyers. Finally, I ob-
serve positive correlations between the variables of cash holdings and the share of female 
board members. All other correlations are as expected, as I find positive correlations between 
board size and variables of board composition.  
 
  
Cash/sales Cash/assets Board size union_rep woco_rep ind_rep female
Size quartile 1 (smallest) 0.04 *** 0.06 * 3 *** 0 *** 0 0 *** 0 ***
Size quartile 2 0.04 0.06 * 6 *** 0 *** 0 *** 0.17 *** 0 ***
Size quartile 3 0.05 *** 0.06 12 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 0.06 *
Size quartile 4 (largest) 0.08 *** 0.07 ** 20 *** 0.15 0.25 0.1 *** 0.05
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Table 32: Pearson correlation 
 Note: Table 32 provides pearson correlations between the main variables used in my model. Values in 
parentheses show the significance level. ***,**, and * imply statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
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 These univariate results provide me with an indication about the interrelations between 
the levels of cash holdings and my variables of board size and board composition. The follow-
ing multivariate analyses will shed further light on these relationships taking into considera-
tion an array of control variables.  
7.6.3. Multivariate Results 
 In a first series of fixed-effects regressions I analyze the relationship between the level 
of cash holdings and variables of board size and board composition, focusing on employee 
representation using my first model as shown in equation (1) above. The results of the first set 
of regressions are displayed in Table 33: in my first regression (1) I only test the effect of su-
pervisory board size and find a significant negative effect of board size on the level of cash 
(i.e., each additional member reduces the cash to sales ratio by 12.5% on average), confirming 
my hypothesis that a larger board is more effective in monitoring cash levels and thus is asso-
ciated with lower levels of cash56. With regards to the other independent variables I find a 
surprising result as large firms (measured by the logarithm total assets, log_assets) are associ-
ated with higher cash levels; I would have assumed that the access to capital markets is better 
for large firms and thus cash holdings out of a precautionary motive are lower. An explana-
tion for this could be that firm size is a takeover deterrent and thus the need for low cash hold-
ings is not as important for these firms. As expected, I see a negative effect of leverage on 
cash holdings, supporting the argument that debt has a disciplining effect on cash holdings. 
As I consider Tobin's Q as a proxy for profitable investment opportunities, it comes to no sur-
prise that it is associated with higher cash levels in order to secure sufficient funding for these 
opportunities. Furthermore, the negative effect of working capital (net_wc_na) is also in line 
with my expectations, as I assume working capital as a proxy for liquid assets substitutes. 
Finally, both, the ratio of capital expenditures to sales (capex_sales) as well as my dummy for 
dividend payments (dividend_paid) are in line with my expectations as I see lower levels of 
cash holdings with higher capital expenditures and dividend payments. All other independent 
variables remain insignificant.  
 This result remains the same when I include the lagged value of my dependent variable 
cash_sales in my second regression (2); I assume that my firm fixed-effects regression does 
                                                           
56 This result is similar for all regressions when using the ratio of cash to net assets as well as an industry ad-
justed cash to sales ratio; these results are – of course – available  from the author upon request.  
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not fully account for potential endogeneity. Adding the lagged value of my dependent varia-
ble gives me the possibility to examine the explanatory power of the independent variables 
above the explanatory power of the lagged value of my dependent variable itself (as used in 
prior research, e.g., Harford, et al. (2008), Dittmann, et al. (2010)).  
 In my next regression (3), I include insider ownership (emp_held) as well as institution-
al ownership (invest_held); as both variables are only available from 2002 onwards on 
Worldscope, the inclusion reduces the number of observations to 1,108 from 214 firms. Con-
trasting prior research, both variables do not show a significant effect on the level of cash 
holdings. Therefore, I do not include ownership in my further regressions on cash holdings. 
The results of the further independent variables remain similar with a stronger effect of board 
size (the coefficient almost doubled from regression (1)) and the surprising exceptions of 
Tobin's Q (tobin_q), which now has a significant negative effect on cash holdings, as well as 
the ratio of cash flow to net assets (cash_flow_na), which has in this regression a significant 
positive impact; this is in line with my expectations for this variable as I use it as a proxy for 
the severity of agency problems and I expect higher levels of cash with more severe agency 
problems.  
In my fourth regression (4), I consider the first measure of board composition, employee 
representation. I observe that the level of cash holdings is significantly lower with employee 
representation (emp_rep) on the supervisory board (each additional employee representative 
in a board of 20 members reduces the cash to sales ratio by 16.1% on average). This confirms 
my hypothesis 2a that employee representation leads to lower cash holdings. While the direc-
tion and significance of all other independent variables remain the same, I observe that board 
size is not significant anymore when including employee representation. To further evaluate 
the effect of employee representation, I replace the general measure of employee representa-
tion with my detailed measures of union representatives (union_rep), works council repre-
sentatives (woco_rep), and independent employee representatives (ind_rep) in regression (5). 
For all three variables I observe a negative effect on cash holdings once again confirming my 
hypothesis 2a. While the share of union representatives is slightly not significant (p-value of 
0.11), both woco_rep and ind_rep are significant on the 99% respectively 95%-confidence 
interval level. Thus, the addition of works council representative in a 20 member board de-
creases the cash to sales ratio by 21.6% on average, the addition of an independent employee 
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representative decreases the ratio by 14.8% on average. All other variables show similar re-
sults to the outcomes of regression (4). 
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Table 33: Fixed-effects regression of measures of cash holdings on measures of board 
size and board composition 
 
 Note: Models 1-5 of table 33 provide the results of fixed-effects regressions with a measure of cash hold-
ings cash_sales (defined as the ratio of cash and equivalents to sales) on measures of board size, board composi-
tion, and a set of control variables. All models include dummy variables for the year of observation. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respec-
tively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales 
            
lag_cash_sales  0.000167 -0.000367 0.000163 0.000234 
  (0.000695) (0.000942) (0.000692) (0.000695) 
Size -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0240*** -0.00279 -0.00299 
 (0.00319) (0.00320) (0.00637) (0.00424) (0.00443) 
emp_held   0.000421   
   (0.000408)   
invest_held   -0.000530   
   (0.000821)   
emp_rep    -0.322***  
    (0.0925)  
union_rep     -0.316 
     (0.197) 
woco_rep     -0.431*** 
     (0.145) 
ind_rep     -0.295** 
     (0.119) 
log_ass 0.0239** 0.0239** 0.0363 0.0234** 0.0245** 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0233) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
leverage -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.135*** -0.133*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0490) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
tobin_q 0.0102** 0.0102** -0.0370*** 0.00970** 0.00989** 
 (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.0116) (0.00491) (0.00491) 
cash_flow_net_assets -0.00232 -0.00232 0.175*** -0.00218 -0.00218 
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.0311) (0.00188) (0.00188) 
free_cf_stdev 1.63e-10 1.46e-10 -2.43e-08 2.99e-09 4.13e-09 
 (1.41e-08) (1.41e-08) (1.77e-08) (1.41e-08) (1.41e-08) 
net_wc_net_assets -0.0725** -0.0724** -0.182*** -0.0651** -0.0634** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0486) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
r_d_sales -0.251 -0.250 -0.409 -0.225 -0.230 
 (0.271) (0.271) (0.430) (0.270) (0.270) 
capex_sales -0.0874*** -0.0874*** -0.341** -0.0840*** -0.0837*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.156) (0.0310) (0.0310) 
cross_list 0.101** 0.101** 0.0486 0.0952** 0.0932** 
 (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0602) (0.0392) (0.0393) 
dividend_paid -0.0271** -0.0271** -0.0358* -0.0267** -0.0261** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0197) (0.0118) (0.0119) 
Constant -0.0318 -0.0319 0.00945 -0.0230 -0.0298 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.329) (0.144) (0.146) 
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,108 1,904 1,904 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 
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 In a next set of regressions, which results are displayed in Table 34, I take a look at fur-
ther measures of board composition: in my first regression (1) I include bank_rep measuring 
the share of bank representatives on the board. While the effect is positive and thus in line 
with my expectations the variable does not have a significant impact on the 90% confidence-
level, but is with a p-value of 0.156 fairly close. Furthermore, size is once again significant 
and has, as observed in my first set of regressions, a negative effect on cash holdings (with 
almost similar magnitude). All other independent variables remain approximately the same 
from my observations in my first set of regressions. Similar results are obtained when consid-
ering the share of former managing board members (regression (2)): while the share does not 
have a significant effect all other explanatory variables show similar significance and direc-
tion as in (1).  
 Next, I analyze the effect of auditors on the board (regression (3)) and observe a nega-
tive effect, i.e., lower cash holdings are associated with the presence of an auditor on the 
board, supposedly due to more diligent monitoring by auditors; the addition of one further 
auditor on a 20 member board reduces the cash to sales ratio on average by 10.4%. This is in 
line with my hypothesis 2 as I expected lower cash levels with better monitoring (using audi-
tors as a proxy for good monitoring). I observe the same effect with lawyers (an addition in a 
20 member board reduces the cash to sales ratio on average by 12.7%), which show even a 
higher significance above the 99% confidence-level, in regression (4). In both regressions (3) 
and (4) no significant changes to the other independent variables can be observed.  
 The effect of female directors on cash holdings is analyzed in regressions (5) and (6): 
while I do not find an effect of female directors in general, I also observe no effect of female 
directors, which are employee representatives (i.e., union_female, works_female, ind_female); 
but I find a significant positive effect of female shareholder representatives. This is not in line 
with my hypothesis 2b but could be a sign that female directors from the shareholder side do 
have a longer term perspective and thus want to hedge risks by holding higher levels of cash; 
the addition of an additional female director from the shareholder side in a 20 member board 
increases the cash to sales by 10.6% on average. All other independent variables once again 
show the same effect as in previous regressions.  
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Finally, I evaluate the effect of all variables of board size and board composition in re-
gression (7): Once again, with the addition of the variables of employee representation board 
size is not significant anymore. The same holds for the share of auditors as well as female 
shareholder representatives. All variables of employee representation (union_rep, woco_rep, 
ind_rep) are significant and negative confirming my hypothesis 2a; in a 20 member board the 
addition of an additional union representative decreases the cash to sales ratio by 19.7% on 
average, respectively, an additional works council representative by 22.9%, an additional in-
dependent employee representative by 16.1%. The remaining independent variables show the 
same significance and direction as in previous regressions 
.  
Table 34: Fixed-effects regression of measures of cash holdings on measures of board 
size and board composition 
 
 Note: Models 1-7 of table 34 provide the results of fixed-effects regressions with a measure of cash hold-
ings cash_sales (defined as the ratio of cash and equivalents to sales) on measures of board size, board composi-
tion, and a set of control variables. All models include dummy variables for the year of observation. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respec-
tively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales 
                
lag_cash_sales 0.000182 0.000168 0.000164 0.000122 0.000158 0.000215 0.000247 
 (0.000695) (0.000695) (0.000694) (0.000691) (0.000695) (0.000696) (0.000692) 
Size -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.003 
 (0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00322) (0.00319) (0.00320) (0.00324) (0.00446) 
bank_rep 0.101      0.0798 
 (0.0705)      (0.0707) 
former_bm  -0.00420     -0.0555 
  (0.0817)     (0.0818) 
auditor   -0.208*    -0.172 
   (0.112)    (0.113) 
lawyer    -0.253***   -0.268*** 
    (0.0547)   (0.0553) 
female     0.0648   
     (0.0686)   
union_female      0.139 0.301 
      (0.237) (0.240) 
works_female      -0.154 0.00430 
      (0.188) (0.194) 
ind_female      -0.0579 -0.0434 
      (0.125) (0.127) 
shareholder_female      0.211** 0.127 
      (0.106) (0.107) 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales cash_sales 
union_rep       -0.393* 
       (0.201) 
woco_rep       -0.457*** 
       (0.147) 
ind_rep       -0.322*** 
       (0.122) 
log_assets 0.0246** 0.0239** 0.0233** 0.0264** 0.0242** 0.0247** 0.0278** 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
leverage -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0349) (0.0346) (0.0345) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0346) 
tobin_q 0.0102** 0.0102** 0.00997** 0.0119** 0.0100** 0.01000** 0.0111** 
 (0.00492) (0.00493) (0.00492) (0.00491) (0.00493) (0.00492) (0.00490) 
cash_flow_na -0.00226 -0.00231 -0.00228 -0.00288 -0.00226 -0.00221 -0.00255 
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00187) 
free_cf_stdev 5.95e-10 1.53e-10 -8.09e-10 -1.03e-09 1.80e-10 1.28e-10 2.97e-09 
 (1.41e-08) (1.41e-08) (1.41e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.41e-08) (1.41e-08) (1.40e-08) 
net_wc_na -0.0697** -0.0724** -0.0729** -0.0720** -0.0735** -0.0735** -0.0631** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0299) (0.0297) 
r_d_sales -0.259 -0.251 -0.241 -0.275 -0.249 -0.236 -0.244 
 (0.271) (0.271) (0.271) (0.270) (0.271) (0.271) (0.269) 
capex_sales -0.0871*** -0.0874*** -0.087*** -0.0649** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.0592* 
 (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0312) 
cross_list 0.100** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.0994** 0.0939** 
 (0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0393) (0.0391) (0.0394) (0.0395) (0.0391) 
dividend_paid -0.0267** -0.0271** -0.0278** -0.0268** -0.0270** -0.0283** -0.0268** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0118) 
Constant -0.0554 -0.0319 -0.0124 -0.0347 -0.0374 -0.0474 -0.0419 
 (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) 
        
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 
 
 To summarize, I am able to confirm my hypothesis 1 in all regressions besides the ones 
which include employee representation. I observe a negative effect of size on cash holdings, 
indicating that larger boards are better monitors when it comes to cash holdings. Furthermore, 
I am able to confirm my hypothesis 2a, as I see a negative impact of employee representation 
on cash holdings; this holds consistently for works council and independent employee repre-
sentatives. While I find a significant positive effect for female shareholder directors when 
only considering female representation, I am not able to confirm this result when considering 
all variables of board composition. Finally, I do not find evidence for significant effects of 
bank representatives and former board members even though I find significant negative ef-
fects on cash holdings for both auditors and lawyers.   
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7.7. Conclusion  
 My research using the, to date, most comprehensive dataset on German supervisory 
boards covers three areas of research with respect to cash and the influence of corporate gov-
ernance. More specifically, I consider the effect of board size and board composition on the 
level of cash holdings; I observe generally lower levels of cash with larger boards and also 
with employee representation on the board. Works council and independent employee repre-
sentatives mainly drive the positive effect of employee representation. This is opposite to pri-
or believes that employee representation leads to higher cash levels and thus less efficiency. I 
find the same positive effect with auditors and lawyers on the board. While I find no general 
effect of female directors, I observe that higher levels of cash are associated with female di-
rectors from the shareholder side. Considering these findings I am not able to provide support 
for current public policy initiatives in Germany aiming to reduce supervisory board size and 
employee representation on boards. I find that large boards and employee representation are 
not quite as efficient in keeping cash levels low as e.g., auditors and lawyers have but still 
show a positive effect. Further empirical work is required to shed more light in the area of 
cash and corporate governance and to validate my approach and results. Moreover, further 
research should be performed on the area of “internal governance mechanisms” (e.g., employ-
ee representation) and “external governance mechanisms” (e.g., the capital market) which 
would be especially interesting for the German market.  
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8. Summary and Implications 
 This thesis provides a detailed analysis on the effects of board size and composition of 
German supervisory boards in three important areas: first, firm performance, second, earnings 
management, and third, cash holdings. The aim to close the current research gap in German 
corporate governance research on supervisory boards has been achieved to a large extend; 
while partly conflicting, the results provide new insights and guidelines for the policy debate, 
academics, and ultimately board members. Additionally, an overview of the development of 
German supervisory boards in the recent years has been provided. Figure 9 provides an over-
view of the overall results of this thesis.  
Figure 9: Overview of results - the effect of board size and composition on various 
measures 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 As Figure 9 shows, the results of this thesis are mixed – with regards to operating per-
formance only works council representatives show a significant and negative effect. Regard-
Dependent variables
ROIC Tobin's Q Total returnROE
Earnings
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holding
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management
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Board size + – – – – –
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–
–
– – –
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a
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n/a n/a n/a n/a +++
▪ Auditor n/a n/a n/a n/a –
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n/a
n/a
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ing firm valuation, I find mixed effects when considering board size: while a larger board has 
a positive effect on the relative market valuation (measured by Tobin's Q), it has a negative 
effect on total shareholder return. Within the variables of board composition only independent 
employee representatives have a negative impact on Tobin's Q. When considering earnings 
management, I find that smaller boards are more efficient in controlling as they are associated 
with less earnings management. The same is true for female board directors; notably, this ef-
fect is mainly driven by independent female directors. Surprising as well is the negative effect 
of auditors on earnings management – i.e., more earnings management is observed when au-
ditors are on the board. Finally, when researching the effects of board size and board compo-
sition, I again find a positive effect of smaller boards – i.e., smaller board are associated with 
smaller cash holdings. I observe the same positive effect for works council representatives, 
independent employee representatives, auditors, and lawyers.  
 These results of my research suggest that no general or generic strategy regarding board 
size and board composition is advisable. This also confirms earlier research on German su-
pervisory boards that has yielded mixed results as well. But the results also show that the 
composition and size of the supervisory board should be diligently considered based on the 
current and future needs of the respective company; these needs could be manifold – from 
controlling to advising. This should be considered especially in the public policy debates, 
which often try to "fix" all problems by e.g., introducing quotas, etc.  
 Given the broad empirical basis of this research, further research should focus on more 
detailed characteristics of supervisory board members to shed further light on the composition 
of the "ideal" supervisory board. Things to be considered could be age of the members, educa-
tional background, personal and professional relationships with other supervisory and man-
agement board members. Another interesting expansion of this research would be the area of 
unlisted companies, which have a large share of the German economy; these companies are 
usually family-owned, of all sizes and usually monitored by supervisory boards as well.  
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Appendix  
Appendix Table 1: Comparison of winzorized values vs. non-winzorized values for de-
pendent variables and operating margin 
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Appendix Table 2: Fixed effects regressions of various performance measures on board 
size and composition 
 
 Note: This table includes all regressions with a regular fixed effects estimation (model (1)) and a clus-
tered fixed effects estimation (model (2)). Z values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical signifi-
cance at the  0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
   
  Tobin's Q Total return index ROE  ROIC  
 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
                  
size 0.0636** 0.0366** -15.41** -8.489** 131.8* 1.178 0.269 0.470 
 (0.0294) (0.0183) (7.504) (3.800) (72.53) (1.740) (0.488) (0.342) 
union_rep 2.090 0.933 -153.8 -48.57 3,102 54.33 -4.875 -8.540 
 (1.449) (0.901) (369.4) (187.1) (3,571) (85.65) (24.02) (16.82) 
woco_rep -0.775 -0.588 -0.400 7.357 -160.4 -71.50 -29.55 -25.85** 
 (1.127) (0.700) (287.4) (145.5) (2,777) (66.60) (18.68) (13.08) 
ind_rep -1.765* -1.138** 151.9 67.93 -1,953 -48.88 0.0563 -1.569 
 (0.909) (0.565) (231.9) (117.4) (2,241) (53.75) (15.07) (10.55) 
bank_rep -0.743 -0.386 126.2 62.14 -848.7 -19.24 7.584 3.579 
 (0.527) (0.327) (134.3) (67.99) (1,298) (31.13) (8.729) (6.111) 
former_bm -2.217*** -1.670*** 110.6 112.6 126.6 -79.44** -42.27*** -17.84** 
 (0.632) (0.393) (161.0) (81.55) (1,557) (37.33) (10.47) (7.330) 
experience 0.00243 -0.00463 1.742 1.468 12.18 0.188 0.0353 0.0339 
 (0.0135) (0.00837) (3.435) (1.739) (33.19) (0.796) (0.223) (0.156) 
log_ass -1.168*** -0.499*** 319.9*** 181.9*** -2,924*** 7.186* 4.891*** 3.175*** 
 (0.0647) (0.0402) (16.49) (8.351) (159.4) (3.823) (1.072) (0.751) 
sales 2.54e-08** 1.48e-08** -3.74e-06 -1.80e-06 4.22e-05* 4.36e-07 -2.31e-09 3.61e-08 
 (1.03e-08) (6.40e-09) (2.66e-06) (1.33e-06) (2.54e-05) (6.09e-07) (1.71e-07) (1.20e-07) 
ind_diversified -0.0904 -0.0492 35.22 10.81 -166.9 -8.615 -2.500* -1.211 
 (0.0903) (0.0561) (23.04) (11.66) (222.5) (5.336) (1.497) (1.048) 
geo_diversified -0.304** -0.177** 78.67** 14.44 -47.95 -10.56 -2.808 -1.774 
 (0.121) (0.0755) (30.96) (15.67) (299.2) (7.176) (2.013) (1.409) 
herfindahl -0.00132 -0.00137 -0.131 -0.210 -0.675 0.153 0.712*** 0.193*** 
 (0.00389) (0.00242) (0.991) (0.502) (9.583) (0.230) (0.0645) (0.0451) 
block_25 -0.171 -0.232*** -46.08* -14.84 86.03 -5.429 -1.746 -1.636 
 (0.106) (0.0659) (27.05) (13.69) (261.3) (6.267) (1.758) (1.231) 
block_50 0.0213 0.0608 7.147 2.297 -91.35 8.671 2.461 1.484 
 (0.116) (0.0723) (29.65) (15.02) (286.6) (6.875) (1.928) (1.350) 
block_75 -0.139 -0.0337 20.47 0.939 -262.4 8.119 -1.934 -0.421 
 (0.138) (0.0860) (35.26) (17.86) (340.8) (8.175) (2.293) (1.605) 
leverage 0.153 -0.199 -218.0*** -164.3*** 1,416** -76.27*** -11.90*** -13.71*** 
 (0.241) (0.150) (61.50) (31.14) (594.5) (14.26) (3.999) (2.799) 
capex_sales -0.00702 -0.00192 9.578 8.831** 6.393 -3.087 -0.834 -0.809** 
 (0.0348) (0.0216) (8.875) (4.494) (85.78) (2.058) (0.577) (0.404) 
op_mar_win 0.00160 -0.00114 -0.904*** -0.249* 18.28*** 1.073*** 0.249*** 0.243*** 
 (0.00116) (0.000724) (0.297) (0.150) (2.870) (0.0688) (0.0193) (0.0135) 
restruct -0.791** -0.558*** 76.20 23.46 -999.1 -34.97* 3.432 2.701 
 (0.334) (0.208) (85.12) (43.11) (822.8) (19.73) (5.535) (3.875) 
m_and_a 0.294 0.362** 67.50 49.84* -137.3 -17.06 0.917 0.670 
 (0.230) (0.143) (58.63) (29.69) (566.7) (13.59) (3.812) (2.669) 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued)        
  Tobin's Q Total return index ROE ROIC 
 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Non-
winzorized Winzorized 
Constant 17.48*** 8.507*** -3,973*** -2,153*** 38,680*** -70.07 -50.38*** -31.09*** 
 (0.896) (0.557) (228.4) (115.7) (2,208) (52.96) (14.85) (10.40) 
         
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,381 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 
R² 0.185 0.175 0.204 0.282 0.153 0.149 0.176 0.207 
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Appendix Table 3: Fixed effects regressions of various performance measures on board 
size and composition 
 Note: This table includes all regressions with a regular fixed effects estimation (model (1)) and a clus-
tered fixed effects estimation (model (2)). Z values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** imply statistical signifi-
cance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
        
  Tobin's Q Total return index ROE  ROIC  
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
                  
Size 0.0366** 0.0366 -8.489** -8.489 1.178 1.178 0.470 0.470 
 (0.0183) (0.0246) (3.800) (6.637) (1.740) (2.067) (0.342) (0.340) 
union_rep 0.933 0.933 -48.57 -48.57 54.33 54.33 -8.540 -8.540 
 (0.901) (1.270) (187.1) (209.0) (85.65) (86.26) (16.82) (15.47) 
woco_rep -0.588 -0.588 7.357 7.357 -71.50 -71.50 -25.85** -25.85* 
 (0.700) (0.807) (145.5) (108.8) (66.60) (53.93) (13.08) (13.86) 
ind_rep -1.138** -1.138 67.93 67.93 -48.88 -48.88 -1.569 -1.569 
 (0.565) (0.796) (117.4) (92.32) (53.75) (37.83) (10.55) (9.785) 
bank_rep -0.386 -0.386 62.14 62.14 -19.24 -19.24 3.579 3.579 
 (0.327) (0.591) (67.99) (73.64) (31.13) (38.95) (6.111) (11.40) 
former_bm -1.670*** -1.670* 112.6 112.6 -79.44** -79.44 -17.84** -17.84 
 (0.393) (0.990) (81.55) (106.1) (37.33) (57.17) (7.330) (12.77) 
Experience -0.00463 -0.00463 1.468 1.468 0.188 0.188 0.0339 0.0339 
 (0.00837) (0.00848) (1.739) (1.630) (0.796) (0.491) (0.156) (0.118) 
log_ass -0.499*** -0.499*** 181.9*** 181.9*** 7.186* 7.186 3.175*** 3.175 
 (0.0402) (0.125) (8.351) (49.45) (3.823) (8.753) (0.751) (1.951) 
Sales 1.48e-08** 1.48e-08*** -1.80e-06 -1.80e-06 4.36e-07 4.36e-07** 3.61e-08 3.61e-08 
 (6.40e-09) (5.16e-09) (1.33e-06) (1.46e-06) (6.09e-07) (2.21e-07) (1.20e-07) (5.25e-08) 
ind_diversified -0.0492 -0.0492 10.81 10.81 -8.615 -8.615 -1.211 -1.211 
 (0.0561) (0.0578) (11.66) (12.10) (5.336) (7.161) (1.048) (1.089) 
geo_diversified -0.177** -0.177 14.44 14.44 -10.56 -10.56* -1.774 -1.774 
 (0.0755) (0.143) (15.67) (22.75) (7.176) (5.415) (1.409) (1.694) 
Herfindahl -0.00137 -0.00137 -0.210 -0.210** 0.153 0.153 0.193*** 0.193 
 (0.00242) (0.00124) (0.502) (0.0840) (0.230) (0.111) (0.0451) (0.144) 
block_25 -0.232*** -0.232** -14.84 -14.84 -5.429 -5.429 -1.636 -1.636 
 (0.0659) (0.0923) (13.69) (18.42) (6.267) (7.732) (1.231) (1.052) 
block_50 0.0608 0.0608 2.297 2.297 8.671 8.671 1.484 1.484 
 (0.0723) (0.0758) (15.02) (17.76) (6.875) (8.381) (1.350) (1.369) 
block_75 -0.0337 -0.0337 0.939 0.939 8.119 8.119 -0.421 -0.421 
 (0.0860) (0.0909) (17.86) (16.83) (8.175) (8.771) (1.605) (1.837) 
leverage -0.199 -0.199 -164.3*** -164.3*** -76.27*** -76.27*** -13.71*** -13.71* 
 (0.150) (0.295) (31.14) (61.26) (14.26) (19.70) (2.799) (7.815) 
capex_sales -0.00192 -0.00192 8.831** 8.831 -3.087 -3.087*** -0.809** -0.809*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0247) (4.494) (7.881) (2.058) (0.941) (0.404) (0.190) 
op_mar_win -0.00114 -0.00114 -0.249* -0.249 1.073*** 1.073*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 
 (0.000724) (0.00269) (0.150) (0.288) (0.0688) (0.272) (0.0135) (0.0402) 
restruct -0.558*** -0.558** 23.46 23.46 -34.97* -34.97 2.701 2.701 
 (0.208) (0.243) (43.11) (29.37) (19.73) (54.74) (3.875) (7.974) 
m_and_a 0.362** 0.362** 49.84* 49.84*** -17.06 -17.06 0.670 0.670 
 (0.143) (0.140) (29.69) (16.34) (13.59) (18.51) (2.669) (2.436) 
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Appendix Table 3 (continued)        
  Tobin's Q Total return index ROE ROIC 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 8.507*** 8.507*** -2,153*** -2,153*** -70.07 -70.07 -31.09*** -31.09 
 (0.557) (1.625) (115.7) (642.6) (52.96) (123.2) (10.40) (24.27) 
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 
R² 0.175 0.175 0.282 0.282 0.149 0.149 0.207 0.207 
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Appendix Table 4: List of firms in dataset and years of inclusion 
 
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
A.S. CRÉATION TAPETEN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AAREAL BANK AG     1 1 1 1 1 1 
ADCAPITAL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ADIDAS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AGIV REAL ESTATE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1     
AHLERS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AIG INTERT. REAL ESTATE KGAA     1 1 1 1 1 1 
AIR BERLIN PLC         1 1 
ALLIANZ SE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALTA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AMADEUS FIRE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AMB GENERALI HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
APCOA PARKING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1     
ARCANDOR AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ARNDT AUTOVERMIETUNG   1 1 1      
ARQUES INDUSTRIES AG     1 1 1 1 1 1 
AUTANIA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
AVA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    
AWD HOLDING AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AXA KONZERN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
AXEL SPRINGER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AZEGO AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
B.U.S. UMWELT-SERVICE AG 1 1 1 1       
BAADER BANK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BABCOCK BORSIG AG 1 1 1 1 1      
BALDA AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BASF SE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BAUER AG         1 1 
BAUVEREIN ZU HAMBURG AG        1 1 1 
BAYER  AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BAYER SCHERING PHARMA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BAYER.HYPO- UND VEREINSBANK 
AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BAYWA AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BEATE UHSE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BEIERSDORF AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BERENTZEN-GRUPPE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BERU AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BEWAG AG 1 1 1 1 1      
BHF BANK AG 1 1 1 1 1      
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BHW AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BIEN-ZENKER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BIJOU BRIGITTE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BILFINGER BERGER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BIOTEST AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BMP AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BMW AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BÖWE SYSTEC AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BRAU UND BRUNNEN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1     
BRÜDER MANNESMANN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BUDERUS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1     
BURGBAD AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A.T. OIL AG         1 1 
CAPITAL STAGE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CARGOLIFTER AG   1 1       
CASH.LIFE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CEAG AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CELANESE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
CELESIO AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CENTROTEC SUSTAIBLE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CEWE COLOR HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CINEMAXX AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
COLONIA REAL ESTATE AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
COMDIRECT BANK AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
COMMERZBANK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CONCORD INVESTMENT BANK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CONDOMI AG  1 1 1 1 1     
CONTINENTAL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CREATON AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CTS EVENTIM AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CURANUM AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D.LOGISTICS AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D+S EUROPE AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DAB BANK AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DAIMLER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DATA MODUL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DBV WINTERTHUR AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEGUSSA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEMAG CRANES AG         1 1 
DEPFA DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEF 
BANK AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE BETEILIGUNGS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIE SERVICE 
AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE POST AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG       1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE STEINZEUG AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTSCHE WOHNEN AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DEUTZ AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DIC ASSET AG      1 1 1 1 1 
DOUGLAS HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DR. ING. HC. F. PORSCHE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DR.SCHELLER COSMETICS AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DRÄGERWERK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DRESDNER BANK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DSL HOLDING AG 1 1 1        
DÜRR AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DYCKERHOFF AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E.ON AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EADS N.V.   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EDSCHA AG  1 1 1 1 1     
EFF-EFF FRITZ FUSS GMBH & CO. 
KGAA 
1 1 1 1 1 1     
EHLEBRACHT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EICHBORN AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EINHELL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ELEXIS AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ELRINGKLINGER AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EM.TV AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EPCOS AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ESCADA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ESSANELLE HAIR GROUP AG    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EUROBIKE AG 1 1 1 1 1      
FAG KUGELFISCHER AG 1 1 1 1       
FIELMANN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FRAPORT AG    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FRESENIUS SE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FRITZ NOLS GLOBAL EQUITY 
SERVICES AG 
1 1 1 1 1      
FUCHS PETROLUB AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GAGFAH S.A.         1 1 
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GARDENA HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1      
GEA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1     
GEA GROUP AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GERATHERM MEDICAL AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GERICOM AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GERMAN BROKERS AG  1 1 1       
GERRESHEIMER GLAS AG 1 1 1 1 1      
GERRY WEBER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GESCO AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GFK AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GILDEMEISTER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GOLD ZACK AG 1 1 1 1       
GONTARD+METALLBANK AG  1 1 1       
GRAMMER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GRAPHIT KROPFMÜHL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GRENKELEASING AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H&R WASAG AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HACH AG 1 1 1        
HANNOVER RÜCKVERSICHERUNG 
AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HAWESKO HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HCI CAPITAL AG        1 1 1 
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HEIDELBERGER DRUCKMASCHI-
NEN AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HEINKEL AG  1 1 1 1 1     
HENKEL AG & CO. KGAA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HERLITZ AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HIGHLIGHT COMMUNICATIONS 
AG 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HOCHTIEF AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HOECHST AG 1 1 1 1 1 1     
HOLSTEN BRAUEREI AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
HORNBACH BAUMARKT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HORNBACH HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HUGO BOSS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HYMER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HYPO REAL ESTATE HOLDING AG      1 1 1 1 1 
IKB DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIEBANK 
AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IM INTERTIOLMEDIA AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
INDUS HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
INNOTEC TSS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
INTERHYP AG        1 1 1 
IVG AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JAXX AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JENOPTIK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JUNGHEINRICH AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K&M MÖBEL AG 1 1 1 1 1      
K+S AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KAMPA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KAMPS AG 1 1 1 1 1      
KÄSSBOHRER GELÄNDEFAHR-
ZEUG AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KAUFRING AG 1 1 1        
KIEKERT AG 1 1 1 1       
KLING JELKO WERTPAPIERHAN-
DELSBANK AG 
1 1 1 1       
KLÖCKNER & CO AG         1 1 
KLÖCKNER WERKE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KNORR CAPITAL PARTNER  1 1        
KÖHLER & KRENZER FASHION AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
KOLBENSCHMIDT PIERBURG AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
KÖNIG & BAUER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KRONES AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KSB AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KUKA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KWS SAAT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LAHMEYER AG 1 1         
LANDESBANK BERLIN HOLDING 
AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LANXESS AG        1 1 1 
LEIFHEIT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LEONI AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LINDE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LOEWE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LOGWIN AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LUDWIG BECK AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M.A.X. AUTOMATION AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MAN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MANNESMANN AG 1 1 1 1       
MANNHEIMER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MARSEILLE-KLINIKEN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MASTERFLEX AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MATERNUS KLINIKEN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MEDICLIN AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MEDION AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
German Supervisory Board Size and Composition 
 
Andreas Bermig   Page XVII
Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
MEDISA AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MERCK KGAA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
METRO AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MISTRAL MEDIA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MLP AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MOEBEL WALTHER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MPC MÜNCHMEYER PE-
TERS.CAP.AG 
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MTU AERO ENGINES AG        1 1 1 
MÜNCHENER RÜCKVERSICHER-
UNGS-GES. AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MVV ENERGIE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MWB WERTPAPIERHANDELSBANK 
AG 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NESCHEN AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NORDDEUTSCHE AFFINERIE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NÜRNBERGER BETEILIGUNGS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OLYMPIA FLEXGROUP AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PA POWER AUTOMATION 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PATRIZIA IMMOBILIEN AG         1 1 
PFLEIDERER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PHILIPP HOLZMANN AG 1 1 1 1       
PHOENIX AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    
PLETTAC AG 1 1 1 1       
PONGS & ZAHN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PORTA SYSTEMS AG 1 1 1 1       
PRAKTIKER AG        1 1 1 
PREMIERE AG        1 1 1 
PROCON MULTIMEDIA AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PROGRESS-WERK OBERKIRCH AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PROSIEBENSAT1 AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PUMA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
QUANTE AG 1 1 1 1       
R. STAHL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RATIOL AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RHEINMETALL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RHÖN-KLINIKUM AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RINOL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
ROHWEDDER AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RSE GRUNDBESITZ- UND BETEILI-
GUNGS AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWE AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SACORP PHARMAHOLDING AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SALZGITTER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
SAP AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SARTORIUS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SCHLOTT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SCHMALBACH-LUBECA AG 1 1 1 1       
SCHNIGGE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SCHULER AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SCHWARZ PHARMA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SG HOLDING AG 1 1 1        
SGL CARBON AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SIEMENS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SIXT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SKW TROSTBERG AG 1 1         
SM WIRTSCHAFTSBERATUNG AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SOFTWARE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SPAR HANDELS-AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
STINNES AG  1 1 1 1      
STO AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
STRATEC BIOMEDICAL SYSTEMS 
AG 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SÜDZUCKER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SURTECO SE  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SYMRISE AG         1 1 
TA TRIUMPH-ADLER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TAG IMMOBILIEN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TAKKT AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TARKETT AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    
TECHEM AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TECIS HOLDING AG 1 1 1 1       
TELEPLAN N.V. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TFG CAPITAL AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
THIELERT AG        1 1  
THYSSENKRUPP AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TRIPLAN AG    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TUI AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TURBON AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UZIN UTZ AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VARTA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VCL FILM + MEDIEN AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VEBA AG 1 1         
VIAG AG 1 1         
VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG 1 1 1 1 1      
VILLEROY & BOCH AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VIVA MEDIA AG   1 1 1 1     
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Appendix Table 4 (continued)           
FIRM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VIVACON AG    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VIVANCO GRUPPE AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VOGT ELECTRONIC AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VOLKSWAGEN AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VOSSLOH AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VTG-LEHNKERING AG 1 1 1 1 1      
W.E.T. AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WACKER CHEMIE AG         1 1 
WALTER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    
WASHTEC AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WCM BETEIL.U.GRUNDBESITZ AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    
WEDECO AG  1 1 1 1 1     
WELLA AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
WIGE MEDIA AG   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WINCOR NIXDORF AG       1 1 1 1 
WINKLER + DÜNNEBIER AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WMF AG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WÜNSCHE AG 1 1 1        
ZAPF CREATION AG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
